The opinion of the court was delivered by
SKILLMAN, J.A.D.
These appeals challenge the validity of N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.-10(d)(l)(vii), which places a five month limit on the period a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) can receive emergency shelter assistance. One appeal was filed by the Public Advocate on behalf of himself and twelve recipients of AFDC, who alleged that the impending termination of their emergency shelter assistance would place them in imminent danger of homelessness. The second appeal was filed by the State Office of Legal Services and seven county Legal Services offices on behalf of fourteen AFDC recipients, who also alleged the termination of their emergency shelter assistance under the challenged regulation would render them homeless.
Appellants filed motions for a stay pending appeal of the five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance, which this court denied by a two-to-one vote. Appellants then filed motions for a stay pending appeal with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the motions on May 3, 1988, with three members of the court dissenting. The Court’s orders stayed the termination of emergency shelter assistance for 30 days and directed this court to decide the merits of the appeals prior to the expiration of the 30 day period.
Because the appeals challenge the same administrative regulation, we hereby consolidate them on our own motion.
The emergency assistance benefits program involved in this appeal supplements the federal AFDC program authorized by Title IVA of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. The AFDC program was enacted
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection____ [42 U.S.C. § 601; emphasis added].
Under the AFDC program “each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-319, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2134, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). Consequently, the “States have traditionally been at liberty to pay as little or as much as they choose, and there are, in fact, striking differences in the degree of aid provided among the States.” Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1216, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).
The payment of emergency assistance (EA) is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 606(e). A state which participates in the AFDC program is not required to provide EA benefits, and if a state elects to provide EA, it is not required to pay any specified level of benefits. See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 102 S. Ct. 2355, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 98 S.Ct. 2068, 56 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978).
There is no specific statutory authorization for the State of New Jersey to participate in the EA program. However, the Department of Human Services has properly construed N.J.S. A. 44:10-1 et seq. as an implied authorization for the State’s participation in this program. Cf. Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, 216 N.J.Super. 434, 446 (App.Div.1987). Such authorization has been confirmed by the inclusion of a separate line item appropriation for EA in the Annual Appropriations Act enacted by the Legislature. L.1987, c. 154 (5 N.J.Sess.Law Serv. (1987) at 280 (West)).
The present version of the State’s EA regulations was adopted on November 16, 1987, following a comprehensive review of those regulations after the decision in Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, supra. In that case, the Public Advocate challenged a 90 day limitation on emergency shelter assistance contained in the prior version of N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(c) and also a requirement imposed by administrative directive that a need for emergency shelter must be “sudden and unexpected,” rather than a situation for which the recipient had an “opportunity to plan.” The court held that the Department’s administrative interpretation of its regulations was invalid, insofar as it disqualified recipients who were aware of impending homelessness but were unable to avert the emergency before it occurred. 216 NJ.Super. at 451-453. The court further concluded that it could not definitively assess the validity of 90-day limitation on the receipt of emergency shelter assistance by AFDC recipients
until the Department itself, by way of a comprehensive public hearing, has had the opportunity to reassess that limitation in terms of the scope and nature of the homelessness problem, the existence of all other resources for homeless families and the manner in which and by whom these resources are coordinated and actually made available, the financial impact of extending emergency assistance beyond 90 days, and a consideration of whether or not there are any other appropriate and reasonable conditions or limitations which could or should be imposed in determining eligibility or continued eligibility for assistance. [216 N.J.Super. at 455].
Therefore, it remanded the matter to the Department of Human Services “for a rule-making hearing both on the effect and consequence of the 90-day limit of N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.10(c).” Id. at 456; see also Rodgers v. Gibson, 218 N.J.Super. 452 (App. Div.1987), which reached essentially the same conclusions as Maticka with respect to the regulations governing the program of emergency shelter assistance for General Assistance recipients.
In accordance with this remand, the Department of Human Services conducted “fact finding” hearings at three locations on March 19, 1987. After those hearings, the Department proposed new regulations to substantially expand the EA program, which included an authorization for two one-month extensions of the initial 90 day limitation on the receipt of emergency shelter assistance. The Department estimated that this expansion of the EA program would cost an additional $8.7 million annually, of which $2 million would come from new State appropriations, 19 N.J.R. 1174. The Department held hearings with respect to the proposed new regulations at three different locations on July 23, 1987. Thereafter, the Department made certain changes in the proposed regulations, which were adopted in final form effective November 16, 1987. N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.10.
