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M. A. Thompson v. John S. Houze

Mississippi Supreme Court1873-04
48 Miss. 444

Summary

Holding. A mortgagee's power of sale, when exercised, extinguishes the mortgagor's equity of redemption and is a valid remedy; however, such a sale does not bar the mortgagee from also pursuing judicial foreclosure, making the remedies cumulative. The decree of the chancellor is affirmed and the cause is remanded with leave for the defendant to answer within forty days.

A mortgagee holding a power-of-sale clause in a mortgage may exercise that power to sell the property without court involvement, and such a sale extinguishes the mortgagor's equity of redemption. However, because the mortgagee occupies a position of significant power over the mortgagor—controlling the timing of sale, accounting, and acting as commissioner—courts will scrutinize these sales carefully and construe them strictly against the mortgagee to prevent unfairness or abuse. The availability of a power of sale does not eliminate the mortgagee's alternative right to pursue judicial foreclosure; rather, the two remedies are cumulative.

The court rejected the argument that an adequate remedy at law through power of sale eliminated the need for equitable foreclosure proceedings. Although modern practice increasingly recognizes the mortgagee's ability to conduct an out-of-court sale to avoid delays and costs of traditional foreclosure, the court recommended that mortgagees resort to chancery proceedings as the preferable approach to protect both parties' interests.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a mortgagee's contractual power of sale provides an adequate remedy at law, eliminating the need for equitable foreclosure
  • Whether an out-of-court sale by mortgagee extinguishes or preserves the mortgagor's equity of redemption
  • Whether power of sale and judicial foreclosure are mutually exclusive or cumulative remedies
  • Degree of judicial scrutiny applied to mortgagee-conducted sales to prevent unfairness or abuse

Procedural posture

A demurrer to a foreclosure bill was filed on the ground that an adequate remedy at law existed through the mortgage's power-of-sale clause, and the case was appealed to this court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

SlMRALL, J. :

The specific objection taken in the demurrer to the bill, and urged by counsel in this court is, that the remedy at law is adequate. The mortgage confers upon the mortgagee a power of sale, upon default made in the performance of the conditions; that is, nonpayment of the money; therefore there was no necessity, as urged by counsel for appellant, to bring this foreclosure suit. Such securities as this, upon their first introduction into use, encountered the serious opposition for a time of the equity courts. It was thought to be too peremptory and barsb upon the debtor. The equity of redemption being a favorite with the court, and the old doctrine being that the mortgagor could not by a covenant in the deed bind himself not to claim or waive it, it was supposed to be curtailment of this right to confer upon the mortgagee a power to cut it off by a sale in pais. As mortgages have come in modern times to be more especially and emphatically regarded as securities for debts, in order to avoid the delays and expenses incident to a foreclosure of the ordinary and usual equity of redemption, it is now coming into common use to give the mortgagee the power of sale.

The controversy heretofore has been, not whether the mortgagee could execute the power in pais, but whether he must not obtain the sanction of a court of chancery to the sale. The position which he bore to his debtor gave him, it was thought, the opportunity to act oppositely. He is made trustee of the equity of redemption, with power to dispose of it without the consent and against the interests of the mortgagor. Upon such considerations the learned chancellor, in Ford v. Russell, Freeman Ch. 48, determined that a mortgagee could not make a valid sale without the sanction of the court. The power of sale does not alter the redeemable character of the instrument. The equity of redemption subsists in the mortgagor so long as the power has not been executed. Eaton v. Whiting, 3 Pick. 490.

It was very strongly intimated, in 1 Rand. 306, that a sale, did not cut off the equity of redemption. The great weight of authority, as said in Wofford v. Board of Police of Holmes county, 44 Miss., is, that a sale by the mortgagee extinguishes the equity of redemption. The title is conveyed to the mortgagee with a power to transfer it when a contingency arises for a sale. It is like an authority constituting an attorney in fact. Smith v. Bovin, 6 Allen (Mass.), 518. But because there is conferred upon the mortgagee a power of sale, his right to foreclose by judicial proceedings is not barred. 1 Hill. Mort. 129; Marriott v. Givens, 8 Ala. 694; 21 ib. 573. The utmost that can be said of it is that the remedy is cumulative.

So peremptory is the remedy by sale, so great is the temptation to act unfairly and oppressively, so absolute is the power over the mortgagor, to determine the time of sale, to state the account, and act as commissioner in his own case, that the courts will watch very closely the mortgagee’s proceedings, and for the least unfairness or excess, or for anything affecting competition, the sale will be strictly construed as against the mortgagee. Longwith v. Gilmer, 3 Gilm. (Ill.) 32; 1 Hill. Mort. 131. Influenced by such considerations, this court, whilst upholding the power as valid, in Hyde v. Warren, 46 Miss. 29, commended a resort to chancery for a foreclosure decree as the better practice.

We think that a sale made by the mortgagee under the power in this deed would have the same effect as a sale by a trustee, under the ordinary deeds in trust, so far as the equity of redemption would be concerned— that is, it would be cut off.

The decree of the chancellor is affirmed, and cause remanded with leave to defendant to answer in forty days from this date.