STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. ISAAC N. WILLIAMS, JR., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

Supreme Court of New Jersey1980-01-25

81 N.J. 498

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the defendant is entitled to credit toward his sentence for the time he spent on probation while his sentence modification was on appeal.

In 1973, a defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 14 to 15 years in prison. The trial court later modified the sentence by suspending the unserved portion and placing the defendant on probation with a requirement to complete drug rehabilitation. The State appealed and successfully had the original sentence reinstated, returning the defendant to prison. The defendant then sought credit toward his sentence for the approximately three years he spent on probation while the modification was in effect. The trial court denied this request, but the Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that denying credit would constitute double jeopardy. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

The court held that the defendant should receive credit for time served on probation. The court reasoned that sentences must be clear and certain, and a defendant should serve an uninterrupted sentence unless the interruption results from the defendant's own wrongdoing such as escape or violation of conditions. Seeking legal review of a sentence modification is not a wrongful act by the defendant, and the error in placing him on probation was attributable to the trial court. Additionally, the defendant successfully completed the rehabilitation program during this period, and denying credit would work against the interests of justice. The court declined to address the separate double jeopardy question since its reasoning on other grounds resolved the case.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for time served on probation during appeal of a modified sentence
Whether denying such credit would constitute multiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause
Principles of sentencing clarity and certainty

Procedural posture

The defendant was convicted of murder in 1973, the trial court subsequently modified his sentence in 1974, the State appealed and had the original sentence reinstated, and the defendant then moved for sentence credit for his time on probation, which the trial court denied before the matter reached the appellate courts.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted of murder in 1973. After the court sentenced him to a term of 14 to 15 years in State Prison, he moved for reconsideration of sentence under R. 3:21-10. In November 1974, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. It suspended the unserved prison term and imposed probation for five years, conditioned upon successful completion of an in-patient drug rehabilitation program. The State successfully appealed the modification order. State v. Williams, 139 N.J.Super. 290 (App.Div.1976), aff’d o.b. 75 N.J. 1 (1977). The original sentence was reinstated, and the defendant returned to State Prison.

Defendant then moved for sentence credit for the time spent on probation, November 20, 1974 to November 14, 1977. The trial court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that without credit the time spent on probation would constitute multiple punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 167 N.J.Super. 203 (App.Div.1979). We granted the State’s petition for certification, 81 N.J. 272 (1979).

We see no reason why the defendant should be denied credit for the time period when he was on probation. As Justice (then Judge) Handler wrote in State v. Braeunig, 122 N.J.Super. 319, 334 (App.Div.1973):

It is axiomatic that sentences not be ambiguous and thus subject to confusion or misunderstanding as to the time and manner in which they are to be served. Sentences must be certain, definite and consistent in all their terms, [citations omitted]

A defendant is generally entitled to serve an uninterrupted sentence, unless broken because of escape, violation of probation or parole, or some other fault of the defendant. It cannot be said that pursuit of legal redress in making a motion to modify the original sentence constitutes a wrongful act. But see Hunter v. McDonald, 159 F.2d 861 (10 Cir. 1947). Here, the error in placing defendant on probation was that of the trial court. We also note that when the State appealed, it did not seek a stay of the trial court’s order.

The interest of justice would not be served by denying the defendant credit for his probation, particularly in view of the fact that during that time he successfully completed the drug rehabilitation program. This situation is analogous to cases in which a defendant had been erroneously released or paroled and was granted, upon reimprisonment, credit for the time which elapsed while he was not in custody. White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10 Cir. 1930) (release); McKellar v. Arizona State Dept. of Corrections, 115 Ariz. 591, 594, 566 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Sup.Ct.1977) (parole).

In view of our holding we find it unnecessary to pass upon the issue of whether time served on probation is punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

For affirmance—Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK—6.

For reversal —None.

See, e. g., Hall v. Bostic, 529 F.2d 990 (4 Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1733, 48 L.Ed.2d 199 (1976); United States v. Guzzi, 275 F.2d 725 (3 Cir. 1960); Kaplan v. Hecht, 24 F.2d 664 (2 Cir. 1928), holding that probation is not such punishment. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2077, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 665-666 (1969), stating that a defendant is entitled to credit for time served in prison upon resentence subsequent to a conviction on retrial.