Under the amended regulations, there are now three kinds of emergencies in which EA is available: (1) a fire, flood or other similar disaster which results in the homelessness of an eligible family; (2) a pending or actual eviction, a mortgage foreclosure, or other circumstances resulting in the loss of a permanent shelter, provided the recipient family demonstrates a lack of realistic capacity to plan for substitute housing; or (3) an imminent placement of children in foster care due to the family being subjected to a serious health or life threatening situation because of the lack of adequate shelter. N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.10(c).
Emergency assistance may consist of special allowances for food, clothing, housing, furnishings and child care. N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(d)(2)(3)(4) and (5). However, the most significant kind of EA is shelter. Under the new regulations, emergency shelter assistance now may take the form of payment of as much as three months retroactive rental, mortgage or utility costs, in order to prevent eviction or foreclosure. N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.10(c)(2)(i). Other forms of emergency shelter assistance include grants to pay expenses for establishing a new home, such as security deposits for rent and utilities, advance rent, N.J.A. C. 10:82 — 5.10(d)(l)(iii), and moving expenses, N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(d)(l)(iv). Where an emergency causes a recipient to become homeless, emergency shelter assistance involves placement in an emergency shelter, N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(d)(1), generally a hotel or motel. Such assistance may be provided for up to three months, N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(d)(l), during which time the recipient, with the aid of the county welfare agency, has a continuing responsibility to seek permanent shelter. N.J. A.C. 10:82 — 5.10(d)(l)(v); N.J.A.C. 10:82-5.10(d)(6). If permanent living arrangements cannot be obtained during the three month period, emergency shelter assistance may be continued for an additional two months. N.J.A. C. 10:82-5.10(d)(l)(vii). Thus, the maximum period during which emergency shelter assistance may be provided is five months.
Appellants do not challenge the eligibility criteria for EA or the form in which such assistance is provided. Appellants challenge only the five month limitation on such assistance.
These challenges are based entirely on State law. Appellants do not contend that the five month limit on emergency shelter assistance violates 42 US. C. § 606(e) or any other federal statute or regulation. Nor do appellants contend that this limitation violates any provision of the United States Constitution. In not relying on federal constitutional grounds, appellants were undoubtedly mindful of statements by the Supreme Court of the United States that “the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public assistance programs are not the business of this Court” and that “the Constitution does not empower this Court to second guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriads of potential recipients.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1163, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-551, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 1730-1734, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S.Ct. 862, 874, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972).
Appellants challenge the validity of the five month limitation of emergency shelter assistance on three alternative grounds. First, appellants contend that the statute governing the AFDC program, N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 et seq., mandates the provision of shelter to every recipient, and that the termination of emergency shelter assistance violates this mandate. Second, appellants contend that the five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance is arbitrary and capricious because it conflicts with the legislative policy of preventing homelessness. Finally, appellants contend that the time limitation on emergency shelter assistance violates Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the New Jersey Constitution. We reject each of these contentions and therefore affirm the validity of the Department’s regulations which impose a five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance.
I
Appellants’ statutory argument rests upon N.J.S.A. 44:10— 1(a), which is a subsection of the definitions section of the statute authorizing New Jersey’s participation in the AFDC program. This section provides:
(a) “Aid to families with dependent children” means the assistance and other services to be extended under this act to or for eligible dependent children and the parents and relatives with whom they are living, for the following purposes:
(1) To provide for the care of eligible dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives, under standards and conditions compatible with decency and health,
(2) To help maintain and strengthen family life,
(3) To help such parents or relatives to attain the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, and
(4) To provide for the care of a dependent child whose parents have been denied assistance under the provisions of section 2.
N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a) does not by itself impose any obligation upon the Department of Human Services; it only defines “aid to families with dependent children.” The State’s obligation to participate in the AFDC program is imposed by N.J.S.A. 44:10-3. This section provides:
The Commissioner of Human Services is authorized, directed and empowered to issue, or to cause to be issued by the appropriate departmental officers or agencies, all necessary rules and regulations and administrative orders, and to do or cause to be done all other acts and things necessary to secure for the State of New Jersey the maximum Federal financial participation that is available with respect to a program of aid to families with dependent children and otherwise to accomplish the purposes of this act ...
N.J.S.A. 44:10-3 then enumerates eleven purposes of the Act in lettered subparagraphs. Our Supreme Court described the more significant of those purposes as follows:
that welfare programs be in effect in all counties; that assistance be furnished with reasonable promptitude; that all resources and income be considered in determining need except that, as discussed earlier in this opinion, there shall be disregarded the amounts required by federal law as a condition of federal participation; that appropriate services be made available for strengthening family life for children; and that appropriate services and cooperative arrangements be provided with other agencies so that maximum opportunities for training and employment be available to welfare recipients. [Motyka v. McCorkle, 58 N.J. 165, 178 (1971)].
