DANIEL v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1997-05-05No. S97A0612

268 Ga. 9485 S.E.2d 734

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. The trial court properly admitted Daniel's voluntary statement, the factual record supported a rational jury verdict on malice murder, and the requirement for submission to an independent mental health evaluation as a condition of presenting expert psychiatric testimony was lawful.

Samuel Daniel was convicted of malice murder in the stabbing death of his former girlfriend's current boyfriend. Although no eyewitnesses saw the killing, the evidence included Daniel's history of stalking his ex-girlfriend, his threats against the victim, and his partial admission to fighting with the victim—all of which permitted a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the Jackson standard.

Daniel raised three challenges on appeal. First, he argued that his incriminating statement should have been excluded because he was confused and mentally impaired from a blow the victim had struck him. The trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing at which the officer testified to the statement's voluntary nature, and Daniel presented no rebutting evidence. The appellate court found the trial court's credibility determination—based on the officer's testimony alone—was within its discretion and not clearly erroneous. Second, Daniel contended the trial court erred by requiring him to submit to a state-selected mental health evaluation if he presented expert psychiatric evidence. The court rejected this argument, relying on established precedent that a defendant cannot offer psychiatric testimony while avoiding state cross-examination.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Sufficiency of evidence to support a malice murder conviction absent eyewitness testimony
Admissibility of a defendant's incriminating statement based on trial court credibility determinations
Right to present expert psychiatric evidence without submitting to state-selected examination

Procedural posture

Daniel appealed his malice murder conviction and life sentence to the appellate court following jury verdict and trial court judgment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Carley, Justice.

A jury found Samuel Daniel guilty of malice murder and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on the guilty verdict.

1. The victim, who was the current boyfriend of Daniel’s former girl friend, was fatally stabbed. Although there were no eyewitnesses to his homicide, the evidence showed that Daniel harbored animosity toward the victim. Daniel had been stalking his former girl friend and, when he attacked her on the day before the murder, the victim came to her rescue and struck Daniel. Daniel threatened to kill the victim. The next day, Daniel displayed a knife to a friend and again made threats to kill the victim. After the discovery of the victim’s body, Daniel made a statement admitting that he fought with the victim, but also claiming that he lost consciousness and did not remember what had happened. This evidence authorized a rational trier of fact to find proof of Darnel’s guilt of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Daniel enumerates as error the admission into evidence of his statement. According to him, the trial court should not have admitted the statement because, at the time he made it, he was confused and his judgment was impaired because of the blow the victim struck the day before. A review of the record shows that the trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing, at which the State called the officer to whom the statement was given and this officer’s testimony authorized the trial court’s conclusion that Daniel gave the statement freely and voluntarily. “ ‘Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings relating to the admissibility of an incriminating statement will be upheld on appeal.’ [Cit.]” LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73 (2) (453 SE2d 737) (1995). Daniel offered nothing to rebut the officer’s testimony and, contrary to Daniel’s contention, the State was not required to corroborate the officer’s testimony by proffering a videotape of the session at which the statement was made. The trial court was authorized to base its ruling on the testimony and credibility of the officer himself. See generally Washington v. State, 243 Ga. 329, 333 (2) (253 SE2d 719) (1979). It follows that this enumeration of error is without merit.

Decided May 5, 1997.

Patrick G. Longhi, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Gina C. Marshall, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Beth Attaway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

3. Daniel urges that the trial court erred in ruling that, in the event he relied upon expert mental health evidence, he would be required to submit to an independent mental health evaluation by an expert of the State’s choosing. In Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 64 (11) (414 SE2d 5) (1992), we held that a defendant in a criminal case “can no more present psychiatric testimony without submitting to an examination by a state-selected psychiatrist than he may testify at trial without submitting to a cross-examination.” Accordingly, this enumeration of error is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

The homicide occurred on May 21,1994 and the grand jury indicted Daniel on August 19, 1994. On December 1, 1995, the jury returned its guilty verdict and the trial court entered its judgment of conviction and life sentence. Daniel filed his notice of appeal on December 14,1995 and the case was docketed in this Court on January 9,1997. Daniel submitted his appeal for decision on March 3,1997.