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Farkas vs. Stewart

Supreme Court of Georgia1884-03-04
73 Ga. 90

Summary

Holding. The trial court's judgment for the buyer is affirmed. A seller who expressly warrants an animal's soundness is liable for the full purchase price when the animal dies from an unsoundness that existed at the time of sale, even if the defect was not discoverable beforehand, provided the buyer exercised proper care in treating the animal.

A seller sold a mule to a buyer with an express warranty that it was sound. The mule developed distemper shortly after purchase and died within two weeks despite proper treatment by the buyer. The seller argued that distemper was merely a curable illness caused by external factors rather than an unsoundness, and that the buyer's treatment may have contributed to the animal's death. The buyer presented evidence that the disease must have existed at the time of sale since it appeared the day after purchase, and that he cared for the animal as a prudent owner would.

The trial court instructed the jury that under an express warranty of soundness, the seller is liable for any defect actually existing at the time of sale, regardless of whether it was obvious or hidden, or known to the seller, provided the buyer did not negligently mistreat the animal. The jury returned a verdict for the buyer in the full purchase price of $95 plus interest.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether distemper constitutes an unsoundness under a warranty of soundness
  • Whether an express warranty of soundness applies to hidden defects not discoverable at purchase
  • Whether a buyer's proper treatment of a sick animal affects seller liability on warranty
  • Sufficiency of a summons that does not state the amount of damages or attach a copy of the demand

Procedural posture

The buyer appealed from a judgment rendered in the seller's favor in justice's court to the superior court, where a jury verdict was returned for the buyer, and the seller moved for a new trial on multiple grounds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Jackson, Chief Justice.

[A. G. Stewart brought suit in a justice’s court on January 30, 1880, against Sam. Farkas. The summons was in the usual form, except that in the caption it was stated to be an action of “ debt on warranty of mule,” and in the body of the summons the defendant was called on to answer plaintiff’s “ demand in an action of debt on warranty, a copy of which is hereto attached.” No copy was attached, nor was the amount of damages stated. The justice rendered judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the superior court.

On the trial, the evidence for the plaintiff was, in brief, as follows: He bought the mule from defendant and drove it home with a light load; next day it developed symptoms of distemper. He treated it for that disease, but it died in fifteen days. His horse, after coming in contact with the mule, also had distemper. If symptoms of this disease appeared the day after the purchase, it must have existed before. The amount paid for the mule was $95.00. It was expressly warranted sound. Distemper is an unsoundness ; about one horse or mule in ten dies with it. The treatment used by plaintiff was proper. In severe cases, lancing the swelling is necessary. Whether or not it requires skill, depends on the position of the swelling. If a mule were kept in a lot, free from contagion, for two weeks, and showed no signs of distemper, a witness for plaintiff stated that he would consider it free from the disease.

The evidence for the defendant was, in brief, as follows: The mule had been in a lot, free from contact with diseased mules, for about two weeks before the sale; it showed no signs of disease and was bright and lively. Distemper is not an unsoundness; it is a cold caused by overheating, hard driving, exposure, change of climate or careless handling, and is contagious. It requires from seven tp nine days to develop. By proper treatment, it can be cured, and does not materially injure the value of a mule. Where the swelling is lanced, skill is required. The first time defendant heard of the death of the mule, plaintiff told him it had taken sick and died, and proposed to buy another on credit; defendant told him he could not sell on a credit, and plaintiff responded that he would sue defendant.

The jury found for plaintiff $95.00 and interest. Defendant moved for a new trial, on the following among other grounds:

(1.) Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.

(2.) Because the court overruled the objection to the following question propounded by plaintiff’s counsel to him in his interrogatories: “Was he (the mule) exposed by you to stock that were diseased ?” — Objected to as leading.

(3.) Because the summons did not set out any amount of damages and had no copy attached, and therefore did not support the verdict,

(4.) Because the court charged as follows“If the seller expressly warrants the soundness of the mule, it is immaterial whether the defect was patent or latent, whether the unsoundness was known or not known to the seller; if if really existed at the time of the sale, the seller would be liable therefor on the warranty for the damage resulting from the unsoundness, unmixed with any negligence or maltreatment of the mule by plaintiff.. If you believe from the evidence that Farkas sold the mule to Stewart under an express warranty of soundness, and that the mule was at the time of the sale unsound, and from said unsoundness died within a few days after the ■ sale, and that the plaintiff, before the mule died, did all to cure , and save him that a prudent and careful man would and could do, then you would find for the plaintiff the damage proved, even to the full extent of the purchase money, as the evidence may warrant.”

The motion was overrlued, and defendant excepted.]