CONTIE, Circuit Judge.
On May 4, 1984, we reversed the district court’s denial of petitioner Roy Wilson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded to the district court with instructions that the writ be granted. Wilson v. Mintzes, 733 F.2d 424 (6th Cir.1984). The Supreme Court of the United States granted respondent Mintzes’ petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment and remanded the case for consideration in light of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). For the reasons that follow, we reaffirm our earlier judgment.
I.
Petitioner Wilson contended in seeking a writ of habeas corpus that the trial judge’s failure to grant a continuance to allow him to retain substitute counsel when he expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of his counsel at trial deprived him of his sixth amendment right to counsel. We found that counsel’s conduct at trial constituted good cause to warrant substitution of counsel and that Wilson was prejudiced by counsel’s attempt to remove himself from the case in front of the jury and by his refusal to cross-examine the officer in charge of the investigation.
A.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
While the plain language of the amendment simply guarantees a defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,” such language encompasses a guarantee of the right to self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1974), the right of indigents to appointed counsel in felony prosecutions, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc) (sixth amendment right to counsel has four components: right to have counsel, minimum quality of counsel, a reasonable opportunity to select and be represented by chosen counsel, and right to preparation period sufficient to assure minimum quality counsel); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir.1978). Additionally, although much sixth amendment jurisprudence has been concerned with the rights of indigent defendants, an accused who desires to and is financially able “should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 1291, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 5, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954) (“[A] defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth.”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (“Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an accused should be respected.”); Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C.Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed. 34 (1979) (“An essential element of the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right to the assistance of counsel is that a defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of his own choosing.”). Contra Rubio v. Estelle, 689 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir.1982). Therefore, “[w]hen a court unreasonably denies defendant counsel of choice, the denial can rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Birt, 725 F.2d at 592; United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983). The denial of an accused’s right to counsel of his choice “may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment____” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70, 62 S.Ct. at 464.
Likewise, our court has long recognized the accused’s right to retain counsel of his choice. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 208-09 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 318 (1982) (right to counsel of one’s choice is guaranteed by due process as well as sixth amendment); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801 (6th Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.1984) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right of a defendant in a criminal case to be represented by counsel of his choosing.”); United States v. Reese, 699 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir.1983); Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892, 96 S.Ct. 190, 46 L.Ed.2d 124 (1975) (right to assistance of counsel “implies a degree of freedom to be represented by counsel of defendant’s choice.”). “The right to choose one’s own counsel is an essential component. of the Sixth Amendment because, were a defendant not provided the opportunity to select his own counsel at his own expense, substantial risk would arise that the basic trust between counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary system, would be undercut.” Linton, 656 F.2d at 209.
While recognizing that the accused’s right to retain counsel of his choice is necessary to maintaining a vigorous adversary system and the objective fairness of the proceeding in which the accused is prose — cuted, United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 667, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), recognition of the right also reflects constitutional protection of the accused’s free choice independent of these concerns. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1056, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). Many of the concerns supporting an accused’s right to choose to represent himself also support an accused’s right to counsel of choice. Conceding that an accused has the right to assistance of counsel at trial as well as the fundamental and personal nature of that right, it is clear that when an accused is financially able to retain an attorney, the choice of counsel to assist him rests ultimately in his hands and not in the hands of the State.
B.
While an accused’s right to choose counsel to assist him at trial is an essential component of the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, it is beyond peradventure that such right is not absolute. Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.1984); Urquhart, 726 F.2d at 1319; Birt, 725 F.2d at 593; James, 708 F.2d at 44; United States v. Silva, 611 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir.1980); Mardian, 546 F.2d at 979 n. 9; Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir.1976); United States v. Ramey, 559 F.Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Tenn.1981). When an accused seeks substitution of counsel in mid-trial, he must show good cause such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney in order to warrant substitution. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908 n. 2 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982); United States v. Hart, 557 F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 305, 54 L.Ed.2d 193 (1977) (to warrant substitution, accused must show justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel). See generally United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926, 93 S.Ct. 1358, 35 L.Ed.2d 587 (1973) (“if on discovering justifiable dissatisfaction a court refuses to replace the attorney, the defendant may then properly claim denial of his Sixth Amendment right”).
