LAY,
with whom WOLLMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Felony drunken driving convictions are not violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “Act”). The “otherwise involves” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) can be interpreted in more than one reasonable manner. The ambiguity of subsection (B)(ii) is resolved when the subsection is viewed in light of Congress’s purpose in enacting the ACCA. When defining crimes that qualify as “violent felonies” under subsection (B)(ii) for enhancement purposes, Congress intended to encompass serious property crimes that are similar in nature to burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives. Congress did not, however, intend to include crimes like drunk driving for enhancement purposes, as drunk drivers are not inherently more dangerous to society when they violate gun possession laws. In this case, McCall should be sen- fenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) as a felon in possession of a gun. His sentence should not be enhanced under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.
As an initial matter, it may be useful to review what is — and is not — at issue in this case. First, we are not faced with the question of how McCall should be punished for his three convictions for felony drunk driving. The State of Missouri presumably convicted and sentenced McCall in accordance with Missouri drunk driving laws and McCall presumably served the sentences imposed. Second, we are not faced with the question of whether McCall should be punished for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Congress,has mandated that any person “who has been convicted in any court of [ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” may not possess a firearm. In this case, McCall pleaded guilty to being a felon- in possession of a forearm after the police discovered a rifle in his home. Under the Guidelines, the presumptive sentencing range for McCall was 27 to 33 months. However, the government sought to have McCall’s sentence enhanced under the ACCA, arguing that McCall’s three previous convictions for felony drunk driving constituted “violent felonies.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under the ACCA, a felon in possession of a gun with three qualifying “violent felony” convictions is subject to a mandatory 15-year minimum sentence. Thus, the district court’s determination that McCall’s three felony drunk driving convictions were “violent felonies” mandated that his sentence be increased nearly six-fold. Rather than being sentenced in the 27-to-33-month range, McCall was sentenced to 180 months. The question to which -this dissent objects in this case is simply this: whether, in enacting the ACCA, Congress intended to enhance the prison terms of defendants with three felony drunk driving convictions who subsequently violate the law forbidding felons from possessing firearms.
II.
Congress expressly defined “violent felony” in the ACCA as follows:
(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another ....
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). This case requires us to decide whether the phrase “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” — known as the “otherwise involves” provision of the ACCA — includes felony drunk driving convictions.
When interpreting a statute, our court’s objective is to give effect to the intent of Congress. Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (8th Cir.1999). The first principle of statutory construction requires us to determine whether congressional intent is clear from the plain meaning of the statute. Shelton v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 277 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has emphasized that, “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). In this process, courts “ ‘consider not only the bare meaning of the critical word or phrase’ ” at issue, “ ‘but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’ ” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995)). Accordingly, in evaluating § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), we cannot consider only the “bare meaning” of the “otherwise involves” provision. Rather, we must consider the provision in light of the “language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811.
Subsection (B)(i), the first subsection in the definition of “violent felony,” is straightforward, directing us to determine whether the elements of the crime in question involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person — thus encompassing a wide swath of crimes with elements that expressly involve the use or potential use of physical force against people.
The wording of subsection (B)(ii) is less clear. The subsection has two operative clauses. The first operative clause contains an enumerated list of crimes, each of which “is” a violent felony. Given the express enumeration of four crimes and the use of the word “is,” this part of (B)(ii) plainly indicates that Congress intended to include the crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving the use of explosives in the definition of “violent felony.”
The second operative clause of subsection (B)(ii) — the “otherwise involves” provision — is not so easily parsed. The statute’s grammatical structure requires us to carry over language from the beginning of the definition in order to make sense of the subsection’s locution. Thus, a violent felony is any crime punishable by more than a year in prison that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” As noted above, in determining the crimes Congress intended to encompass in the “otherwise involves” provision, we cannot look at the language of the provision in isolation. Rather, the Supreme Court has stressed “over and over” that “‘in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1850)). As the Court has said, “[statutory construction is ‘a holistic endeavor,’ and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.” Id. (quoting United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988)). Given these established rules of statutory construction, in evaluating whether congressional intent is clear from the plain meaning of subsection (B)(ii), the “otherwise involves” provision must first be read in the context of the other language in subsection (B)(ii) and then in the context of the statute as a whole.
