POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF SAVANNAH et al. v. BROWN

Supreme Court of Georgia1997-05-12No. S97A0007

268 Ga. 26486 S.E.2d 28

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's judgment denying the writ of mandamus and dismissing the petition was affirmed because PBAS lacked standing to pursue mandamus relief, and the petitioners failed to properly prove the existence and terms of the city document on which they relied to establish the city manager's duty to bargain.

The Police Benevolent Association of Savannah (PBAS) and seven police officers sought a writ of mandamus to force the city manager to recognize PBAS as the collective bargaining representative for Savannah police officers and to negotiate under the city's union guidelines. The trial court denied the mandamus petition and dismissed the case. On appeal, the court addressed two separate problems with the petitioners' case.

First, regarding PBAS's standing, the court found that while the individual officers would benefit materially from the writ, PBAS itself showed no material advantage or special damages that would result from granting mandamus. The petition contained allegations about PBAS being chosen by officers, but the city manager denied these claims and nothing in the record proved them true. Without such proof, PBAS lacked standing to pursue the mandamus remedy.

Second, the petitioners failed to properly establish the city's alleged duty to bargain. They attempted to rely on a document called the "Guidelines for City's Relationship with Unions" to show the city manager had a legal obligation to recognize PBAS and bargain. However, the record contained neither an original nor a certified copy of this purported city document. Because courts cannot take judicial notice of municipal ordinances and require proper proof of their terms, the trial court properly could have—and would have been correct to—refuse to enforce an ordinance not properly presented before it.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Standing of an organization to seek mandamus when individual members would benefit materially
Proper proof required for a municipal ordinance or city guideline in court proceedings
When mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel official action

Procedural posture

After the trial court denied an application for a writ of mandamus and granted a motion to dismiss, the petitioners appealed to the appellate court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Benham, Chief Justice.

The Police Benevolent Association of Savannah (“PBAS”) and seven Savannah police officers filed a petition for mandamus, asking the trial court to order the Savannah city manager, appellee Michael B. Brown, to recognize the PBAS as the chosen bargaining representative of the rank-and-file Savannah police officers, and to commence bargaining with the PBAS under Savannah’s “Guidelines for City’s Relationship with Unions.” After concluding that the City of Savannah could not be required to recognize the PBAS as the officers’ collective bargaining agent, the trial court denied the appellants’ application for mandamus nisi and granted the city manager’s motion to dismiss the petition. The PBAS and the officers filed this appeal.

1. A writ of mandamus may issue “to compel a due performance” of an official duty if there is no other specific legal remedy. OCGA § 9-6-20. Mandamus is “a harsh remedy” and should not be granted unless the applicant would be afforded a material advantage by its grant (Harper v. Burgess, 225 Ga. 420 (2) (169 SE2d 297) (1969)), or has suffered “special damages.” Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519, 521 (265 SE2d 811) (1980). There is no question but that the seven police officers/petitioners/appellants would be afforded a material advantage by the grant of the writ of mandamus which they sought in conjunction with PBAS. However, the issue is not as clear with regard to PBAS. The “Request for Representation” cards signed by the Savannah police officers requested that the Police Benevolent Association of Georgia (“PBAG”) be authorized to represent the officers, and contained PBAG’s address and logo. The petition for writ of mandamus alleges that the PBAS is a non-profit association composed of the rank-and-file members of the Savannah police force, that it is affiliated with the PBAG, and that it “has been chosen as the designated representative” by the overwhelming majority of the police officers who signed cards requesting representation. The city manager did not admit any of these allegations, and there is nothing in the record which establishes any of the averments as fact. Since there has been no showing that PBAS would gain a material advantage should the writ of mandamus be granted or that PBAS has suffered special damages from the city manager’s failure to do as PBAS has requested, based on the record before us we conclude that PBAS had no standing to seek the writ of mandamus it filed with the seven officers.

2. As stated earlier, mandamus is used to compel an official to perform a duty. OCGA § 9-6-20. Through their mandamus petition, the seven police officers asked the trial court to require the city manager to comply with a document entitled “Guidelines for City’s Relationship with Unions,” a copy of which was attached to the petition for mandamus. The petition averred that the document was promulgated by the City of Savannah in 1973 and contains “the rules, regulations and procedures under which collective bargaining representatives may meet and confer with the City Manager to negotiate the terms and conditions of their members’ employment.” The city manager denied the averment and the admissibility of the document attached to the petition.

The superior and appellate courts of this state do not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. Childers v. Richmond County, 266 Ga. 276, 277 (467 SE2d 176) (1996). See also OCGA § 24-1-4. The proper method of proving a city ordinance is by production of the original or of a properly certified copy. R.O.H. Properties v. Westside Electric Co., 151 Ga. App. 857 (2) (261 SE2d 767) (1979). The record contains neither the original nor a properly certified copy of the city-promulgated document which purportedly contains the city manager’s duty which the petitioners seek to compel judicially. The trial court would have been in error if it had ordered the city manager to comply with the terms of an ordinance not properly before the court. Id. Although this principle was not relied upon by the trial court, “ ‘[w]here the trial court is right for any reason, its judgment will be affirmed.’ [Cit.]” Medlin v. Mickle, 240 Ga. 552 (2) (242 SE2d 38) (1978).

Decided May 12,1997.

Wallace & Tetreault, Matthew W. Wallace, Victor J. Tetreault, for appellants.

Wiseman, Blackburn & Futrell, James B. Blackburn, Abda L. Quillian, for appellee.

Walls & Glucksman, J. Michael Walls, amicus curiae.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.