Consideration of such motions requires a balancing of the accused’s right to counsel of his choice and the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. Linton, 656 F.2d at 209; Urquhart, 726 F.2d at 1319; Reese, 699 F.2d at 805 (disqualification order); Phillips, 699 F.2d at 801-02; Burton, 584 F.2d at 489; Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1323; Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 960, 30 L.Ed.2d 793 (1972). However, “a trial court, acting in the name of calendar control, cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably interfere with a client’s right to be represented by the attorney he has selected.” Linton, 656 F.2d at 209.
Whether a continuance is appropriate in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964); Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. at 1615-16, with the trial judge considering the length of delay, previous continuances, inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court, whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused, the availability of other competent counsel, the complexity of the case, and whether denying the continuance will lead to identifiable prejudice. Burton, 584 F.2d at 490-91; Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983); Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1324; Giacalone, 445 F.2d at 1240; Ramey, 559 F.Supp. at 62. Evidence of unreasonable or arbitrary interference with an accused’s right to counsel of his choice ordinarily mandates reversal without a showing of prejudice. Linton, 656 F.2d at 211-12; Phillips, 699 F.2d at 802. Such motions are directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859, 865 (6th Cir.1983); Morris, 714 F.2d at 673; Welty, 674 F.2d at 190; Silva, 611 F.2d at 79; United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir.1979) (where request made during trial, it was within trial court’s discretion to deny request); Burton, 584 F.2d at 489; Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1322; United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S.Ct. 613, 54 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977).
As set forth in our initial disposition of this case, we find that the trial judge, after questioning the competence of Wilson’s counsel and provoking counsel into acts inconsistent with his duty of loyalty to his client, acted unreasonably in failing to heed Wilson’s expressions of dissatisfaction.
II.
In Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the accused, on petition for writ of habeas corpus, claimed that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of counsel’s failure to obtain a psychiatric report and to present character witnesses. Counsel’s competence was not questioned at trial and the accused proffered no motions for a continuance to obtain new counsel. In order to obtain relief, an accused must show first that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 2065, and second, that counsel’s performance prejudiced the accused’s defense. Id. at 2067. Ordinarily, in assessing prejudice “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 2069. However, when counsel labors under a conflict of interest prejudice may be presumed.
In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests____ Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and “that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”
Id. at 2607 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the standards enunciated in Strickland are inapplicable to this case.
A.
Application of the two-prong Strickland test to motions for substitution of counsel would require a defendant who cannot communicate with counsel, who is dissatisfied with counsel or whose defense is burdened by a conflict of interest to prove that counsel’s conduct rises to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness. We know of no court which has placed such a burden on defendants, and find such a burden incompatible with the principles underlying the right to counsel of choice.
First, while ineffectiveness claims attack the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged, Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, and are concerned with its reliability or objective fairness, Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2046, the right to counsel of choice “reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.” Flanagan, 104 S.Ct. at 1056; Burton, 584 F.2d at 489 n. 10 (“[T]he right to choice of counsel is distinct from the right to adequate assistance of counsel. The fact that one is infringed does not indicate one way or the other whether the other is infringed.”); Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1326. Therefore, the Strickland test, which governs situations involving the effectiveness of counsel, should not be applied to cases involving the choice of counsel.
Second, the Strickland test is incompatible not only with the nature of the right protected but with the context in which it is asserted. The performance/prejudice inquiry of Strickland is tailored to limit the availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance, Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, since ineffectiveness claims inevitably arise subsequent to the proceeding’s conclusion. However, in choice of counsel cases, the court is required to adjudicate the accused’s rights at a time when the outcome of the proceeding remains in doubt. Therefore, our concern for limiting intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance has little relevance in choice of counsel cases and does not require application of the Strickland standards.