Although N.J.S.A. 44:10-3 does not restate the statutory goals set forth in N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a), we have no doubt that the Act should be administered in a manner designed to achieve both sets of statutory goals.
However, this does not mean that an administrative regulation or other administrative action which falls short of full realization of these goals is invalid. The administration of the AFDC program, like other governmental programs, is subject to the limitations imposed by the level of annual legislative appropriations for the program. If the appropriations for the AFDC program are insufficient to satisfy all the vital needs of recipients, the Department still must adopt a structure of benefits which can be provided within those appropriations.
Our courts have frequently acknowledged these limitations upon the full realization of the goals set forth in N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 et seq. In Bailey v. Engelman, 56 N.J. 54 (1970), the Court rejected a claim that the State is required to make an individualized determination of the budget needs of each recipient in administering the AFDC programe The Court stated that “[ajppellant correctly concedes the State is not required to meet the total needs of a recipient of aid.” 56 N.J. at 57. In Motyka v. McCorkle, supra, the Court rejected an argument that the State was required under N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 et seq. to provide the same level of benefits in the wholly state funded program of assistance for two parent families with insufficient income as in the AFDC program for single parent families with dependent children. The Court rejected arguments that N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 imposes specific mandates with respect to the State’s assistance programs, and it emphasized that state administrative officials must set benefits levels within the limits imposed by legislative appropriations:
[T]he legislative approach was to restrict the imposition of specific mandates to those considered by it to be absolutely essential, and to entrust the administrative agency with comprehensive powers designed to enable it to operate equitably and reasonably under general standards and within the legislative appropriation.
In N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 et seq. the Legislature set forth general goals which the Division [of Public Welfare] has conscientiously sought to achieve within the limits of available finances. [58 N.J. at 176-177].
In Matter of Petitions for Rulemaking, 223 N.J.Super. 453 (App.Div.1988), the court held that the State must establish a “standard of need” based on actual living costs in New Jersey. However, the court also recognized that the actual “level of benefits” paid to recipients is determined by the level of legislative appropriations:
The extent to which funds are to be made available to meet the standard of need under New Jersey statutes is a political question to be decided by the representatives of the people. [223 N.J.Super. at 460].
Cf. Texter v. Dep’t of Human Services, 88 N.J. 376, 386 (1982). Therefore, we reject appellants’ argument that the goals of the AFDC program identified in the statutory definition of “aid to families with dependent children” constitutes a legislative mandate to provide any specific level or form of benefits, including open-ended emergency shelter assistance designed to prevent homelessness.
Moreover, even where the Legislature has mandated a particular program, it is subject, insofar as it requires appropriations, to the Annual Appropriations Act. Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483 (1984); City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133 (1980). “The Constitution has placed the State’s conscience in these matters in the Legislature and it is that branch of government which must weigh the interests of its citizens at all levels of government.” City of Camden v. Byrne, supra, 82 N.J. at 158. Therefore, even if appellants were correct in reading N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a) to create a “substantive right” to adequate shelter, that right would still be subject to the availability of sufficient appropriations.
Although appellants concede that this court cannot force the Legislature to appropriate additional funds, they suggest that the court can require the Department to seek supplemental appropriations from the Legislature or to transfer funds appropriated for other programs in order to provide an emergency shelter assistance program of unlimited duration. However, since N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a) does not require any particular form of AFDC or EA program or any particular level of benefits, the Department has no statutory obligation to seek additional appropriations for these programs.
Beyond that, the courts lack the power to require the executive branch of government to seek appropriations. As stated by the Court in City of Camden v. Byrne:
Some plaintiffs also maintain that despite the responsibility of the legislative branch to enact appropriations and the inability of the courts to compel such legislative action, the courts stand in a different posture vis-a-vis the Governor with respect to his constitutional and statutory responsibilities over State expenditures. The Governor is statutorily authorized to “examine and consider all requests for appropriations” and to “formulate ... budget recommendations” to be forwarded to the Legislature for its consideration and ultimate approval. NJ.S.A. 52:27B-20. Although the power to expend and actually appropriate monies from the State treasury is reserved exclusively to the Legislature, see N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § II, par. 2, the Governor does have a constitutional role. He may formally object to any item or items included in an appropriation bill by exercising his line-item veto, thereby excising that item or items from the bill. ... The Governor’s statutory authority to propose the State budget and his constitutional power to exercise a selective veto over legislative appropriations reflects his significant responsibilities over the State’s fiscal affairs and are an important aspect of the centralization of state finances essential to efficient modern government operations. ... Since these executive responsibilities are so clearly involved in the budget process, and since the ultimate constitutional responsibility for appropriations rests with the Legislature, the judiciary is without authority to compel either the Legislature to make a specific appropriation or the Governor to recommend or approve one. [82 N.J. at 149-150].
