SELMA ROSVALL v. CITY OF DULUTH

Minnesota Supreme Court1929-04-12No. No. 27,315

177 Minn. 197

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the industrial commission's denial of workers' compensation, holding that the employee's death did not arise out of or occur in the course of his employment because the injury happened while he was traveling to work before his shift began, outside the hours and premises of active employment.

Selma Rosvall sought workers' compensation benefits following the death of her husband, Carl Rosvall, a city employee who died from a heart rupture while controlling his team of horses on the morning of March 8, 1928. The accident occurred as Rosvall was traveling with a dump cart belonging to the City of Duluth toward his work site. Although the causal connection between the accident and death was undisputed, the industrial commission denied the claim, and the central legal question became whether the fatal injury arose out of or occurred in the course of his employment.

The court examined the statutory definition of compensable workplace injuries, which limited coverage to workers injured while engaged in or at the premises where services were performed, or where their presence was required as part of their duties. The court concluded that Rosvall's injury did not satisfy this requirement. At the time of the accident, Rosvall was en route to work before official working hours began, traveling on his own initiative rather than under a requirement imposed by the employer. The fact that he was using a city-owned cart did not change this analysis, particularly since the court found no evidence that the city required him to transport the cart or to maintain it at his home. The court distinguished scenarios where the outcome might differ, such as if the employer had specifically dispatched him to retrieve the wagon or if he maintained it as part of his formal job duties.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a workplace injury occurs 'in the course of employment' when the worker is traveling to the work site before the shift begins
The significance of the employee using an employer-owned vehicle versus a personal vehicle
Whether transporting an employer's equipment constitutes employer-furnished transportation under the statute

Procedural posture

The case came before the court on a petition for certiorari to review an order of the industrial commission denying workers' compensation benefits.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Dibell, J.

Certiorari on the relation of Selma Rosvall to review the order of the industrial commission denying compensation for the death of Carl J. Rosvall, an employe of the city of Duluth, the husband of Selma Rosvall.

Rosvall was employed with his team by the city in work on the streets. On March 8, 1928, when on his way with his team and a dump cart belonging to the city to his place of work his horses became fractious, and in his efforts to control them he sustained a strain which resulted in a rupture of the heart causing his death within a few minutes. There is no question as to the relation of cause and effect between the accident and the death. The only question is whether the death arose out of or in the course of his employment.

Rosvall had been working for the city many years. He furnished a team. His employment at this particular time was intermittent. The. meeting place in the morning was at the tool-house at Fourteenth avenue west and Superior street and the time was eight o’clock. The men worked eight hours; and Rosvall, when the quitting time came, left his work, wherever he might be, and drove home without reporting at the meeting place. He had a wagon of his own which he sometimes used. He sometimes used a dump cart of the city, as he was doing on the morning when he met his death. He kept the dump cart on his own premises. He did not give it shelter or storage or care but left it in his yard as a matter of convenience.

G-. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 4326(j), is as follows:

“Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause ‘personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.’ It is hereby declared:

“Not to cover workmen except while engaged in, on, or about the premises where their services are being performed, or where their services requires their presence as a part of such service, at the time of the injury, and during the hours of service as such workmen; provided, that where the employer regularly furnishes transportation to his employes to or from the place of employment, such employes shall be held to be subject to this act while being so transported, but shall not include an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employe intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe, or because of his employment.”

We are compelled to the conclusion that the finding of the commission that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of Rosvall’s employment is sustained.

The first part of the section quoted excludes such a case by positive language. It was so held in Jotich v. Village of Chisholm, 169 Minn. 429, 211 N. W. 579, under very similar facts. The claim of the relator necessarily is based upon the fact that Rosvall was using the city’s wagon. If he had taken his own and the same accident resulted there would be no serious claim. There is nothing in the fact that the wagon belonged to the city requiring a finding different from that of the commission. It is not found that Rosvall was required to bring the city’s wagon to the tool-house though concededly he was in the rightful use of it. As a matter of convenience he took the wagon home when he quit work for the day, not returning to the tool-hoüse, which was the meeting place mornings. If he had been sent for the wagon and had been injured when returning with it, or if he had kept the wagon at his home and stored and cared for it there as a part of his service to the city, a different finding might be suggested.

The proviso in the statute quoted with reference to the furnishing of transportation we think without force. This proviso came intd the statute by L. 1923, p. 398, c. 300. It may be conceded that it was enacted because of Nesbitt v. Twin City F. & F. Co. 145 Minn. 286, 177 N. W. 131, 10 A. L. R. 165, and that it permits compensation in such a case as that. We think that in no proper sense was the city furnishing transportation within the meaning of the statute.

In 38 A. L. R. 1041, and 48 A. L. R. 1400, the cases are collected and the briefs of counsel consider all of them. Nothing would be gained by a prolonged discussion of them here.

Order affirmed.