Likewise, the fact that choice of counsel issues are raised at trial demonstrates both the appropriateness of the current standard set out in Part I B above, and the inappropriateness of the Strickland test. Strickland requires consideration of the totality of the evidence to determine whether counsel’s performance was prejudicial. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. While such an inquiry is possible on review, a trial judge, faced by an accuseds assertion of his right to counsel of his choice, would be unable to consider counsel’s performance in light of all the evidence and could not thereby determine whether counsel’s actions were prejudicial to the extent required to find a constitutional violation pursuant to Strickland. On the other hand, the test set out in Linton, Burton, and Welty entrusts the determination to the discretion of the trial judge and involves a balancing of the accused’s rights with public interests in judicial efficiency. This approach allows inquiry into a variety of factors including the time in the proceeding at which the accused seeks new counsel and embodies a flexibility necessary to the variety of contexts in which such requests may arise. Therefore, we find the current approach to requests for substitution of counsel sound and decline to apply Strickland to this case.
B.
We also consider, in light of Strickland, whether, to be entitled to relief, an accused must establish that his defense was prejudiced by the trial judge’s erroneous denial of his request for substitution.
(a)
An evaluation of an alleged error in light of the evidence in a case frequently plays a role in disposing of a casé under the guise of either a prejudice inquiry as a prerequisite to establishing a constitutional violation, Strickland, or in finding an established constitutional error de minimus or harmless. Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In Flanagan, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1056-57 (1984), the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a defendant asserting denial of the right to counsel of choice must show prejudice to obtain reversal. However, the Court did note that, “to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one’s choice is like, for example, the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself[,] ... [ojbtaining reversal for violation of such a right does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.” Id. In other circumstances, such as a denial of appointment of counsel as required by Gideon or denial of counsel’s request to be replaced due to conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed. Id. United States v. Celani, 748 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir.1984). Therefore, although “there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt,” Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 26, such errors are cognizable without any showing of effect on the outcome of the proceeding when the right asserted is entitled to constitutional protection apart from the objective fairness of the proceeding. The prejudice prong of Strickland, therefore, has no applicability to counsel of choice cases since, unlike the right to counsel of choice, “the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2046.
The majority of courts have held that prejudice need not be shown when an accused is denied the right to counsel of his choice. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983); Linton, 656 F.2d at 211-12 (neither prejudice nor harmless error rule applicable); Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 722-23 (9th Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (prejudice presumed); Burton, 584 F.2d at 498; United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir.1963); Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 302 (9th Cir.1961) (prejudice assumed); Raullerson v. Patterson, 272 F.Supp. 495, 500 (D.Colo. 1967). See, however, United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 889, 54 L.Ed.2d 795 (1978). As noted supra at 8, prejudice to the accused is but one factor to be considered by the trial judge and a continuance or substitution may properly be granted in the absence of prejudice and may properly be denied despite its presence. Burton, 584 F.2d at 491 n. 19.
We have concluded above that the right to counsel of choice, like the right to self-representation, is premised on respect for the individual and similarly is either respected or denied irrespective of the harmlessness or prejudicial nature of the error. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 951 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Requiring an accused to establish that he was prejudiced by a trial judge’s denial of his motion for substitution would focus our attention on the result obtained by the substitution rather than on the accused’s right to exercise such choice. Therefore, requiring a showing of prejudice would obliterate the heretofore recognized right of the accused to counsel of his choice, would reduce the balancing approach of Linton and Burton to a parroting of Strickland, and would lock the accused into his first selection of counsel unless he can prove conduct rising to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness. Therefore, having determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to respect Wilson’s complaints regarding counsel, we decline to depart from precedent and will not require that an accused, improperly deprived of counsel of his choice, show prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial thereof.
