MEMORANDUM
1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) didn’t err in examining the criminal complaint and the abstract of judgment to determine that Marroquin-Ibarra had been convicted of elder abuse with a dangerous weapon. see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct, 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); see also CaLPenal Code §§ 368(b)(1), 12022(b)(1). Marro-quin-Ibarra’s claim that he didn’t use a dangerous weapon is an impermissible collateral attack on his state court conviction. See Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2011).
2. The BIA didn’t err in adopting the immigration judge’s determination that elder abuse with a dangerous weapon is a crime of violence because the crime presents a “substantial risk that physical force ... may be used” against another person. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Marroquin-Ibarra’s argument that he lacked intent is belied by the fact that a conviction for elder abuse requires a finding that the defendant “willfully cause[d] or permitted] any elder ... to suffer.” CaLPenal Code § 368(b)(1).
DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.