Blackley against Sheldon

New York Supreme Court of Judicature1810-11

7 Johns. 32

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is affirmed. The court held that a justice of the peace may permissibly request that a jury reconsider its verdict before the verdict is formally recorded, and jurors have the right to do so, as this power is necessary to allow jurors to correct mistakes and fulfill their obligation to render a true verdict.

A constable sued to recover goods that had been seized under an execution. The defendant challenged the judgment on two grounds: first, that the constable produced only the execution document rather than the underlying judgment, and second, that the justice improperly sent the jury back to reconsider their verdict before it was recorded.

On the first issue, the court relied on established precedent holding that an execution alone is sufficient proof of a constable's right to seize goods. On the second issue, the court examined the principles governing jury verdicts. The court explained that before a verdict is formally recorded, jurors retain the right to change their initial pronouncement, and courts may even direct jurors to reconsider if a verdict appears erroneous. This principle applies equally to trials before justices of the peace as it does to trials in higher courts, since jurors' consciences are bound by their verdict regardless of the tribunal.

In this case, the justice simply requested that the jury reconsider, which the jury did voluntarily. The jury retained the power to refuse and stand by their initial verdict, but instead chose to deliberate further. The court found no error in the justice's conduct, as the recorded verdict—not any preliminary pronouncement—is the only verdict that matters legally.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an execution alone, without the underlying judgment, is sufficient proof of a constable's authority to seize goods
Whether a justice of the peace may send a jury back to reconsider a verdict before it is recorded
Whether jury members retain the right to alter or reconsider a verdict after initial pronouncement but before recording

Procedural posture

The case comes before the court on two objections to a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, following a jury trial in which the constable prevailed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

Two objections are stated in this case to the judgment below: 1. The constable who sued for taking the goods upon which he had levied by virtue of an execution, produced the execution only, and not the judgment; 2. The justice sent back the jury to reconsider their verdict.

The first objection was overruled by the decision in the case of Barber ξ Knapp v. Miller, (6 Johns. Rep. 195.) in which it was held, that if a constable sues a stranger, for taking goods which he had seized by virtue of an execution, the production of the execution, without the judgment, was sufficient to support his right of action.

The second objection requires more attention. The law is well settled, that before a verdict is recorded, the jury may vary from the first offer of their verdict, and the verdict which is recorded shall stand; and there are many cases in the books of a jury changing their verdict, immediately after they have pronounced it in open court, and before it was received and entered. (Dyer, 204. b. Plowd. 209. Saunders v. Freeman. Co. Litt. 227. b.) The verdict is not recognised as valid and final, until it be pronounced and recorded in open court; and it is reasonable that the jury should be enabled to avail themselves of the locus penitentice, and cor rect a verdict which they have mistaken, or about which# upon further reflection, they have doubt, (6 Johns. Rep. 68.) After the verdict is received, the jury may be examined by the poll, if the court please, and then either of the jurors may disagree to the verdict. (Cro. Eliz. 779.) So when the jury are retired, under the charge of the officer, they may come back into court to hear the evidence of a thing of which they are in doubt. (2 Roll. Abr. 676.) The law allows the jury all reasonable opportunity, before their verdict is put upon record and they are discharged, to, discover and to declare the truth according to their judgment. The court may, also, of its own accord, send the jury back to reconsider their verdict, if it appears to be a mistaken one, and before it is received and recorded. We have an instance of this in 11 Heno IV. 2. pl. 3. It was in a case of a writ of conspiracy against two, and the jury found one guilty and the other not guilty; and Tirwit, J. told the jury that theii> verdict was contradictory, and that if one be not guilty, the other was not guilty, in a charge of conspiracy ; and that they had better reconsider their verdict; and the jury xrere accordingly taken back, and, afterwards, returned and found both guilty. This case was cited and approved of by the court of C. B. in Freeman’s case, in Plowden.

The only question is, whether this law is applicable to the trial by jury, in a justice’s court. The act says,that “ when the jurors have agreed on their verdict, they shall deliver the same to the justice in the same court, who is thereby required to give judgment thereupon.” This leaves the law precisely the same as before ; for the judgment is to be upon the verdict agreed to by the jury, which means their final and definitive agreement; for they have the same right, and ought to have the same opportunity to correct a mistake, or to reconsider, that juries have in other-courts, for the ver .diet is equally binding upon their consciences, and still , . , . more conclusive upon the parties.

If the verdict be delivered in writing, as it was here, the justice had a right to permit the verdict to be taken by the poll; and the jury had a right to vary from their first finding. They had a right to retire and reconsider; and all that the justice did, in this case, was to request the jury to reconsider their verdict. They might, have refused to reconsider, and have insisted upon adhering to their first verdict; but they consented to reconsider. It was their voluntary act, and one which they had a right to do. There was nothing then erroneous in the conduct of the justice. The verdict received and recorded was the only one to be regarded, and consequently the judgment below ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.