(b)
Application of a prejudice standard would not affect our disposition of this case, since we find that Wilson was prejudiced by the trial court’s action.
First, the Court in Strickland reaffirmed that “prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.” Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. However, “[prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and ‘that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1716-19). While this presumption grew out of multiple representation cases, prejudice has also been presumed when counsel’s interests conflict with his client’s interests. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 139 (3d Cir.1984); Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984). See United States v. Barnes, 662 F.2d 777, 782 n. 8 (D.C.Cir. 1980). Although “[t]his conflict must cause some lapse in representation contrary to the defendant’s interests ... such lapse need not rise to the level of actual prejudice.” Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1086 (3d Cir.1983). In our initial disposition of this case, this panel unanimously found that counsel’s decision to continue his battle of wits with the trial judge rather than attend to his client’s case constituted “an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of defense counsel and petitioner which prejudiced petitioner’s case____” Wilson, 733 F.2d at 428. As a result of this conflict, counsel stated before the jury that he no longer was Wilson’s counsel and he subsequently refused to cross-examine the witness who was on the stand during the initial confrontation between counsel and the trial judge. It is clear that counsel’s loyalty to his own interests rather than those of his client adversely affected his performance in terms of appearance before the jury as well as his tactical conduct of the case.
Second, in Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, the Court has reaffirmed that no specific showing of prejudice is required when an accused is deprived of his sixth amendment right to effective cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Prejudice need not be shown since denial of such a right is of such magnitude that “no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 749, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968) (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966)). If prejudice is presumed when a trial judge denies a defendant the right of cross-examination, reason dictates that such presumption be of equal force when a trial judge unreasonably refuses a defendant’s request to remove counsel who flatly refuses to cross-examine a witness because of his running feud with the judge. Therefore, even if a showing of prejudice were a prerequisite to reversal, the conflict of interest between counsel and client along with counsel’s flat refusal to cross-examine a witness require a presumption of prejudice in this case.
III.
We establish no novel right or theory of constitutional law, but rely on tried and true principles as old as the document we expound. The Court has recognized that “Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation____” Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364, 101 S.Ct. at 667. The accused has demonstrated that his right to choose the counsel to present his defense was unconstitutionally abridged. Therefore, having concluded that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, we hold that appropriate respect for Wilson’s right of choice can be accorded only by directing the district court to grant the writ.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus.
. Mintzes v. Wilson, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 317, 83 L.Ed.2d 255 (1984).
. For a statement of the facts and procedural history of the case, see our earlier opinion at 733 F.2d 424.
. Accord United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 904 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1313, 79 L.Ed.2d 710 (1984); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2154 (1984); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075, 99 S.Ct. 851, 59 L.Ed.2d 43 (1979); United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 754 n. 6 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir.1973); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920, 78 S.Ct. 1361, 2 L.Ed.2d 1364 (1958); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C.Cir.1956); United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1946); Raullerson v. Patterson, 272 F.Supp. 495, 498 (D.Colo. 1967); United States v. Anonymous, 215 F.Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.Tenn.1963). Recognition of defendant’s right to counsel of his choice developed in cases such as Glasser where a defendant objected to multiple representation of co-defendants. The accused under such circumstances has a special interest in representation by experienced counsel of his own choice in whom he can have the kind of confidence that grows from long-standing acquaintance____ United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc). While the Court has emphatically rejected the notion that an accused has the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617-18, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), the Court has not indicated that this rejection diminishes the accused’s right to effective assistance of counsel, right to conflict-free counsel, or right to counsel of choice. See generally United States v. Cronic, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Strickland, supra.
. In United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1963) we noted that "[t]he Amendment does not concern itself with who the counsel may be or how the counsel may be selected. But if a defendant in a criminal case desires to hire his own counsel, in order that the object of the Sixth Amendment be met, such defendant must have fair opportunity and reasonable time to employ counsel of his own choosing.”