While the Camden case involved the Governor’s role in the appropriations process, we see no constitutional or statutory-distinction between the Governor’s role and that of the members of his cabinet. Indeed, a cabinet officer’s role in the budget process is completely subordinate to that of the Governor. Department heads only make requests for appropriations, which the Office of Budget Management reviews and transmits to the Governor with its findings, comments and recommendations. See N.J.S.A. 52:27B-14, 16 and 19. It is the Governor who then formulates a single proposed state budget which is submitted to the Legislature. See NJ.S.A. 52:27B-20; N.J.S.A. 52:9H-1. Moreover, any proposed transfer of appropriated funds by a cabinet officer is subject to statutory control by other executive and legislative officials. Thus, any transfer in excess of $200,000 must be approved by both the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting and the Legislative Budget and Finance Officer. A. 1987, c. 154 (5 NJ.Sess.Law Serv. (1987) at 396-397 (West)). Therefore, the judiciary cannot order a department head to make a request for an appropriation or to transfer funds anymore than it can order the Governor to include a recommendation for an appropriation in his proposed budget.
Accordingly, we reject appellants’ argument that N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a) obligates the Department of Human Services to grant emergency shelter assistance of unlimited duration, regardless of the level of EA appropriations and regardless of the other needs of recipients which must be met out of these appropriations.
II
An administrative regulation which does not directly contradict the enabling legislation pursuant to which it was adopted still may be found “arbitrary and capricious” and therefore invalid. Texter v. Dept. of Human Services, 88 N.J. 376, 389 (1982); Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 50 (1976). When an administrative regulation is challenged on these grounds, a reviewing court is required to defer to the expertise of the agency entrusted by the Legislature with responsibility for the program and to accord the agency’s judgment a presumption of validity. Bergen Pines Hosp. v. Dept. of Human Services, 96 N.J. 456, 477-479 (1984); Texter v. Dept. of Human Services, supra, 88 N.J. at 389; Motyka v. McCorkle, supra, 58 N.J. at 181.
Appellants argue that the five month limitation on the payment of emergency shelter assistance is arbitrary and capricious because it will result in the homelessness of some recipients, contrary to the state’s policy to avoid homelessness expressed in N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a) and various other legislative enactments. See Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 448-449, which catalogues that legislation. More specifically, appellants argue that because the inadequacy of the basic AFDC grant and the shortage of affordable housing make it very difficult for an AFDC recipient to obtain permanent shelter, it is arbitrary and capricious to place a five month limit on the period emergency shelter assistance will be paid. As stated by the Public Advocate, “[a]ppellants pinpoint the ever-widening gap between AFDC benefit levels and rising housing costs as the primary impediment to obtaining permanent shelter.”
When the Department of Human Services proposed the new EA regulations, it gave the following reasons for the five month limit on the receipt of emergency shelter assistance:
The Department had seriously considered the unrestricted extension of the 90 day limit for emergency shelter (that is, maximum of two calendar months following the month in which the state of homelessness becomes known to the CWA). However, monthly and annual fiscal reports submitted by CWAs of emergency assistance cases, recipients and disbursements disclosed that 95 percent of emergency situations lasted less than 90 days. Significantly, more than half of the emergencies (52.1%) were resolved within one week, with two-thirds resolved in three weeks, and nearly three-fourths of all emergencies addressed within a month. At all times during the emergent situation, a family continues to receive its monthly public assistance grant. To expand the EA program further could result in a separate permanent public assistance program for housing and shelter, which would merely compensate for the inadequacies of current programs which are specifically charged by Congress and the legislatures with providing housing assistance for low-income families. Neighboring states’ recent experience with unlimited EA for housing resulted in an enormous cost to the public with no permanent solutions to homelessness. [19 N.J.R. 1173].
In a March 10, 1988 report to the Legislature, the Commissioner of Human Services expanded upon his Department’s reasons for not adopting regulations which would authorize emergency shelter assistance for an indefinite period of time:
A shortage of affordable housing has created a crisis for many New Jerseyans. This housing shortage, fueled by skyrocketing housing costs, gentrification, and increased commercial and residential development in urban centers, has made it increasingly difficult for low-income families to remain adequately housed— It is this structural problem of too little affordable housing that gives rise to most homelessness and that creates the need for emergency assistance in the state’s AFDC program.
Any attempt to alleviate homelessness short of systemic efforts to expand the supply of affordable housing — an expensive and difficult effort at best — will fall short. In the absence of an increased housing supply, our programs, including emergency assistance, must be marginal solutions that mitigate, but do not eliminate, the problems of homelessness. To expect more from the tools at hand, including emergency assistance, is unrealistic and to attempt to turn these limited tools into broad solutions is impossible.
