C. D. Adair, admr of John R. McDonald, plaintiff in error, vs. John Adair, Exr of Edward Adair et al., defendants in error

Supreme Court of Georgia1868-06

38 Ga. 46

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed because the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the testator's statements made after the deed transferred title, as such declarations are prohibited by statute and were used to defeat the grantee's rights.

The executor and legatees of Edward Adair sought to reform a deed that Adair had executed to John R. McDonald, claiming the written document did not reflect Adair's true intent. At trial, the court allowed testimony regarding statements Adair made after the deed was executed and outside McDonald's presence, allegedly showing what Adair actually intended. The plaintiff challenged this evidentiary ruling on appeal.

The court held that this testimony was inadmissible under the applicable statute, which prohibits the use of statements made by someone after title has passed out of their hands. Because Adair's title had already transferred to McDonald through the deed, his subsequent statements—made without McDonald present and some made after McDonald's death—could not be used to defeat McDonald's title. The court acknowledged that courts of equity do have authority to reform written agreements when there is clear and convincing proof of mistake, fraud, or accident, but such evidence must be strong, unequivocal, and decisive rather than equivocal or uncertain.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of declarations made by a grantor after title has passed
Standards for reformation of written instruments in equity
Sufficiency and character of evidence required to prove mistake in deeds

Procedural posture

The case was appealed to the supreme court following a trial court decision that permitted certain testimony and apparently ruled in favor of the reformation claim.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Walker, J.

This was a bill filed by the executor and legatees of Edward Adair, to reform a deed made by testator, to John R. McDonald. During the trial, the Court permitted the sayings of Edward Adair, made after the execution of the deed, and in the absence of the grantee, to be proved on the part of the complainants, for the purpose of showing that the deed, as written, did not speak the intention of the maker. The admission of this testimony was objected to, and assigned as error in this Court. Section 3735 of Rev. Code says, “Declarations of privies in estate, after the title has passed out of them, cannot be received.” This is conclusive in this case. It is admitted by both sides, that the title passed out of the testator, and his sayings, made after the deed, were proved to defeat the title of John E. McDonald, the grantee named in the deed. These sayings were madejn the absence of John B. McDonald, and .some of them after his death. This testimony was inadmissible, and on this ground, we reverse the judgment of the Court below.

As there is to be a new trial, it would be improper to pass upon the question as to the weight of the evidence.

Some of the questions growing out of the charge of the Court, and the requests to charge, are interesting, but perhaps it is not necessary to pass upon them seriatim now.

In Admr. of Ligon vs. Rogers, 12 Ga. R., 255, the Court says, “That a court of equity has jurisdiction to correct mistakes in written contracts, has been solemnly adjudicated by this Court. It is a jurisdiction, however, which will always be cautiously exercised.” Again, in the same case, on page 288, the Court says that the written evidence of the intention of the parties must prevail, unless the party can show, “by clear proof, and satisfactory evidence, that either by accident, fraud or mistake, the written instrument does not ■contain and express what the parties intended it should corntain and express, at the time of its execution.” In Shellburne vs. Inchinquin, (1 Brown’s Ch. 347,) Lord Thurlowsaid the evidence must be strong, irrefragable evidence. By this, we understand that evidence offered to establish the mistake must not be equivocal, uncertain, contradictory, or doubtful in its character. The evidence to show a mistake in a written instrument, must be clear and strong, so as to establish the mistake to the entire satisfaction of the court. Gillespie vs. Moon, 2 J. C. R., 585.” Again, in Wyche vs. Green, 16 Ga. R., 61, this Court says, “In every case, under this head of the law, the only question is, does the instrument contain what the parties intended it should, and understood that it did ? Is it their agreement? If not, then it may be reformed by aliunde proof, so as to make it the evidence of what was the true bargain, or contract between the parties.” A court of equity will relieve from the consequences of mistake in written contracts, but the power is exercised with caution, and to justify it, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal and decisive, as to the mistake. Rev. Code, sec. 3062. Such is the language of our law in relation to the power of the Court of Equity to reform written instruments, and the rules by which it will be governed in the exercise of this jurisdiction.

Judgment reversed.