Jacob Bowers v. The State of Ohio

Supreme Court of Ohio1876-12

29 Ohio St. 542

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant in a seduction prosecution, because the statute protects females of good current reputation under eighteen regardless of past errors, and properly excluded evidence of a privileged communication between the victim and her attorney made in the presence of her mother acting as a confidential agent. The motion to overturn the conviction was overruled.

A defendant in a seduction case challenged the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The defendant sought to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct to undermine her credibility, and also attempted to present evidence of an alleged admission the victim made to her attorney. The core legal question was whether Ohio's seduction statute—which protects females of good reputation under eighteen years old who are induced into sexual relations by promise of marriage—allows defendants to introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual history to rebut her claim of good reputation.

The court held that the statute's plain language protects any female under eighteen with a current good reputation for chastity, regardless of her past conduct. The law recognizes that even women who have erred sexually may reform themselves and earn a spotless reputation, which the statute is designed to protect. Evidence of specific prior acts of intercourse by the victim with others was properly excluded because reputation, not personal conduct, is what matters under the statute. However, evidence that the defendant himself had previously engaged in sexual relations with the victim was properly admitted, as it tends to show the sexual act was not committed under a promise of marriage rather than to impeach her character.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a seduction statute protects only women of inherently pure conduct or those with a current good reputation regardless of past sexual history
Whether evidence of a victim's prior sexual acts is admissible to impeach her good reputation in a seduction case
Whether communications between a witness and her attorney are privileged when made in the presence of her mother

Procedural posture

The defendant moved for a new trial based on the trial court's evidentiary rulings excluding certain testimony and refusing a requested jury instruction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Welch, C. J.

The instruction asked by the defendant and refused by the court, and the rejection of testimony tending to show specific acts of lewdness on the part of theprosecutrix, raise the same question, namely, whether the protection of the statute extends to all females under the age-of eighteen whose reputation for chastity is good, or only to such as have deservedly acquired that reputation by a pure life. It seems to us that the plain words of the statute leave no room for doubt on this question. The statute provides: “ That any person over the age of eighteen years, who, under promise of marriage, shall have illicit carnal intercourse with any female of good repute for chastity, under the age of eighteen years, shall be deemed guilty of seduction.” Language could hardly be plainer. It is the reputation and the age of the female, and not her previous conduct, that bring her within the protection of the statute. The law wisely and justly accords to the erring female a locus pcenitentice. If she has repented of her past error, and by her upright walk acquired an unimpeachable reputation for chastity, the law protects her against the man who overcomes her good resolves by a promise of marriage. It-is the purity and integrity of her mind, and not merely those of her person, that the law designs to guard against the attacks of the seducer; and it looks alone to her general repute as evidence of that purity and integrity. We-think, therefore, that the court was right in excluding evi deuce of specific acts of intercourse by the prosecutrix with persons other than the defendant. Evidence of the defendant’s previous connection with her stands on a different basis. Such evidence was properly admitted, not, however, for the purpose of impeaching her character, but because it tends to show that the criminal act charged was not committed under a promise of marriage. We are supported in this view of the case by decisions in several of the states, under similar or analogous statutes. We refer to 11 Ind. 466; 13 Id. 46; 20 Id. 44; 21 Id. 15; 25 Id. 90; 29 Id. 267; 26 N. Y. 203.

The remaining question is, whether the court erred in refusing to receive evidence of the alleged admission of the prosecutrix, made in consultation with her attorney. We think not. She was a mere witness and not a party, and as such witness was compelled to testify. The case, therefore, comes clearly within the rule in regard to privileged communications, unless the presence of her mother at the time of her interview excludes it. It is well established that the privilege extends as well to communications to or through an agent, as to those made directly to the attorney by the client in person, and we think it is only a dictate of decency and propriety to regard the mother in such a case as being present and acting in the character of confidential agent of her daughter. The daughter’s youth and supposed modesty would render the presence and participation of her mother appropriate and necessary.

We see no error in the case, and the motion must be overruled.

Motion overruled.