When the “otherwise involves” provision is read in the context of the list of enumerated crimes in (B)(ii), the provision gives rise to more than one reasonable interpretation. On the one hand, it is possible to extrapolate from the subsection’s language that a violent felony is any crime — regardless of its nature — that involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. However, this is merely one inference that can be drawn from the subsection’s tortured locution. An equally reasonable inference is that Congress enumerated four specific property crimes prior to the “otherwise involves” provision because it intended the subsection to encompass serious property crimes similar in nature to the enumerated crimes.
In discerning the intent of Congress, the word “otherwise” in subsection (B)(ii) poses particular interpretive difficulties. If Congress intended the “otherwise involves” provision to include all crimes, rather than only a subset of crimes similar to the enumerated crimes, the word “or” alone would have achieved this end more clearly. That is, Congress could have stated “is [one of the enumerated crimes], or involves conduct .... ” Thus, under the “all crimes” interpretation, the word “otherwise” adds nothing to the meaning of the provision. This violates the “settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative effect.” United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992). If “otherwise” is assumed to have some purpose in the statute, turning to the dictionary to confirm the term’s plain meaning is of little avail. When used as an adverb, “otherwise,” means (1) “in a different way or manner”; (2) “in different circumstances”; and (3) “in other respects.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 835 (1984). Depending on which definition of “otherwise” one chooses to apply, and which elements of the chosen definition one emphasizes, the “otherwise involves” provision can be read to support both the “any crimes” and “similar crimes” interpretations.
We have stated a statute is clear and unambiguous when “it is not possible to construe it in more than one reasonable manner.” Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.1998); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001) (stating a statute is ambiguous if it is “capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways”). Simply put, the strange wording of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) gives rise to more than one reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent. Accordingly, it contravenes basic principles of statutory construction to assert that subsection (B)(ii) “plainly” includes all crimes involving conduct that poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. In fact, the only plainly apparent quality in subsection (B)(ii) is its ambiguity.
The ambiguity of subsection (B)(ii) is amplified if we consider the subsection in relation to the overall structure of the definition of “violent felony” in § 924(e)(2)(B). When it defined “violent felony,” Congress set forth tivo subsections establishing the scope of the term. Subsection (B)(i) includes crimes with elements related to the use of physical force against another person. Subsection (B)(ii) enumerates four specific property crimes, followed by the “otherwise involves” provision. This deliberate, two-part structure cannot be easily reconciled with the proposition that Congress plainly intended the “otherwise involves” provision to include all crimes — regardless of their nature— that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Such a view requires the conclusion that Congress deliberately created a subsection delineating crimes against people, then deliberately created a subsection that enumerated four serious crimes against property that pose a risk of injury to people, and then included an all-encompassing “otherwise involves” provision that subsumes most of the crimes already defined in each subsection.
That is, if the “otherwise involves” provision is interpreted to include all crimes that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, that definition encompasses all of the non-threat crimes against people that fall under (B)(i) as well as three of the four specific crimes set forth in(B)(ii) — i.e., burglary, arson, and crimes involving explosives. Thus, not only is the specific language of subsection (B)(ii) ambiguous, that ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that Congress defined “violent felony” in two parts. This two-part structure neatly echos the structure of the original ACCA, which designated only the crimes of robbery and burglary for enhancement purposes. See discussion infra Part III.B. Accordingly, the deliberate structure of the definition of “violent felony” in subsections (B)(i) and (B)(ii) cannot be reconciled with the proposition that Congress “plainly” intended the “otherwise involves” provision to be all-encompassing. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (“[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 200, 77 S.Ct. 779, 1 L.Ed.2d 765 (1957) (acknowledging courts interpret a statutory provision to harmonize with surrounding provisions).
III.
If the language of a statute is ambiguous or its meaning is doubtful, courts must consider the “purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led” to the statute’s enactment. Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir.1945). “When the meaning of a statute is questionable, it should be given a sensible construction and construed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law.” Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir.1998) (quotation and citation omitted).