. An accused’s right to counsel of choice, like the right to choose self-representation, is part of an accuseds right under the sixth amendment to choose the manner in which he will present his defense. The right is personal to the accused and is protected independent of our concerns regarding the fairness of the proceeding. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540. "It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064-65, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007, 86 S.Ct. 1950, 16 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1966).
. Dictating who shall act as counsel for the accused, like dictating that an accused shall be represented by counsel, essentially interposes an organ of the state between an unwilling accused and his right to choose his defense, and violates the logic of the sixth amendment. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533. "An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.” Id. at 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2534. The court in Faretta rested its conclusion that an accused’s choice regarding the conduct of his defense is entitled to independent constitutional protection in part on the intent of the drafters.
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them. And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice.
Id. at 833-34, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41 (footnotes omitted).
. “Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540.
. Similarly, an accused’s right to self-representation is not absolute and unfettered. "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46. “Moreover, the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540. See Brown, 744 F.2d at 908 (right unqualified only if exercised before commencement of trial); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
. The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in reaching that result a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense.” Powell, 287 U.S. at 59, 53 S.Ct. at 60; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1336, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976) (convenience must occasionally yield to concern for the integrity of the trial itself.”) Recently, concerns of finality, administrative convenience and victims’ rights have weighed more heavily in the balance.
[I]n the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims. Apart from all other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one calling for public testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was involved here. Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an experience for the third time need not be decided now; but that factor is not to be ignored by the courts. The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources.
Morris, 461 U.S. at 14-15, 103 S.Ct. at 1617-18.
. An accused’s right to counsel of choice is implicated in motions for disqualification of counsel, Flanagan, motions for continuance so that counsel of accused’s choice might be present, Morris v. Slappy, and motions for substitution of counsel. While Wilsons expressions of dissatisfaction with his counsel, largely engendered by the trial judge, are ambiguous regarding the relief he sought from the court, Wilson’s complaints can best be construed as requests for a continuance to seek new counsel. The transcript indicates:
THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, you have heard your attorney indicate that this is his third or fourth criminal trial. You have heard your attorney indicate he has never checked the court record in this case. Are you willing to continue with this lawyer in view of—
MR. PATTERSON: May I ask him something?
THE COURT: Yes, you may ask him something. (Discussion off the record)
DEFENDANT WILSON: No.
THE COURT: You wish to discharge your lawyer as being incompetent?
DEFENDANT WILSON: You asked me did I wish to continue with this attorney and I said no.
THE COURT: Why? State your reasons on the record. He had not prepared the case well?
DEFENDANT WILSON: No he hasn’t prepared the case — prepared for the case.
THE COURT: He what?
DEFENDANT WILSON: He hasn’t prepared for the case.
THE COURT: Do you have money to hire another lawyer? We have a question of incompetency of Counsel—
DEFENDANT WILSON: My family may—
THE COURT: Is your family here?
DEFENDANT WILSON: Yes.
After Wilson conferred with his family the following exchange took place.
THE COURT: Do you want to continue the trial Mr. Wilson:
MR. PATTERSON: I don’t; I move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.
MR. LA BRET: Mr. Wilsons mother just walked into the courtroom your Honor.
MR. PATTERSON: And I’ve indicated to my client, who I still represent; I have not been discharged; not to answer anything — nobody’s questions.
THE COURT: Bring out the jury; we’ll continue the trial.
Apparently, the trial judge construed counsel’s indication that he had not been discharged as proof that Wilson wished to retain Patterson as counsel. Such a conclusion is contrary, however, to counsel’s subsequent attempt to remove himself as Wilson’s counsel.
MR. PATTERSON: I refuse — I’m telling the jury right now, I refuse to conduct this case in this courtroom after what has been said by the Court to my client while the jury was in the jury box.
THE COURT: Continue the trial, Mr. Patterson.
MR. PATTERSON: I am making no further objections; I remove myself from the case. I remove myself from the case.