It is only in this context that the state’s emergency assistance program can be understood. The emergency assistance program is intended to provide emergency, time-limited assistance to individuals on AFDC. Available services under emergency assistance include emergency shelter, food, up to three months back rental assistance, security deposits, replacement of lost clothing or furniture, and health and social service supports. But despite this broad scope of benefits, the AFDC law does not contemplate that emergency assistance be an ongoing housing subsidy program.
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[D]ramatic action has already been taken by the Department on emergency assistance. But removing the time limit — the last available liberalization in emergency assistance — presents enormous problems.
First, an open-ended emergency assistance program duplicates the AFDC program. Providing both together amounts to a selective and dramatic AFDC grant level increase for a subset of the population — those who receive emergency assistance.
Second, emergency assistance is the wrong way to attempt to keep families permanently and adequately housed. Federal matching funds are not available for open-ended emergency assistance. Indeed, the Department of Health and Human Services attempted in 1987 to limit emergency assistance to 30 days; this attempt was temporarily stopped only by Congressional intervention. Third, open-ended emergency assistance fails to address the root cause of homelessness — an inadequate and shrinking supply of affordable housing. Emergency assistance is not a long range answer to homelessness; reliance on it only diverts attention and funds from the real need.
Fourth, eliminating the time limit on emergency assistance would create an enormous unfunded liability in the AFDC program. The current limited policy is already causing a severe deficit in emergency assistance. We are, therefore, already beyond our fiscal limits in the emergency assistance program, even without an open-ended policy.
Fifth, limited emergency assistance funds must be used for “emergencies.” Ongoing housing support, a use not anticipated in Federal policy, state regulation, or, most importantly, budget appropriations, will make the Department unable to use these limited funds for time-limited needs____
Sixth, we must ask what would be supported by an unlimited emergency assistance program. Such an approach would make residence in hotels or motels a permanent fact of life for some New Jersey welfare recipients and their children____
Finally, we must consider the cost of an unlimited emergency assistance program. We have seen that the changes already made in emergency assistance have added $15 million to the cost of the program. Removing the time limit would add at least $20 million — all unbudgeted — to this total. And again, these funds would support only the worst living arrangements in hotels and motels, at an average monthly cost of $l,200-$2,000.
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... Trying to contort a program — emergency assistance — that was designed for an entirely different purpose into a solution to the low-income housing problem is a losing proposition. All of America is struggling with the tragedy of homelessness; we cannot address it through a limited, inappropriate welfare program.
We find nothing arbitrary and capricious in the Department’s reasons for limiting the duration of emergency shelter assistance. The Department’s EA regulations reflect an awareness of the need for a governmental response to imminent homelessness. The regulations also reflect an awareness that the shortage of affordable housing is one of the root causes of the homelessness problem, but that only limited government funds are available to address the problem. Therefore, those funds must be wisely spent. While emergency shelter assistance provides a temporary response to an imminent need for housing, it is both enormously expensive for the government and a highly unsatisfactory form of shelter for recipients. Therefore, we conclude that the Commissioner’s decision to limit the duration of emergency shelter assistance rationally serves the goal of equitably apportioning the limited funds appropriated for welfare among AFDC recipients.
Ill
Appellants’ constitutional attack upon the five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance is based entirely on Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the New Jersey Constitution, which provide:
AH persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. [N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 1].
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it. [N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 2].
Appellants’ theory is that these provisions impose an affirmative obligation upon state government to provide certain necessities of life for indigent persons, including shelter. However, this theory is not supported by the history of these constitutional provisions, their language, or the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, were adopted in substantially their present form in the 1844 New Jersey Constitution. These constitutional provisions set forth principles of government substantially similar to those expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Comparable provisions are contained in the constitutions of most other states. C.W. Heckel, “The Bill of Rights” (Monograph), II Proceedings of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, 1336, 1338-1340. These provisions, as well as other paragraphs of the Bill of Rights, were intended to establish “a limitation upon the capacity of the sovereign" and to make clear that “the people are the master, and the sovereign the servant.” Id. at 1336.
