EX PARTE FAHEY, FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK COMMISSIONER, et al.

Supreme Court of the United States1947-06-23No. No. 133, Misc.

332 U.S. 25891 L. Ed. 204167 S. Ct. 15581947 U.S. LEXIS 2882SCDB 1946-137

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for extraordinary writs is denied, and the applicants must pursue their grievance through the ordinary appeal process rather than through the Court's original jurisdiction.

Petitioners sought extraordinary writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction to overturn a district court judge's order allowing $50,000 in attorney fees in a related case. The petitioners contended that the judge lacked authority to award fees while an appeal was pending, that such an award was premature before final judgment, and raised questions about the source of funds for payment and whether a single judge could act in a matter assigned to a three-judge court.

The Supreme Court acknowledged these were serious legal questions but declined to exercise its original jurisdiction for extraordinary remedies. The Court emphasized that such drastic remedies should only be used in truly exceptional circumstances where appeal provides an inadequate remedy. Because the fee award would not materially harm a large financial institution during the time needed for an appeal, and because the petitioners had proper appellate remedies available, the Court found no justification for extraordinary intervention.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Propriety of district court awarding attorney fees while appeal is pending
Whether a single judge can authorize fees in a case before a three-judge court
Appropriate circumstances for granting extraordinary writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against judges
Whether ordinary appeal adequately remedies challenges to interim fee awards

Procedural posture

Petitioners invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking extraordinary writs against a district court judge's fee allowance order made during the pendency of an appeal in the underlying case.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Jackson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This petition by John H. Fahey, individually and as Federal Home Loan Bank Commissioner, and A. V. Ammann, individually and as Conservator for the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association, invokes the original jurisdiction of this Court. They ask leave to file petition for a writ of “mandamus and/or prohibition and/or injunction” against Judge Peirson M. Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in Fahey v. Mallonee, decided today, ante, p. 245, to prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments heretofore allowed.

While an appeal in the principal case was pending in this Court, application was made by various counsel for the plaintiffs and associated interests therein for allowance of fees aggregating some $125,000. The District Court allowed counsel for plaintiffs $50,000 as a partial payment on account of services, but withheld action on other applications. Certain costs and expenses of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,295.13 were also ordered reimbursed.

The petition involves serious questions of law and of fact. Whether, because of the pendency of the appeal and the stay order granted therein, the District Court had power to entertain the application, whether before the final outcome of the case could be known an allowance was premature, whether the source of the fund on deposit with the court was so related to the services as to be subject to disbursement for their compensation, and whether one judge can make allowances in a case before a three-judge court, are, with other questions, much contested. We do not decide any question as to the merits.

Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic and extraordinary remedies. We do not doubt power in a proper case to issue such writs. But they have the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigants before him. These remedies should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to utilize them as substitutes for appeals. As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes.

We find nothing in this case to warrant their use. An allowance of $50,000 will hardly destroy a twenty-six-million-dollar association during the time it would take to prosecute an appeal. The status of one of the applicants in the principal case is now settled so that he has standing to take all authorized appeals. We hold that the applicants’ grievance is one to be pursued by appeal at the proper time and to the appropriate court, rather than by resort to our original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs.

The petition is

Denied.