Messersmith, Defendant in Error, v. Messersmith and others, Plaintiffs in Error

Supreme Court of Missouri1856-01

22 Mo. 369

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed and the petition is dismissed because a court of equity cannot enforce a forfeiture under the deed's condition; instead, the grantor must pursue a legal remedy through entry and suit at law for possession, while the grantee's heirs may seek equitable relief through compensation or other appropriate defenses.

A grantor conveyed land to a grantee on condition that the grantee provide the grantor with adequate support for life. After the grantee died intestate without providing such support, the grantor sought equitable relief by petitioning the court to cancel the deed and restore the land to her. The court held that equity cannot be used to enforce forfeitures, even when a condition has been breached. Instead, the court explained that equity intervenes in forfeiture cases only to provide relief through compensation or other remedies that serve the parties' underlying contractual intentions, not to punish breach through penalty.

The court noted that the grantor's proper remedy lies in a legal action for possession or entry on the land. The grantee's heirs, meanwhile, could seek equitable relief by offering compensation or raising the forfeiture as a defense in a possession suit. The court suggested that if the breach here resulted merely from the grantee's failure to provide by will—rather than from fault—and if adequate means existed to compensate the grantor, equity would compel acceptance of compensation in place of forfeiture.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether equity may enforce forfeitures of land for breach of conditions
What remedies are available to a grantor when a grantee fails to perform a maintenance condition
When equitable relief may be granted to prevent forfeiture through compensation

Procedural posture

The court reviewed a judgment entered against infant defendants by default and considered the case on its merits regarding the grantor's petition for cancellation of a deed and restoration of land due to breach of a maintenance condition.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Leonard, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Without stopping to remark upon the irregularity, occurring in the proceeding, of giving judgment against infants by default, for want of an answer, we proceed at once to dispose of the case upon its merits. Here is an estate in land subject to be divested upon the non-performance of an express condition mentioned in the deed, that “ the grantee should provide for the grantor a good and sufficient maintenance during her natural lifeand the grantee having died intestate without making any provision for her support, she asks the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to enforce the penalty by directing the deed to be cancelled and the landto be restored to her. The answer to this is, that a court of equity never lends its aid to enforce forfeiture under any circumstances ; (Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Chan. Rep. 415 ;) and as we can not consider this a proceeding at law to recover the possession of the land upon the legal title that would have reverted to the plaintiff upon an entry for the breach of the condition, the judgment must be reversed and the petition dismissed.

In order however that the matter may be properly and finally settled between the parties, in any future proceeding that may be instituted for that purpose, we remark, that for any breach of the condition, the remedy of the grantor is in her own hands, by an entry and a suit at law, if necessary, to recover the possession ; and the remedy of the heirs is by a suit of equity to be relieved against the forfeiture, upon making a just compensation, or perhaps, by setting up this matter as a defence, when sued at law for the possession upon a breach of the condition. But, however this may be, the party will, in one way or the other, be relieved against the forfeiture incurred by the breach of a condition, if a proper case for equitable relief exist. In an early case, Peaety v. Somerset, 1 Strange, 447, it is said : “ The true ground of relief against penalties is from the original intent of the ease, and the court gives him all that he expected or desired; it is the recompense that gives the court a handle to grant relief.” In other words, the ground of equitable interference is, that we ought to presume the object of entering into the contract was its fulfilment, and not an infliction of an injury on one side, nor the acquisition of a collateral advantage on tbe other ; and that when this object is frustrated, the intention of the parties will be best carried out by substituting an equivalent in its stead, and not by enforcing a recovery which is excessive in value and different in nature ; and relief, we believe, is never denied, where the breach is accidental and without fault, and admits of compensation. (Livingston v. Tompkins, above cited; Popham v. Barnfield, 1 Vern. 89; Carey v. Bertie, 2 Verm. 339.)

If a breach of the condition has been incurred here, merely by the grantee’s dying without making any provision by will for the support of his mother, although leaving ample means for that purpose, which his representatives have offered to apply accordingly, and which she declines receiving, (which we are not now called upon to determine,) it is very clear that it should not be imputed to the fault of the party, and that equity would compel the party to accept a compensation in lieu of the forfeiture.

Judge Ryland concurring;

the judgment is reversed and the petition is dismissed.