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson—
MR. PATTERSON: He doesnt have an attorney.
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson, have a seat.
MR. LA BRET: Your Honor, I’ve turned the witness over to Mr. Patterson.
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson, do you have any questions of this witness?
MR. PATTERSON: I am no longer this mans attorney. If the Court is going to conduct a trial in this fashion, I am no longer the attorney.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions of this witness?
MR. PATTERSON: Mr. Jamison, Mr. Allen, you can arrest me if he tells you to arrest me, if I walk out this door. I know damn well I can be arrested when I walk out that door.
THE COURT: Are you going to continue the trial?
MR. PATTERSON: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions of this witness?
MR. PATTERSON: I move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Motion denied.
Call the next witness.
MR. LA BRET: I believe that concludes our witnesses, your Honor, for today. We have two or three witnesses who will conclude our portion of the trial.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Return to this courtroom at 9:00 o’clock and we’ll continue the trial tomorrow.
At the resumption of trial the next day, the trial judge ignored Wilson’s further expressions of dissatisfaction with his counsel.
THE COURT: All right. Are we ready to proceed today?
MR. LA BRET: Yes sir, we are.
THE COURT: And you’re satisfied with your lawyer, Mr. Wilson?
MR. PATTERSON: Let me make one last statement. I want to get this in the record—
DEFENDANT WILSON: No. I made a statement that I wasnt satisfied.
THE COURT: You’re what?
DEFENDANT WILSON: I am not satisfied with the events that took place yesterday.
THE COURT: You may not be satisfied — Im trying to protect your rights, Mr. Wilson.
At the heart of this case is the trial judge’s failure to acknowledge Wilsons dissatisfaction with counsel. The exchanges cited above indicate that although the prospect of retaining different counsel was raised, such prospect was quashed when the trial judge continued to ignore Wilson’s complaints. The dissent argues that the issue in this case is whether Wilson’s counsel was ineffective since this was the issue presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. However, although the issue before the Michigan appellate court was phrased in terms of counsel’s competency, the appellate court clearly recognized that at issue was whether the trial judge erred in not allowing Wilson to seek substitute counsel.
The trial court asked the defendant twice if he was satisfied with counsel and both times received a negative answer. In People v. Wilson, supra, the Court held that a defendant was entitled to substitution of appointed counsel for "good cause” and where the judicial process would not be disrupted. While counsel in the instant case was retained, no less a standard would seem to apply. Further, Wilson also indicated that the application of this substitution standard was left to the discretion of the court.
The appellate court did not speak in terms of ineffectiveness of counsel, nor did it cite Michigan case law, People v. Garcia, 398 Mich. 250, 264, 247 N.W.2d 547 (1976) (citing Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.1974)), which sets out the standards for judging ineffectiveness. It would certainly be curious to adopt a construction of a state court’s opinion which ascribes to that court the application of legal standards to which the court makes neither explicit nor implicit reference. In fact, the "good cause” standard for substitution of counsel cited in the passage above is consistent with that enunciated in Part I B of this opinion. These factors, gleaned from our study of the state court opinion, convince us that our analysis of this case pursuant to substitution of counsel cases interpreting the accused’s sixth amendment right to choice of counsel is consistent with the trial record and prior dispositions of the case.
. Wilson has not claimed that, and the parties have not argued whether, counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The trial judge, however, apparently believed that counsel’s competency was implicated.
THE COURT: Now Mr. Wilson, are you prepared to discharge your lawyer? I have a problem. I have been reversed three times for incompetence of Counsel. I dont know how to solve the question. Each one has to be handled on its own merits. I find here a lawyer who is trying his third or fourth capital case, two years of experience; never bothered to check the court file; didn’t start his preparation until yesterday when he asked the Prosecutor for a search warrant.
. We note that in the recent case of Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court’s denial of motions for continuances to obtain counsel of choice and for more preparation time. The court limited its inquiry to whether the trial judge abused his discretion and did not inquire whether counsel’s conduct rose to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness.