These principles of democratic government, rooted in eighteenth century political philosophy, are fundamentally different from any concept of a governmental obligation to provide social services. A prohibition against the government interfering with a citizen’s “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,” secured by Article I, paragraph 1, of the New Jersey Constitution, does not imply any governmental obligation to provide shelter or other necessities at public expense. Likewise, Article I, paragraph 2, articulates the basic democratic principle that the purpose of government is to serve the people and that the people therefore have the right to change the form of government, but this provision does not impose an affirmative obligation on government to furnish the necessities of life to its citizens.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of New Jersey have consistently held that Article I, paragraph 1 secures individual liberties against governmental infringement but does not mandate government financing of social services. Thus, in Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 (1982), the Court held that a statute which prohibited Medicaid funding for most abortions violated Article I, paragraph 1. However, the rationale for this holding was that Article I, paragraph 1 implicitly guarantees equal protection of the laws, and that the exclusion of medically necessary abortions from a system providing all other medically necessary care for indigents violated this guarantee. 91 N.J. at 310. The Court specifically stated: “[T]he right of the individual [under Article I, paragraph 1] is freedom from undue government interference, not an assurance of government funding.” 91 N.J. at 307, n. 5. Therefore, Right to Choose recognizes that the State has no constitutional obligation to finance medical care for the needy, but if it chooses to provide such care, it may not invidiously discriminate with respect to the services it provides. Similarly, in Barone v. Dept. of Human Services, 107 N.J. 355 (1987), the Court rejected a claim that Article I, paragraph 1 was violated by a provision of the Pharmaceutical Assistance to the Aged and Disabled Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4D~20 to 35, which granted benefits to disabled persons under 65 who received social security payments but denied benefits to disabled persons under 65 who did not receive social security. The Court noted that its opinion in Right to Choose had not rested on a “constitutional right to health.” 107 N.J. at 369. The Court went on to say:
State funds available for public assistance programs are limited. It is the Legislature that has the duty to allocate the resources of the State. As long as the classification chosen by the Legislature rationally advances a legitimate governmental objective, it need not be the wisest, the fairest, or the one we would choose. It is not for the courts to determine if there is a better way to allocate resources under these programs. [107 N.J. at 370].
The cases interpreting Article I, paragraph 1 relied upon by appellants involved traditional challenges on equal protection or due process grounds to legislative enactments which allegedly infringed upon individual rights. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra; State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99 (1979) (municipal ordinance which prohibited more than four unrelated individuals from sharing a single housing unit held to deny due process); Taxpayers Ass ’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6 (1976), cert. den. 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L.Ed.2d 373 (1977) (zoning ordinance which limited use of mobile homes to families in which the head of household or spouse was 52 years of age or older held not to deny equal protection); cf. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 249-250 (1981) (Article I, paragraph 1 encompasses the right of a mentally retarded person to be sterilized). However, none of these cases interpreted Article I, paragraph 1 to impose an affirmative obligation upon the government to finance social services.
Similarly, in Southern Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Tp., 67 N.J. 151, 174-175 (1975) (Mount Laurel I) and Southern Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158, 208-209 (1983) (Mount Laurel II), the Court held that a municipality which uses its zoning power to exclude housing for lower income persons violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of Article I, paragraph 1. See also Hills Development Co. v. Bernard Tp., 103 N.J. 1, 40 (1986). However, the Court did not hold that either the State or municipalities have any constitutional obligation to construct housing for lower income persons.
We also note that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article-1, which protect persons from improper exercises of government power, are fundamentally different from the Education Clause of the New Jersey Constitution, which imposes an affirmative obligation upon the Legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this State between the age of five and eighteen years.” N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1. See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501-521 (1973). There is no constitutional provision comparable to the Education Clause which obligates the State to provide free shelter for citizens who are unable to afford it.
The Public Advocate also argues that the five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance “violates the equal protection concepts enshrined in Article I, par. 1.” The Advocate claims that this limitation discriminates against AFDC recipients who are unable to secure permanent shelter within five months. However, such a classification will not be invalidated unless it is shown not to rationally advance a legitimate governmental objective. Barone v. Dept. of Human Services, supra, 107 N.J. at 370. We are satisfied for the reasons expressed at length in section II of this opinion that the five month limitation on emergency shelter assistance is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of equitably apportioning the limited funds appropriated for welfare among AFDC recipients.
Finally, we note our whole-hearted agreement with the view of our dissenting colleague, expressed in Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, supra, 216 N.J. Super, at 447, that “a civilized society cannot tolerate the homelessness of those of its members who are too impoverished to provide shelter for themselves.” See also DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 436 (1970) (noting that the critical housing situation addressed in that case “cries out for the active and continuous exercise of the highest responsible citizenship by all segments of the population and all governmental bodies.”) However, the common consensus that government is obligated to address the problems of homelessness does not mean that this obligation is enshrined in the Constitution. Government has many obligations, such as the care of the mentally ill and retarded, the protection of its citizens from criminals, and the maintenance of a basic transportation system, which may be properly characterized as fundamental. But the manner in which government discharges these obligations, and the amount of money it is prepared to allocate to any particular area of its responsibilities, are subjects within the province of the executive and legislative branches, rather than the judiciary. We add that the executive and legislative branch es of state government have addressed the problem of homelessness by proposing and enacting new legislative programs, such as the Prevention of Homelessness Act of 1984, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-280, et seq. and the Emergency Shelters for the Homeless Act of 1985, N.J.S.A. 55:1301 et seq., and by increasing appropriations for existing housing programs. These new initiatives have not yet solved the problem of homelessness, but we refuse to presume that these legislative enactments and the efforts of the Commissioner of Human Services will fall short of their goals. In any event, the difficulties experienced by the responsible government agencies in dealing with homelessness do not elevate the problem to constitutional dimensions, or justify judicial intervention.