In resolving whether Congress intended subsection (B)(ii) to encompass “all crimes” or only crimes similar to the enumerated crimes, we have three primary tools at our disposal. First, we can apply established canons of construction to the statutory text itself. Second, we can examine the legislative history of the ACCA to ascertain the purposes of the Act. Third, we can draw from the Supreme Court’s discussion of the Act in Taylor, supra, as well as the Supreme Court’s statements about the ACCA in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), for guidance in understanding the Act’s purpose.
A. Canons of Construction
Because subsection (B)(ii) is ambiguous, we apply established canons of construction to the text to determine congressional intent. Subsection (B)(ii) begins with a list of four enumerated crimes, followed by the general “otherwise involves” provision. When general words are appended to an enumeration of more specific items, the “sensible and long-established” maxim of ejusdem generis “limits the way we should understand such general words.” Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 917, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). “The principle of ejusdem generis suggests that such general terms should be understood to refer to items belonging to the same class that is defined by the more specific terms in the list.” Id.; see also Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384, 123 S.Ct. 1017, 154 L.Ed.2d 972 (2003) (“Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”) (citation and quotation omitted). Here, Congress enumerated four crimes against property and attached this list to the general phrase “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the general words in the “otherwise involves” provision should be construed “to embrace only subjects similar in nature” to the enumerated crimes. Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 537 U.S. at 384, 123 S.Ct. 1017. Therefore, the “otherwise involves” provision should not be interpreted to encompass all crimes — regardless of their nature — that involve the specified conduct. Rather, the provision should be interpreted to encompass only serious property crimes that are similar in nature to burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving the use of explosives.
B. Legislative History
The conclusion that Congress intended the “otherwise involves” provision to include only crimes similar in nature to the enumerated property crimes is reinforced by the legislative history of the ACCA. When it enacted the 1984 Armed Career Criminal Act, Congress provided that a convicted felon in possession of a firearm who had three previous convictions for “robbery or burglary” faced a mandatory minimum prison sentence of 15 years. The 1984 Act was amended in 1986 by the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, then five months later by the Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986 (CCAA of 1986). The CCAA of 1986 effected two central changes. First, Congress changed the predicate offenses triggering enhancement from “burglary and robbery” to “a violent felony or serious drug offense.” Congress then added subsections (B)(i) and (B)(ii), defining “violent felony.”
As our court observed in United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir.2005), the legislative history of the CCAA of 1986 expressly reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended the “otherwise involves” provision to encompass crimes similar in nature to the enumerated crimes. In deciding how “violent felony” should be defined, Congress agreed that the categories of crimes against people in (B)(i) should be included. The congressional debate that took place “centered upon whether any property crimes should be included as predicate offenses, and if so, which ones.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (emphasis added). The compromise bill presented by the Subcommittee provided that
the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another; or
(ii) involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
H.R. 4885. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary (“Report”) favorably reported on this compromise bill, explaining:
The Subcommittee on Crime held a hearing ... to consider whether it should expand the predicate offenses (robbery and burglary) in existing law in order to add to its effectiveness. At this hearing a consensus developed in support of an expansion of the predicate offenses to include serious drug trafficking offenses ... and violent felonies, generally. This concept was encompassed in H.R. 4885 by deleting the specific predicate offenses for robbery and burglary and adding as predicate offenses State and Federal laws for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed for manufacturing, distributing or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute controlled substances and violent felonies under Federal or State law if the offense has an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against a person. This latter provision would include such felonies involving physical force against a person such as murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc.
The other major question involved in these hearings was as to what violent felonies involving physical force against property should be included in the definition of “violent” felony. The Subcommittee agreed to add the crimes punishable for a term exceeding one year that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others. This will add State and Federal crimes against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a serious risk of injury to a person.
H.R.Rep. No. 99-849, at 3 (1986) (second emphasis added). Later, the Report summarized its conclusions, stating “[sjubsection 2(b)(B)(ii) adds all State and Federal felonies against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a serious risk of injury to a person.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The repeated reference to “similar crimes” in the Report reinforces the view that Congress intended the “otherwise involves” provision to encompass property crimes that are similar in nature to burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes that involve the use of explosives.
