HIGGINS v. CARR BROTHERS CO.

Supreme Court of the United States1943-01-18No. No. 97

317 U.S. 57287 L. Ed. 46863 S. Ct. 337SCDB 1942-0761943 U.S. LEXIS 1208

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court affirmed the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's judgment, holding that Carr Brothers' business operations did not fall within the Fair Labor Standards Act's coverage because the interstate movement of merchandise ended when goods were unloaded at the company's warehouse, and the Act was narrowly confined and did not extend to all businesses merely affecting interstate commerce.

Higgins sought unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act for work performed between January 1939 and July 1940 at Carr Brothers, a wholesale produce distributor in Portland, Maine. During the relevant period, Carr Brothers purchased merchandise from local producers and out-of-state dealers, but all sales and deliveries were made solely to retail customers within Maine. Higgins performed work as a night shipper and truck driver for local deliveries.

The central question was whether Carr Brothers' operations constituted commerce subject to federal regulation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that once merchandise from out-of-state sources was unloaded at Carr Brothers' warehouse, the interstate movement had ended, placing the company's activities outside the Act's scope. Higgins argued the company should be covered because it competed with interstate wholesalers and because there was practical continuity in the movement of goods from out-of-state suppliers to in-state customers.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

When does interstate commerce end in wholesale distribution operations
Scope of Fair Labor Standards Act jurisdiction over local businesses purchasing from out-of-state sources
Whether competition with interstate businesses triggers federal wage and hour protections

Procedural posture

The case came to the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, which had rejected Higgins' wage claims.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a companion case to Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., ante, p. 564, and is here on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Higgins claims minimum wages and overtime compensation alleged to be due him under §§ 6 (a) and 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act between January 1939 and July 1940. Prior to that time, respondent, which conducts a wholesale fruit, grocery and produce business in Portland, Maine, had been selling and delivering its merchandise not only to the local trade in Maine but also to retailers in New Hampshire. For the period here in question the New Hampshire trade had been discontinued and all sales and deliveries were solely to retailers in Maine. The only additional facts which we know about respondent’s course of business are accurately summarized in the following excerpt from the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court: “It buys its merchandise from local producers and from dealers in other states, has it delivered by truck and rail, unloaded into its store and warehouse and from there sells and distributes it to the retail trade. While some of the produce and fruit is processed, much of it is sold in the condition in which it is received. The corporation owns all of its merchandise and makes its own deliveries. It makes no sales on commission nor on order with shipments direct from the dealer or producer to the retail purchaser.” Higgins’ employment involved work as night shipper putting up orders and loading trucks for delivery to retail dealers in Maine or driving a truck distributing merchandise to the local trade.

Petitioner in his brief describes the business in somewhat greater detail and seeks to show an actual or practical continuity of movement of merchandise from without the state to respondent’s regular customers within the state. But here, unlike Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., there is nothing in the record before us to support those statements nor to impeach the accuracy of the conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine that when the merchandise coming from without the state was unloaded at respondent’s place of business its “interstate movement had ended.” Some effort is made to show that the court below applied an incorrect rule of law in the sense that it gave the Act too narrow a construction. In that connection it is argued that respondent is in competition with wholesalers doing an interstate business and that it can by underselling affect those businesses and their interstate activities. As we indicated in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., that argument would be relevant if this Act had followed the pattern of other federal legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act (see 29 U. S. C. § 152 (7), §160 (a)) and extended federal control to business “affecting commerce.” But as we pointed out in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, this Act did not go so far but was more narrowly confined.

Thus petitioner has not maintained the burden of showing error in the judgment which he asks us to set aside.

Affirmed.