Consequently, we affirm the validity of the part of the Department of Human Services’ EA regulations which impose a five month limit on the receipt of emergency shelter assistance.
A third appeal challenging the five month limit on emergency shelter assistance was filed at the same time as these two appeals, Gresham v. Department of Human Services, A-3755-87T5. However, we were advised at oral argument that Gresham had obtained permanent shelter during the pendency of this appeal and hence was no longer in need of emergency shelter assistance. Consequently, we dismissed the Gresham appeal as moot by order dated May 26, 1988. We were also advised at oral argument that four of the appellants represented by the Public Advocate had obtained permanent shelter subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal in McCurdy.
The original five month maximum period for the receipt of emergency shelter assistance under the new regulation was scheduled to expire on March 31, 1988. However, the Department has extended this expiration date, first to April 30, 1988 and then to May 31, 1988, see 20 NJ.R. 933.
Similar changes were made, effective January 4, 1988, in the regulations governing the EA program for General Assistance recipients, including an increase from three to five months in the maximum period emergency shelter assistance may be provided. See N.J.A.C. 10:85-4.6.
Indeed, the Department of Human Services indicates that it has been notified by the United States Department of Health and Human Services that federal funding will not be available with respect to any emergency shelter assistance provided beyond 90 days. However, the federal regulations implementing the EA program, 45 C.F.R. 233.120, are subject to varying interpretations, and we assume that the Department will pursue all available avenues to secure full federal participation for all aspects of its expanded EA program.
We note that the Legislature has often expansively described the purposes of various governmental programs without appropriating sufficient funds to fully achieve those purposes. For example, although N.J.S.A. 27:25-2(b) declares that it is the responsibility of the State to establish and provide for the operation and improvement of a coherent public transportation system in the most efficient and effective manner, there continue to be shortcomings in the states public transportation system due to insufficient appropriations.
We also note that acceptance of appellants’ arguments in this case would have ramifications far beyond emergency shelter assistance to avoid homelessness. The objective of AFDC set forth in N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(a)(l) is ”[t]o provide for the care of eligible children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives, under standards and conditions compatible with decency and health. Surely, achievement of these objectives would require not only shelter but also food, clothing, medical care and other vital human needs. Moreover, the reference to “standards and conditions compatible with decency and health could be easily construed to require a certain qualitative level of benefits; for example, not only shelter” but adequate shelter and not only “food” but nourishing food.” See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Security of Human Services, 400 Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603, 612-614 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1987). We do not mean to denigrate the importance of these needs of AFDC recipients; to the contrary, all parties to these appeals agree that every effort should be made to satisfy them. However, we make these observations to demonstrate the breadth of appellants’ arguments.
The number of families whose emergency shelter assistance is subject to termination due to expiration of the five month limit is constantly changing, as some families whose EA is scheduled to expire find permanent shelter and others reach the end of the five month period for receipt of EA. In his March 10, 1988 report to the Legislature, the Commissioner of Human Services reported that there were 940 families whose emergency shelter assistance was scheduled to terminate as of March 31, 1988. At the oral argument before us on May 17, 1988, the Assistant Attorney General representing the Department indicated that there were 463 families whose emergency shelter assistance was scheduled to terminate.
This court similarly observed in Matter of Petitions for Rulemaking, supra, that:
Since 1971 neither inflation nor actual need has been a factor in the New Jersey standard of need. Id. [New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 483 F.2d 723] at 726 [ (3d Cir.1973) ]. The consequence has been that by 1987 despite a 176% increase in the consumer price index, AFDC benefits, taking into account both cash allotment and food stamps, have increased only 77% in New Jersey. A study conducted by the National Social Science and Law Project showed that in 1985 the New Jersey monthly payment together with the maximum food stamp allotment for a family of four covered only 46% of the family’s actual basic needs. [223 N.J.Super. at 458].