Before the CCAA of 1986 was finally enacted, the compromise version of subsection (B)(ii) was amended to read: “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” In Taylor, the Supreme Court explained the addition of the enumerated crimes to subsection (B)(ii), stating the compromise bill “appar ently was intended to include burglary, among other serious property offenses, by implication, as a crime that ‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’ ” 495 U.S. at 589, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court then noted that the enumerated crimes were added to the subsection “simply to make explicit the provision’s implied coverage of crimes such as burglary.” Id. This indicates the Court founded its analysis of(B)(ii) on the assumption that Congress intended to limit the subsection to “serious property offenses.” Id. Thus, the enumerated crimes were added to the compromise bill to assure that burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives would be treated as “serious property crimes” for enhancement purposes. The Court’s express statement in Taylor that (B)(ii) was intended to encompass “serious property crimes” cannot be reconciled with the proposition that Congress intended (B)(ii) to encompass all crimes — regardless of their nature — -that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another. Such a proposition requires the assumption that, after defining an all-encompassing category, Congress added the enumerated crimes merely to articulate a random subclass of enhancement crimes.
The conclusion that the Court in Taylor interpreted subsection (B)(ii) as limited to “serious property offenses” is supported by the Court’s express statements regarding Congress’s intent in enacting the ACCA. In reviewing the legislative history of the ACCA, the Court in Taylor stated that. a number of “useful observations” could be drawn from the legislative history. Id. at 587, 110 S.Ct. 2143. First, the Court observed that
throughout the history of the enhancement provision, Congress focused its efforts on career offenders — those who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who, because they possess weapons, present at least a potential threat of harm to persons.
Id. at 587-88, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court further noted that, in defining predicate offenses under the ACCA, Congress intended to “capture all offenses of a certain level of seriousness that involve violence or an inherent risk thereof, and that are likely to be committed by career offenders.” Id. at 590, 110 S.Ct. 2143. As the Court pointed out, in enacting the ACCA, Congress was “immersed in the intensely practical. concerns of controlling violent crime.” Id. at 594, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
Thus, the Court expressly acknowledged in Taylor that the ACCA is meant to enhance the prison sentences of career criminals who commit violent crimes “as their means of livelihood.” The Court recognized that a causal nexus exists between dangerous career criminals and subsequent gun possession — and that when both factors are present, a serious potential risk of injury to others results. That is, the ACCA is premised on the notion that a defendant with a history of violent crime is more dangerous to society when he possesses a gun. Thus, if a defendant’s previous felonies have been “violent,” the defendant is made particularly dangerous by possessing a gun — and enhancement under the ACCA is in order. When, however, the defendant’s previous conduct does not indicate he poses an elevated risk of injury to others by possessing a gun, enhancement makes no sense. Rather, in those cases the defendant who has violated the prohibition against possessing guns should be sentenced under the Guidelines in accordance with his criminal history category and offense level.
C. Leocal and Doe
The conclusion that Congress did not intend subsection (B)(ii) to encompass felo ny drunk driving laws is supported by statements in United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir.1992), and Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004). In Leocal, the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6, 125 S.Ct. at 381. The Court noted this definition of “crime of violence” is much more specific than the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 — a provision that is viewed as essentially interchangeable with the definition of “violent felony” in § 924(e)(2)(B). United States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665, 666 (8th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Kelly, 422 F.3d 889, 894 n. 2 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Montgomery, 402 F.3d 482, 488 n. 28 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330, 333 n. 5 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir.1995).
When comparing § 16(b) with § 4B 1.2, the Court in Leocal stated that “ § 16(b) plainly does not encompass all offenses which create a ‘substantial risk’ that injury will result from a person’s conduct.” Id. at 10, 125 S.Ct. at 383 n. 7. This statement could be construed to mean that the Court is predisposed to concluding that § 4B1.2 (and thus § 924(e)) does include “all offenses” that create a substantial risk injury will result from one’s conduct. However, the Court went on to state that “[t]he ordinary meaning of [crime of violence] ... suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.” Id. at 10, 125 S.Ct. at 383 (emphasis added). The Court then favorably quoted then-Chief Judge Breyer’s statement in Doe that the term “violent felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) “ ‘calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.’ ” Id. (quoting Doe, 960 F.2d at 225). This favorable citation of Doe in Leocal supports the proposition that a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2— and therefore a “violent felony” under § 924(e) — does not include drunk driving. At the very least, the tension between the Court’s initial observation that § 16(b) and § 4B1.2 encompass different conduct and its subsequent observation, citing Doe, that actively violent crimes must be distinguished from “accidental or negligent conduct” underscores the unsettled nature of whether Congress intended to include felony drunk driving convictions in the category of violent felonies as defined in § 924(e). Thus, although neither Doe nor Leocal provide direct support for the conclusion that drunk driving is not a violent felony under § 924, Leocal’s discussion of § 924(e) indicates that the Court believes drunk driving is not an actively violent crime, as required under the ACCA.
