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HALL v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1957-10-11No. 19846
213 Ga. 557

Summary

Holding. The judgment was affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hall's continuance motion, did not err in admitting the defendant's incriminating statements as voluntary, did not err in allowing photographs and physical evidence to be admitted and taken to the jury, and did not err in its handling of the solicitor's statements or the clarifying cross-examination question.

Hall was tried for murder committed during a robbery alongside two co-defendants. His court-appointed counsel received the assignment on Monday, tried the other defendants Wednesday and Thursday, and Hall's trial began Friday. Hall moved for a continuance but provided no specific information about what investigation or preparation was needed—merely requesting additional time. The trial court denied this motion, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in doing so given the compressed timeline and lack of particularized need.

Hall also challenged several evidentiary and procedural rulings. A witness testified that Hall made incriminating statements freely, without threats, coercion, promises, or abuse, and after being advised of his right to counsel. The court admitted photographs of the victim's body and the murder weapons (an ax and wooden bar), which evidence connected Hall and his co-conspirators to the killing. During cross-examination, the solicitor asked a clarifying question that defense counsel objected to; the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard it. Hall also objected to the solicitor making factual arguments from counsel table rather than from the witness stand, but the court found no reversible error in any of these rulings.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether denial of a continuance motion lacking specific factual support constitutes abuse of discretion
  • Whether statements allegedly made by defendant were voluntary and admissible despite no explicit threat or coercion
  • Whether photographs of victim and murder weapons were properly admitted
  • Whether trial court properly instructed jury to disregard potentially prejudicial cross-examination question

Procedural posture

Hall sought review of his murder conviction by way of appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for continuance, his motion for mistrial, and his motion for new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

1. Where, on motion for continuance, it appeared that counsel were appointed on Monday to represent this defendant as well as two others, all indicted for the murder of the same man while in the commission of a robbery, and they tried the other defendants on Wednesday and Thursday, and the present case was called for trial on Friday, and the motion indicated no information or investigation which the movant desired, but he merely sought more time, we can not hold that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55 (2) (52 S. E. 2d 294); Blackston v. State, 209 Ga. 160 (2) (71 S. E. 2d 221); Starr v. State, 209 Ga. 258 (1) (71 S. E. 2d 654); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1a) (83 S. E. 2d 610); Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327 (1) (85 S. E. 2d 770); Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231 (1) (91 S. E. 2d 764).

2. Where a witness, wlm testified to incriminating statements made to him by the accused, testified that he did not threaten the accused, and the accused was not coerced by anyone, that the accused was not promised anything, that he was not abused and was advised that he might have legal counsel, it was not error to overrule an objection upon the ground that the statements were not shown to be free and voluntary. Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770 (1) (48 S. E. 2d 522); Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 207 (3) (78 S. E. 2d 521).

3. Where a witness had said in response to questions by counsel for the defendant that there was no evidence on the trial that the defendant wielded an ax or a bar, it was not ground for a mistrial when the solicitor asked the same witness if he was not referring only to this defendant’s statement when he said they did not hit with the bar, and the court instructed the jury not to consider the question asked by the solicitor and to erase it from their minds. Waller v. State, 164 Ga. 128 (138 S. E. 67); Nelson v. State, 187 Ga. 576 (1 S. E. 2d 641); Johnson v. State, 196 Ga. 358 (26 S. E. 2d 600); Tye v. State, 198 Ga. 262 (31 S. E. 2d 471).

Argued September 11, 1957

Decided October 11, 1957.

Lewis ■& Rozier, Dickens & Dickens, for plaintiff in error.

George D. Lawrence, Solicitor-General, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Ruhye G. Jackson, contra.

4. Where the solicitor stated “in his place” certain facts, and said he could not get on the stand and testify, and defense counsel replied that no law barred him from testifying, whereupon he replied that, “if they want to put me up there, I will explain,” cause for a mistrial was not shown, and it was not error to deny the motion therefor.

5. It was not error to admit in evidence over objection photographs of the body of the deceased, an ax, and a wooden bar which some of the evidence showed were used in the slaying by this accused and his coconspirators to rob. Bryan v. State, 206 Ga. 73, 74 (55 S. E. 2d 574); Davidson v. State, 208 Ga. 834 (4) (69 S. E. 2d 757); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. 333 (72 S. E. 2d 291); Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 207 (4), supra; Jones v. State, 210 Ga. 94 (3) (78 S. E. 2d 18).

6. Nor was it error to allow the articles referred to in headnote 5 to go out with the jury. The jury is entitled to have out with it all evidence introduced. Davis v. State, 91 Ga. 167 (17 S. E. 292); Adams v. State, 93 Ga. 166 (18 S. E. 553); Edwards v. State, ante.

7. The evidence supports the verdict; and, no error of law appearing in the special grounds, the court did not err in denying the amended motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.