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H. Emma Riley vs. Bradshaw S. Tolman

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1902-05-20
181 Mass. 335

Summary

Holding. The trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant because the evidence failed to establish that the property was moved to premises belonging to or occupied by the plaintiff. The exceptions to the trial court's evidentiary rulings were overruled.

A deputy sheriff attached personal property of the plaintiff on two separate writs issued in favor of creditors. After receiving notice to remove the property, the defendant moved it to barns belonging to the creditors rather than to premises controlled by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued, but the evidence showed that the barns where the property was placed were neither owned nor occupied by the plaintiff, and there was no indication that she had any right to possess them. The court found the evidence insufficient to support the plaintiff's claims and upheld the trial judge's decision to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.

The court also addressed evidentiary matters. Receipts the plaintiff offered showing her payment for some of the property were properly excluded as immaterial since her ownership of those items was not contested. Cross-examination questions suggesting prior inconsistent testimony by the plaintiff's husband were properly admitted as admissible impeachment evidence, though the court noted the case had been removed from jury consideration.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether property attached on mesne process was properly removed to a place of safe keeping
  • Whether the plaintiff had a legal interest in the premises where the property was moved
  • Admissibility of receipts and impeachment evidence in attachment proceedings

Procedural posture

The plaintiff appealed from a directed verdict entered by the trial judge in favor of the defendant deputy sheriff.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lathrop, J.

The defendant, a deputy sheriff, attached on mesne process certain personal property of the plaintiff on two writs, one in favor of Joseph L. Harding and the other in favor of John R. Farnum, and appointed a keeper of the property. Thé attachment on the first writ was made on December 12,

1899, and that on the second writ on December 16, 1899. The day before the last attachment, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to remove the keeper and the property without delay, in accordance with the Pub. Sts. c. 161, §§ 42, 43. Subsequently the defendant moved the property, and the plaintiff admitted at the trial that there was no unreasonable delay in moving it, if it was moved at all.

The contention of the plaintiff was that the property was moved simply from one part of her premises to another. The return of the defendant sets forth the receipt of the notice, and proceeds as follows: “ and on December 16th in accordance with said notice, I removed said property to a place of safe keeping, and hold the same to respond to the judgment of this suit.” This was at least prima facie evidence of the fact of removal. Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487, 513. Bruce v. Holden, 21 Pick. 187, 189. Lothrop v. Ide, 13 Gray, 93. Whithead v. Keyes, 3 Allen, 495, 498. McGough v. Wellington, 6 Allen, 505.

The defendant, who was called as a witness by the plaintiff, testified that he received the notice late in the evening of December 15, and moved the hay, the cattle, the pung, the harnesses and the straw into Harding’s barn, and the rest of the goods to Farnum’s. place; and that he sold them all on May 18, 1900. He also testified that the barn belonging to Harding was on the Lowell Grove farm; that this farm belonged to one Bigelow, as trustee, and was in charge of one Viles; that Harding had the occupation of the barn ; and that Harding was not living on the farm at this time, but had some of his property in this barn, though nothing of any great value.

The plaintiff did not testify as a witness, and the only other witness on this point was the plaintiff’s husband, who testified that he hired the Lowell Grove farm from Harding, and managed the milk business for his wife there, and that the barn to .which some of the property was removed, was on the premises hired by him.

On this evidence the judge rightly ruled that the action could not be maintained. There was no evidence that the Harding barn was on premises belonging to, or hired by, the plaintiff. Nor was there any evidence that she occupied it.

Some questions of evidence remain to be considered. The plaintiff offered in evidence two receipts from Harding to her for money paid for some of the attached property. These were excluded, and the plaintiff excepted. We need not consider whether under other circumstances than existed in this case they would have been admissible, (see McAvoy v. Wright, 137 Mass. 207, 209; Brooks v. Duggan, 149 Mass. 304, and Silverstein v. OBrien, 165 Mass. 512,) because her title to the property covered by the receipts was not in dispute. The receipts were entirely immaterial.

The plaintiff’s husband was asked some questions on cross-examination for the purpose of showing that a few days before, in the trial of another case, he had testified contrary to the testimony which he gave on direct examination in the present case. So far as the questions put and the answers given tended to contradict him they were clearly admissible. Allin v. Whittemore, 171 Mass. 259. Whether the cross-examination went further than this is immaterial, as the case was taken from the jury, and we have assumed, in deciding the principal question in the case, that his testimony on direct examination was true.

Bxcejotions overruled.

See ante, 334.