IV.
There is no question that drunk driving has destructive consequences and that state legislatures and Congress have a duty to enact laws that facilitate the identification, conviction, and punishment of drunk drivers. The issue at hand, however, is not how drunk driving should be punished. Nor is the issue whether felons should be punished in accordance with the Guidelines for illegally possessing guns. The issue is whether Congress intended to include drunk driving convictions in the category of “violent felonies” as defined in the ACCA. Congress enacted the ACCA to lengthen the sentences of career offenders “who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who, because they possess weapons, present at least a potential threat of harm to persons.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587-88, 110 S.Ct. 2143. It bears repeating that the ACCA is an enhancement statute triggered by gun possession. In imposing mandatory minimum sentences on these defendants, Congress has recognized society’s interest in enhancing the sentences of violent career criminals whose dangerousness is intensified by gun possession. Although a repeat drunk driver poses a threat to society, that threat is not intensified by the possession of a gun. Rather, a drunk driver’s threat to society is intensified by his or her choice to drink and drive again. While state legislatures and Congress are free to fashion sentencing remedies to address the threat repeat drunk drivers pose to society, it only makes sense to have those remedies triggered by the dangerous conduct in question: drunk driving.
Because the wording of § 924(e) gives rise to reasonable questions regarding whether Congress intended to include drunk driving as an enhancing crime under the ACCA, rather than expanding the scope of the statute, our court should apply the principle of lenity and construe the statute in favor of the defendant. “[A]m-biguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). Courts should not “interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958). In the case at hand, after pleading guilty to possessing a gun in violation of § 922(g)(1), McCall’s prison sentence was increased nearly six-fold, from 27-to-33 months to a mandatory minimum of 15-years. Absent clear direction from Congress, we should avoid construing the ACCA in a manner that imposes such a dire penalty on a criminal defendant. Instead, we should construe the statute at issue in McCall’s favor, recognizing that the legislative history of the ACCA indicates that Congress did not intend to include felony convictions for drunk driving inthe “otherwise involves” provision. If Congress disagrees, the statute can be amended to alleviate any question regarding Congress’s intent. This case should be remanded, and McCall should be resen-tenced without an enhancement under the ACCA.
. McCall’s criminal history category was V and his offense level was 12, which reflects a two-level reduction because McCall accepted responsibility for his offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
. However, even this clearly enumerated list has caused interpretive problems, as it is not clear from the statutes language whether Congress intended to define the enumerated crimes according to the common law, the model penal code, or the label given to crimes in state statutes. The United States Supreme Court settled this issue in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Court stated that burglary, as used in § 924(e), must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States criminal codes. Id. at 592, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court then concluded Congress "meant by burglary the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
. For the sake of convenience, this will be referred to as the “all crimes” interpretation.
. This will be referred to as the "similar crimes” interpretation.
. It also subsumes many forms of the fourth enumerated crime — extortion—which, depending on the circumstances, often creates the serious potential risk of physical harm to another.
. A full statement of the ACCA’s legislative history can be found in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581-83, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
. Pub.L. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III) (repealed in 1986 by Pub.L. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459).
. Pub.L. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458. This act recodified § 1202 as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
. Section 1402 of Subtitle I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-40.
. In discussing § 924(e), the First Circuit noted in Doe that reading the statute broadly would “bring within the statute’s host a number of other crimes that do not seem to belong there.” 960 F.2d at 225. The First Circuit went on to say that "[t]here is no reason to believe that Congress meant to enhance sentences based on, say, proof of drunken driving convictions. Rather, we must read the definition in light of the term to be defined, violent felony, which calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.” Id.