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Hill vs. The State of Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia1883-09-11
72 Ga. 131

Summary

Holding. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that sympathy should not govern their discretion to recommend life imprisonment for murder, as the statute grants juries unlimited discretionary authority to make such recommendations without prescribed limitations. The judgment was reversed.

George Hill was convicted of murder and sought a new trial, arguing among other grounds that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on its sentencing discretion. Under Georgia law, a murder conviction carried a death sentence unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. The trial court told jurors they should base any recommendation for life imprisonment on their judgment and the evidence, explicitly instructing them not to be governed by sympathy. Hill challenged this instruction as an improper restriction on the jury's discretion.

The court found that the statute granting juries discretion to recommend life imprisonment imposed no limitations or conditions on how that discretion should be exercised. By instructing the jury that sympathy should not guide their decision, the trial court imposed restrictions that the law did not authorize. The court cited its prior holding in a cattle-stealing case, establishing that juries possess an unfettered right to grant mercy, and trial courts should not constrain that right through limiting jury instructions.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Scope of jury discretion in recommending mercy or life imprisonment in capital cases
  • Propriety of trial court instructions limiting jury consideration of sympathy in sentencing recommendations
  • Statutory interpretation of murder sentencing provisions allowing jury discretion

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction and the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Blandford, Justice.

George Hill was indicted and found guilty of the mur der of Bill Bryant. A motion for a new trial was made upon several grounds, which was overruled by the court below, and the defendant excepted, and assigns as error the refusal of the court to grant said motion. It is unnecessary to consider but one ground contained in the motion for new trial. The court below instructed the jury, “ If you find this defendant guilty, then you have a right, under our law, either to find him guilty without a recommendation, or you have the right, if you find him guilty, to recommend that he be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. If you find him guilty, it is for you to consider the case and say whether it is a proper case for that or not. You are not to be governed in that instance by your sympathies, but by your judgment, to say whether or not it is such a case as it ought to be done. You must be governed by your judgment, approved by the evidence * * * in the case and the law applicable to it, and then say what is your duty as twelve upright, sworn jurors; if you seo proper to recommend his imprisonment for life, you will then find that verdict * * * ; if you think it is not such a case as would make it proper to so recommend, then you are to find him guilty * *

The Code of Georgia, §4323, declares: “ The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death, but may be confinement in the penitentiary for life in the following cases: If the jury trying the case shall so recommend. If the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial testimony, the presiding judge may sentence to confinement in the penitentiary for life; in the former case it is not discretionary with the judge; in the latter it is.” This statute leaves it in the discretion of the jury as to whether they will recommend imprisonment for life in the penitentiary of a person convicted of murder; it is not limited or circumscribed in any respect whatever. This law does not prescribe any rule by which the jury may or ought to exercise this great discretion; it does not say that the jury are not to be governed by ■ their sympathies, and that they are to be governed by their judgment, as instructed by the court below. The court below imposed, by its charge, restrictions upon the jury unauthorized and unwarranted by the statute. In the case of Johnson vs. State, 58 Ga., 491, this court held the same thing; that is, where a party was charged with the offence of cattle stealing, which was felonious upon conviction, unless the jury recommended to mercy, in which event the punishment was as for a misdemeanor, that “ the right of the jury is to -lessen the punishment by the grant of mercy, and the right of the defendant is to receive mercy from the jury, if they see proper to grant it. * * The law not limiting this free grant of mercy in the jury, the court should not limit it in charging the law thereon.”

The court below committed error in his instructions to the jury, as above set forth, and should have granted a new trial on this ground.

Judgment reversed.