Harris, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error was indicted in the court below for the murder of his slave, and convicted of manslaughter. Many errors are assigned here, for reversal, which we do not deem it necessary to notice, in the view we take of this case. We shall confine our opinion to the instructions complained of.
Tbe first objection urged by tbe plaintiff in error to tbe instructions of the court related to tbe omission of tbe qualification, “ and not in necessary self-defence,” in tbe latter clause of tbe sixth instruction given for tbe State. It is evident that this was •the idea intended to be conveyed by tbe• instruction, though, perhaps, for greater certainty and accuracy, it would have beebetter to repeat tbe qualification in tbe last clause of tbe instruction.
It is further insisted that this instruction assumes that tbe killing was “ in a cruel and unusual manner.” While, in this respect, tbe instruction may not be philologically accurate in using tbe word “when” for “if” in tbe beginning of tbe sentence, we yet think it was so intended, and substantially conveys tbe same idea.
It is still-further urged that this instruction was erroneous because it excluded from tbe consideration of tbe jury the question, whether the blow inflicted on the negro slave ivas or not necessary to overcome the resistance of the slave to the lawful authority of the master. This qualification we think was not only material, but relates to tbe most important inquiry involved-in tbe case.
Tbe seventh instruction given for tbe State, in relation to tbe doctrine of “ correction,” by tbe master, we think was erroneous, at least, because, inapplicable to tbe facts shown in this record. There is no evidence (as tbe case is now presented by tbe record) tending to show that tbe master was intending or attempting to correct bis slave, submissive to his authority, and exceeded tbe bounds of due moderation in tbe exercise of that undoubted right.
If it is a case of resistance and rebellion, then tbe authority and power of tbe master is only to be limited by tbe necessity occasioned by unlawful resistance to lawful authority. If, without necessity, or apparent necessity, in reducing bis rebellious slave to subjection, tbe master wantonly take bis life, be would certainly be guilty of murder or manslaughter, according to tbe circumstances. Or if tbe master, by inhuman or brutal treatment, endangering tbe life or limb of the slave, induce resistance necessary on tbe part of bis slave to save bis life or limb, and tbe master, in tbe further prosecution of bis unlawful conduct, take tbe life of tbe slave in such conflict, it is equally certain that the master would be guilty of murder. But if the master, in the exercise of lawful authority, in a lawful manner, be resisted by his slave, then the master may use just such force as may be requisite to reduce his slave to obedience, even to the death of the slave, if that become necessary to preserve the master’s life, or to maintain his lawful authority.
Unconditional submission and obedience to the lawful commands and authority of the master is the imperative duty of the slave, as well as the undoubted right of the master. And the wisdom and origin of this rule is to be traced to the humane reason that upon its proper observance the happiness and welfare of both races, in that relation, necessarily depend.
The eighth instruction given for the State asserts the proposition, without qualification, that the “ master has no right to slay, or inflict what the law calls great bodily harm upon his slave,” &c. In self-defence, or in the exercise of necessary and lawful force in order to secure obedience, he may do both, as we have already seen.
The ninth instruction for the State refers to the doctrine of “correctionwhich we have just said is inapplicable to the facts of this case as presented in this record.
The modification of the fourth instruction given for the defendant is clearly erroneous, because it assumes, as proven, facts which the jury are to examine and determine for themselves.
The modification of the eleventh instruction given for the defendant is also erroneous, because it limits the right of the master, in subduing resistance and rebellion on the part of his slave, to the use of “lawful instruments of correction,” and prohibits the use of “ a staff or such means as are likely to kill or maim,” without regard to the circumstances or necessities which might demand the use of either or all to make his authority effectual.
The modification of the twelfth instruction for defendant is a clear and correct exposition of the law on the subject to which it refers.
Let the judgment be reversed, cause remanded, and venire de novo awarded.