Commonwealth vs. A Juvenile

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1973-05-14

363 Mass. 640

Summary · law.co

Holding. The order dismissing the indictments is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to remand to juvenile court so that the defendant may receive a proper hearing on the question of whether he should be tried as an adult, with appropriate procedures including separate proceedings on dismissal and a continuance if requested.

A sixteen-year-old was charged in juvenile court with armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. At a single hearing on the merits, the judge dismissed the juvenile complaints and ordered the defendant tried as an adult, but provided no written statement of reasons as required by court rules. The defendant's counsel, who was not specifically noticed that dismissal would be addressed at that hearing, requested a one-week continuance to prepare on the dismissal issue; the judge denied this request. The defendant was then bound over to Superior Court, indicted, and moved to dismiss the indictments, which motion was granted.

On appeal by the Commonwealth, the court did not address constitutional concerns but held that proper administration of justice required the defendant receive another opportunity in juvenile court to argue against adult treatment. The court found that while the statute itself may have warned of the possibility that dismissal could be considered at a single hearing, counsel's prompt objection and reasonable request for continuance warranted a second chance. The court noted that the statutory scheme contemplated juvenile court as the preferred forum for the initial adult-treatment determination.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a juvenile court judge must provide written reasons for ordering a child tried as an adult
Whether counsel must receive prior notice that dismissal will be addressed at the merits hearing
Whether the juvenile court or Superior Court is the proper forum for the initial determination of adult treatment
Whether denial of a continuance request to prepare on the dismissal issue violated proper procedure

Procedural posture

The Commonwealth appealed from a Superior Court order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss indictments that resulted from a juvenile court judge's decision to dismiss juvenile complaints and try the defendant as an adult.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Kaplan, J.

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth under G. L. c. 278, § 28E, from the allowance by the Superior Court of the defendant’s motion to dismiss indictments returned against him by the grand jury for Suffolk County.

On dates in August and September, 1972, complaints were issued by the Municipal Court of the Dorchester District (the juvenile court) against the defendant, then sixteen years old, charging him with being a delinquent child by reason of acts of armed robbery and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The defendant was arrested on a warrant and was arraigned and pleaded not delinquent to each of the complaints.

On October 10, 1972, the juvenile court held a hearing on the complaints. The defendant was represented by counsel. After hearing the merits, the judge dismissed the juvenile complaints and ordered that the defendant be proceeded against as an adult (see G. L. c. 119, §§ 61, 74). The judge found, following the terms of the statute (§ 61), that “the interest of the Public requires that . . . [the defendant] shall be tried for the said offence,” but this finding was not supported by a statement in writing of “the reasons or considerations” therefor as prescribed by Rule 85 of the Rules of the District Courts (1965). The defendant’s counsel objected that he had not received prior notice that the subject of dismissal would be taken up in conjunction with the hearing on the merits, and requested a continuance of one week so that he might prepare on the issue of. dismissal. The judge denied counsel’s request, and counsel excepted.

On the same day, October 10, 1972, corresponding criminal complaints were issued against the defendant. The same judge, over objection and exception, held a probable cause hearing and bound the defendant over to the Superior Court for proceedings by the grand jury, which eventuated on October 12, 1972, in indictments for armed robbery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.

The defendant moved in the Superior Court to dismiss the indictments. In allowing the motion, the judge held that, taken as a whole, the course of proceedings in the juvenile court — the claimed lack of notice, the refusal to grant the continuance, and the blanket findings as to the “interest of the Public” without supporting reasons or considerations under a statute laying down no further standards — deprived the defendant of due process of law.

On this appeal we do not reach any constitutional issue. Rather we hold, on the facts of the particular case, that the “proper administration of criminal justice” (see Commonwealth v. Martin, 355 Mass. 296, 301) requires that the defendant be now afforded an opportunity in the juvenile court to establish that he should be treated as a child rather than as an adult.

In our view the defendant was not deprived of notice that the question of dismissal might be considered in addition to the merits at a single hearing, for the terms of the statute itself, fairly read, give warning of that possibility. See § 61. However, as counsel stated frankly at our bar, he was new at the practice and only vaguely familiar with the statute at the time, and assumed that the issue of dismissal of the juvenile complaints would be dealt with at a second hearing. He explained his difficulties to the judge in a reasoned request for a short continuance. He moved promptly in the Superior Court.

The Commonwealth urges us to let the indictments stand and leave it to the Superior Court to consider whether the defendant should be ultimately treated as a child or adult (see § 83), but the statutory scheme contemplates that that determination shall preferably be first made by the juvenile court. See § 74; cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 563-564.

Pending the present appeal, the Rules of the District Court were amended, effective May 7, 1973. The Rules now provide that the question of dismissing a juvenile complaint and trying the child as an adult shall be made the subject of a separate hearing, with a continuance if requested. The Rules set forth the factors to be considered by the judge in deciding whether the public interest requires dismissal, and they provide further that any finding of probable cause after a dismissal shall be made by a judge other than the one who heard the juvenile complaint, unless the child shall have waived the probable cause hearing. See new Rule 85A.

The order dismissing the indictments is vacated. The Superior Court is directed to remand the cases to the juvenile court with directions to vacate the orders dismissing the juvenile complaints and promptly to take appropriate proceedings thereon in accordance with the statute and the Rules of the District Courts, as amended. The defendant is granted leave to apply to the Superior Court for dismissal of the indictments if the action of the juvenile court indicates that such dismissal would be appropriate.

So ordered.