Appellants do not dispute the Departments representations that the combined effect of the stay of the prior EA regulations granted in Maticka and the liberalization of EA eligibility criteria and benefits in the new EA regulation have caused a deficit of approximately $15,000,000 in the EA appropriations for the current year. In addition, the Commissioner of Human Services estimates that the elimination of any time limit on emergency shelter assistance would add another $20,000,000 to EA expenditures, thereby increasing the deficit in the EA program. These dire fiscal forecasts would be subject to downward revision to the extent other legislative programs addressed to the problem of homelessness, referred to elsewhere in this opinion, succeed in their goals.
The only change in the 1947 Constitution was the substitution of persons for men in Article I, paragraph 1. There was no change in Article I, paragraph 2.
There were several proposals made at the 1947 Constitutional Convention to include a specific provision in the New Jersey Constitution regarding public welfare. See III Proceedings of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, Appendix, Recommendations of the League of Women Voters, at 360-361; II Proceedings, supra, Delegate Proposal No. 41, at 1020-1021; II Proceedings, supra, Delegate Amendment No. 12 to Proposal 2-1 of the Committee on the Legislative, at 1093. All of these proposals were merely permissive; they would have authorized legislation to address the problems of the needy, but not mandated any form of public assistance. For example, the relevant part of proposal no. 41 was as follows:
Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent the Legislature from providing as it may deem proper by general laws:
For the aid, care and support of the needy;
********
For health and welfare services for children and the needy;
For the aid, care and support of neglected and dependent children and of the needy, ... [II Proceedings, at 1021],
The first sentence of the second paragraph to the Declaration of Independence states, in language similar to Article I, paragraph 1, that;
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights states, in language even more similar to Article I, paragraph 1:
I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. K.M. Rowland, The Life and Correspondence of George Mason, 438-439 (1964).
The second sentence of the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence states in part, in language similar to Article I, paragraph 2, that:
That to secure these rights. Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government____
And the Virginia Declaration of Rights declares in pertinent part that:
II. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people;
III. That government is or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, ... and that when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. Rowland, supra, at 439.
Although the Public Advocate also relies upon Article I, paragraph 2, he does not cite any case law to support his argument under this provision.
As an alternative to her statutory rationale, our dissenting colleague proposes the novel theory that the doctrine of parens patriae imposes an affirmative obligation on the government to provide shelter to AFDC families, and that Article I, paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution makes that obligation a matter of constitutional imperative. Preliminarily, we note that appellants have not relied on the doctrine of parens patriae in support of their constitutional arguments. Consequently, the State has been deprived of any opportunity to respond to this theory and this court has been denied the benefit of an adversarial presentation. This is the reason that courts ordinarily do not consider arguments sua sponte that have not been briefed or argued by the litigants. See Planned Parenthood of New York City v. State, 75 N.J. 49, 55 (1977). In our view, this principle of judicial restraint should be adhered to in the present case, which involves the validity of a component of one of the State’s major public welfare programs. In any event, we find the dissent’s theory to be insupportable. The doctrine of parens patriae relates to the jurisdiction of the chancery courts over private disputes relating to the welfare of children and incompetents. Thus, of the cases cited by the dissent, Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525 (1956) and E. v. T., 124 N.J.Super. 535 (Ch.Div.1973) involved child custody disputes between parents, and In re Hannah Barry, 61 N.J.Eq. 135 (Ch.1900) and Seaboard By-Products Co. v. Luszcs, 100 N.J.L. 54 (Sup.Ct.1924), rev’d on other grounds, 101 NJ.L. 170 (E. & A.1925), involved claims on behalf of children to support from private funds. However, none of the cases cited by the dissent, or any other authority we have been able to locate, suggests that the parens patriae doctrine encompasses any affirmative governmental obligation, independent of statute, to furnish support at public expense for any class of its citizens. In fact, one commentator has stated that "according to our system of government, the power of parens patriae belongs exclusively to the legislature of each state, and is not possessed by the courts.” 4 Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) § 1304 at 870 n. 14. Therefore, even if Article I, paragraph 2 incorporated the doctrine of parens patriae, this could not affect the validity of the EA regulations challenged on this appeal. Moreover, as described in the text of this opinion, Article I, paragraph 2 is purely an affirmation of the basic democratic principle that the people retain the right to change their form of government by constitutional amendment. See Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 470-471 (1964); Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Public Schools, 187 N.J.Super. 224, 250 (App.Div.1982), mod. on other grounds, 95 N.J. 65 (1983); see also The City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 191 (E. & A.1946); Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N.J.L. 592, 608 (E. & A.1913). It was not intended to confer any constitutional rights upon individuals. See The State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 375 (Sup.Ct.1845), affd o.b. 21 N.J.L. 699 (E. & A.1848).