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BUDGET CHARGE ACCOUNTS, INC. v. PETERS et al.; and vice versa

Supreme Court of Georgia1957-02-11No. 19574, 19575
213 Ga. 17

Summary

Holding. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer because the petition failed to state a valid cause of action, consisting only of conclusory allegations unsupported by sufficient factual allegations of fraud, collusion, or other defects in the security deed. The judgment is reversed.

Property owners sought to enjoin the sale of their real estate under a power of sale contained in a security deed, claiming the transaction involved collusion, conspiracy, fraud, usury, and failure of consideration. They also sought cancellation of the deed and damages. The trial court initially granted a temporary restraining order and later a temporary injunction, overruling the lender's demurrer to the petition.

The appellate court reversed, finding that the owners' petition failed to state any valid cause of action. The court determined that bare legal conclusions of fraud and conspiracy without supporting factual allegations do not constitute sufficient pleading. The petition's claims that the owners were tricked into signing—based only on allegations that an agent was hurrying to catch a plane and that the deed was assigned the same day it was executed—were legally insufficient to excuse the owners from their obligation to read the documents they signed. Similarly, the petition's assertion that improper witnessing by a lender's agent invalidated the deed was rejected, as an unattested deed remains valid between the grantor and his heirs.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether conclusory allegations of fraud and conspiracy without factual support state a valid cause of action
  • Whether allegations that parties signed documents without reading them constitute fraud when the signatories had capacity and opportunity to read
  • Whether improper witnessing by a lender's agent voids a security deed
  • Whether the timing of deed assignment and receipt of payment coupons establishes collusion or conspiracy

Procedural posture

The owners appealed the trial court's order overruling a general demurrer and granting a temporary injunction restraining the foreclosure sale.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

This is an action brought by the owner and his wife to restrain the sale of real property, being advertised under a power of sale contained in a deed to secure debt by the assignee of the grantee in the deed, for cancellation of said deed and damages, alleging collusion, conspiracy to defraud, usury, and failure of consideration. The defendants named in the suit are the grantee and assignee. The defendant assignor-grantee was not served in the lower court, but a temporary restraining order was granted stopping the sale pending a hearing. The court overruled a general demur rer filed by the assignee, refused to grant a motion to declare the loan deed null and void as a matter of law — which is the question of error raised in the cross-bill of exceptions; and, after an interlocutory hearing, granted a temporary injunction and continued in force the previous restraining order. The exceptions here are to these judgments. Held:

1. A defendant who was not served with process, did not appear in the lower court, and did not otherwise waive service, need not be made a party to a bill of exceptions. Wyche v. Greene, 16 Ga. 47; Hines v. McLellan, 117 Ga. 845 (45 S. E. 279); Clay v. Smith, 208 Ga. 423 (67 S. E. 2d 235). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied, since the defendant who was not served or named in the bill of exceptions is not an interested party.

2. No cause of action is stated in a petition which states mere legal conclusions of conspiracy, collusion and fraud with no facts alleged upon which to base them except general and loose allegations consisting of statements without facts upon which the conclusions are based. Green v. Spears, 181 Ga. 486 (182 S. E. 913); Fowler v. Southern Airlines, 192 Ga. 845 (16 S. E. 2d 897).

3. The allegations of the petition for injunction, cancellation, and damages, claiming collusion, conspiracy, fraud, usury, and failure of consideration, and claiming that the loan deed containing the power of sale under which the defendant is advertising the property for sale is illegal, null and void, since the petitioners’ signatures were obtained by trickery and fraud, fails to allege a cause of action for the relief sought, since the allegations are totally insufficient to show any trick or fraud which would excuse the petitioners — having the capacity and opportunity to read the instruments — who signed them not under any emergency. See Truitt-Silvey Hat Co. v. Callaway & Truitt, 130 Ga. 637 (61 S. E. 481); Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596 (6 S. E. 2d 788); West v. Carolina Housing & Mortgage Corp., 211 Ga. 789 (89 S. E. 2d 188). The mere allegation that the agent of the defendant grantee was in a hurry to catch a plane to his home office is totally insufficient to allege an emergency excusing the petitioners from reading the instruments. Nor is there any fiduciary relationship alleged between the parties. And the allegation of usury fails to meet the requirements of Code § 81-901. The allegation that the security deed was transferred and assigned on the same day it was executed by an agent of the grantee, and thereafter the petitioners received a coupon book from the assignee for payment of his account with the grantee, fails to allege collusion or conspiracy to defraud the petitioners.

Submitted January 14, 1957

Decided February 11, 1957.

Robert L. Cork, for plaintiff in error.

Jesse T. Edwards, contra.

4. The allegation that the deed was improperly witnessed by an agent of the lender as notary public is insufficient to void the deed to secure debt, since a deed without attestation conveys the title as against the grantor and his heirs. See Downs v. Yonge, 17 Ga. 295; Gardner, Dexter & Co. v. Moore; 51 Ga. 268; Marable v. Mayer, Son & Co., 78 Ga. 60; Howard v. Russell, 104 Ga. 230 (30 S. E. 802); Hoover v. Mobley, 198 Ga. 68 (31 S. E. 2d 9).

5. Since the petition was subject to the general demurrer, the court erred in overruling it. This renders all subsequent proceedings nugatory, and no ruling is necessary on the other exceptions.

Judgment reversed on the main bill; cross-bill dismissed.

All the Justices concur.