BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
An indictment was returned in the Southern District of Texas against Osear E. Voigt and others, charging a conspiracy to smuggle intoxicating liquor into the United States. Voigt was arrested in the Eastern District of Texas, and held by order of a United States commissioner for removal pursuant to 18 USCA § 591. On his application, the judge for the Eastern District issued a writ of habeas corpus and released him on bail pending a hearing. Before the arrival of the date set for the hearing, and while he was temporarily in San Antonio, in the Western District, two United States customs officers, acting without warrant for his arrest, seized him and forcibly brought him back into the Southern District where they placed him in jail, and then procured a capias under which he was held for trial on the indictment. He then sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District claiming the right to return to the Eastern District, and insisting that until the court of that district should order his removal the court for the Southern District could not acquire jurisdiction over his person. From an order discharging the second writ of habeas corpus and remanding him to custody for trial, Voigt has taken this appeal.
The District Court for the Southern District acquired jurisdiction over the person of appellant by reason of the service of process upon him within that district. It is well settled in the courts of the United States that jurisdiction once acquired in a criminal case is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought before the court. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 1211, 32 L. Ed. 283; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 13 S. Ct. 40, 36 L. Ed. 934; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 212, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 L. Ed. 148, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047. See, also, Ex parte Lamar (C. C. A.) 274 F. 160. In Mahon v. Justice, supra, upon a review of the authorities the Supreme Court said that the decisions all proceed upon the theory “that the offender against the law of the state is not relieved from liability because of personal injuries received from private parties, or because of indignities committed against another state”; and then added : “It would indeed be a strange conclusion if a party charged with a criminal offense could be excused from answering to the government whose laws he had violated because other parties had done violence to him, and also committed an offense against the laws of another state.” In that ease a distinction is taken between civil and criminal eases. In the former the party who is guilty of fraud or violence in bringing a defendant within the jurisdiction cannot invoke the aid of the court; whereas in a criminal case wrong will not be imputed to tbe sovereign. Tbe eases above cited, it is true, had to do with jurisdiction as between states; but in Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 17 S. Ct. 735, 42 L. Ed. 103, where the question was which of two district courts of the United States had jurisdiction, the same doctrine was announced and applied. In Ker v. Illinois, supra, it is recognized that, while in the trial of a criminal ease the court will not stop to inquire whether the rights of the accused were violated in securing his presence for trial, yet the accused may have his remedy against his abductors or kidnapers by a civil suit for false imprisonment. And of course officers who violate the criminal law by abducting or kidnaping even individuals charged with crime are not immune from prosecution and punishment.
The order appealed from is affirmed.