. Further, the Court has indicated that stricter standards may appropriately be applied to sixth amendment claims not raised at trial. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718 ("In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance.”) (footnote omitted).
. The prejudice inquiry in this context, compared with the prejudice inquiry in Strickland, differs semantically rather than substantively. If the Strickland standard of prejudice were applied, our inquiry would be whether the accused was prejudiced by the actions of counsel, whereas if a prejudice requirement is applied to choice of counsel claims the inquiry is whether the accused was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion for substitution. Both inquiries would likely be determined based on assessments of counsel’s conduct.
. The difference in the standards appears to be in the burden of establishing prejudice or harmless error. The harmless error rule requires the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, whereas in a prejudice inquiry ”[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Obviously, constitutional errors such as denial of effective assistance of counsel which require a showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to a finding of error can never be harmless. Although, in light of Strickland, we deal primarily with the requirement of prejudice, the Court has recognized that the right to be represented by counsel, like most constitutional rights, [is] subject to harmless error analysis ... unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot be harmless.” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455 n. 2, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983). See, however, Rushen, 104 S.Ct. at 461 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232, 98 S.Ct. 458, 466, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (use of evidence obtained in derogation of right to counsel is subject to the harmless error rule); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (no per se rule of reversal in late appointment of counsel cases); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir.1984) (validity of waiver of right to counsel subject to harmless error rule). Likewise, the Court has recognized that a showing of prejudice is usually required. The premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel’s representation or has produced some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendants right to counsel and to a fair trial. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981).
. Likewise, “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error____” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827 (footnote omitted) (citing Gideon, right to counsel as example). See Linton, 656 F.2d at 212.
. Since the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is concerned with the objective fairness of the proceedings, a showing of prejudice may be appropriately required in such cases. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 12, 103 S.Ct. at 1616; Cleven-ger, 733 F.2d at 1360-61. Cases such as Morris v. Slappy in which defendants seek continuances in order to obtain more time for counsel to prepare are premised on the theory that lack of adequate preparation time deprives the accused of the effective assistance of counsel. Since our concern in such cases is with the objective fairness of the proceeding, an inquiry into prejudice suffered by the accused is appropriate in reviewing rulings on such motions, although such inquiry would not be appropriate if the motion sought a change of counsel. See United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1226-27 (9th Cir.1981).
. Justices Brennan and Marshall have concluded that prejudice need not be shown, Morris, 461 U.S. at 27-28, 103 S.Ct. at 1624-25, although noting that “it is reasonable to assume that a trial court’s arbitrary denial of a continuance produces some prejudice to the defense without requiring a specific showing of prejudice.” Id. at 28 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1624 n. 9.
. "The nature of the right to defend pro se renders the traditional harmless error doctrine peculiarly inapposite. Unlike other constitutional rights, the right to represent oneself is not result-oriented. The normal operation of the harmless error doctrine is in cases where the challenged error concerns a right accorded the defendant to facilitate his defense or to insulate him from suspect evi-dence____ By contrast, we recognize the defendant’s right to defend pro se not primarily out of the belief that he thereby stands a better chance of winning his case, but rather out of deference to the axiomatic notion that
each person is ultimately responsible for choosing his own fate, including his position before the law. A defendant has the moral right to stand alone in his hour of trial and to embrace the consequences of that course of action.”
McKaskle, 104 S.Ct. at 961 n. 6 (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir.1977)). See, however, Brown, 744 F.2d at 908 (prejudice required); United States v. Malizia, 437 F.Supp. 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y.1977), affd, 573 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1978).
. While deprivation of his sixth amendment right to effective cross-examination may entitle an accused to a presumption of prejudice, an accused must establish an abuse of discretion under the standards set out in Part I B above to be entitled to reversal based on denial of his motion for substitution of counsel.