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UNITED STATES ex rel. STAPF v. CORSI, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

Supreme Court of the United States1932-11-07No. No. 10
287 U.S. 12977 L. Ed. 21553 S. Ct. 40SCDB 1932-0021932 U.S. LEXIS 10

Summary

Holding. The Court affirmed the deportation order, holding that the alien's return to the United States in 1929 constituted a new entry subject to the Immigration Act of 1924, and that his failure to comply with immigration inspection, visa, and tax requirements rendered his stay unlawful and deportable.

A German alien deserted his ship in New York in 1923 and remained in the United States unlawfully for six years. In 1929, he joined the crew of an American vessel for a round-trip voyage to Germany and returned to the United States in April 1929, where he was discharged from the ship without undergoing immigration inspection, obtaining a visa, or paying the required head tax. He was arrested in 1931 and ordered deported. The question was whether his 1929 return constituted a new entry that subjected him to deportation under the 1924 Immigration Act, or whether he retained immunity from the three-year deportation limitation that applied to his original 1923 entry.

The Court held that the alien's return to the United States in 1929 constituted a new entry under the immigration laws, even though he arrived as a crew member on an American ship. The alien's status as a seaman entitled him to remain only temporarily, and his failure to comply with immigration procedures for seamen did not grant him additional rights. The Court rejected the argument that the shipmaster's statutory obligation to return the seaman to the United States made the entry lawful or conferred permanent residence rights. Since the alien did not satisfy the legal requirements for entry as either a temporary seaman or an immigrant, his continued presence violated immigration law and rendered him subject to deportation.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether an alien's return to the United States as a crew member on a round-trip voyage constitutes a new entry
  • Whether immunity from deportation under the three-year limitation in the 1917 Act extends to an unlawful entry made in 1923
  • Whether an alien seaman's status confers rights to permanent residence or exempts the alien from standard immigration procedures

Procedural posture

The District Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting decisions among Circuit Courts regarding whether a crew member's return from a round-trip voyage constitutes a new entry.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

By writ of habeas corpus petitioner challenged the legality of his arrest for deportation as an alien alleged to have remained in the United States in violation of the terms of § 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924 (c. 190, 43 Stat., 153, 162). That section provides:

“Any alien who at any time after entering the United States is found ... to have remained therein for a longer time than permitted under this Act or regulations made thereunder, shall be taken into custody and deported ...”

The undisputed facts are that petitioner, a German citizen, deserted his ship, the Hansa, February 15, 1923, in the port of New York, and remained in this country until March, 1929, when he signed as a member of the crew of a vessel of United States registry, the America, for a voyage to Germany and return. This vessel stayed in Germany two and a half days; but it does not appear whether petitioner went ashore. He arrived in the United States on the return voyage in April, 1929, and was discharged from the ship, but was not examined by any immigration officer, nor did he possess an immigration visa or pay a head tax. On March 20, 1931, while working in Florida as a butcher, he was arrested on a warrant charging that he had remained in the country for a period longer than permitted by the Immigration Act of 1924 and the regulations thereunder. After hearing, an order of deportation was made. On this showing the District Court dismissed the writ and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The entry in 1923 was irregular, and petitioner was not entitled to remain. Under the statute then in force he was subject to be deported; but such action could be taken only within three years of his entry. The Immigration Act of 1924 did not alter the status of one who had unlawfully entered the country or remained after the passage of the act of 1917, but abolished the three year period of limitation only as to those entering after 1924. Section 14, quoted supra; Philippides v. Day, 283 U. S. 48. The petitioner was therefore entitled to invoke immunity under the act of 1917 unless he lost it by making the voyage to Germany in 1929.

The question is whether by so doing he made a new entry into the United States which left him amenable to the provisions of the act of 1924. The court below answered in the affirmative. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have held the contrary. In view of these conflicting decisions certiorari was granted.

The relator’s arrival in the United States in April, 1929, was an entry into this country notwithstanding he was a member of the crew of an American ship which had made a round-trip voyage. He came from a place outside the United States, and from a foreign port or place, within the meaning of the immigration laws; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398. While that case construed § 19 of the act of February 5, 1917, and the time limitation on deportation therein contained, the decision as to what constitutes an entry is equally conclusive in construing other sections of the immigration law.

That petitioner entered without permission does not entitle him as an alien seaman to more than sixty days’ stay in the United States. His non-compliance with the regulations respecting such seamen can not confer upon him greater rights than if he had satisfied their requirements. Philippides v. Day, supra.

The statutes requiring the master of a ship, under penalties, to bring back to the United States a seaman who signs for a round-trip voyage are said to make the entry of April, 1929, lawful. The argument, in substance based upon the theory that an American vessel is American soil, was effectively answered, as respects the requirements of the Immigration Acts, in the Claussen case, supra. Irrespective of any statutory duty to return the seaman to this country, the petitioner’s entry would have been lawful had he complied with the provisions of statute and regulation for temporary sojourn as an alien seaman., The obligation of the master to return him did not, as contended, confer the right to remain here permanently.

If we are to disregard petitioner’s status ,as an alien seaman, the law required that he should have submitted himself to inspection, should have produced an immigration visa, and paid a head tax, if as an immigrant he desired to apply for citizenship. He did none of these things, and in this aspect remained here in violation of law.

The suggestion is made that since the relator could not have been deported after the expiration of three years from his original entry in 1923, his status when discharged as one of the crew of the America in 1929 was that of an “ immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad,” and thus he was a non-quota immigrant within § 4 of the act of 1924. But he was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 1923, and his stay here can not be converted into such lawful residence by the mere fact that the then applicable statute limited the time within which deportation proceedings could be had. United States ex rel. Georgas v. Day, 43 F. (2d) 917.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

Sec. 32 of the Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 895, then in force, but since repealed by the Immigration Act of 1924, provided: “ That no alien excluded from admission into the United States by any law . . . and employed on board any vessel arriving in the United States from any foreign port or place, shall be permitted to land in the United States, except temporarily for medical treatment, or pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor providing for the ultimate removal or deportation of such alien from the United States, . . .”

Sec. 34 of the Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 896: “ That any alien seaman who shall land in a port of the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United States, and shall, at any time within three years thereafter, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody and brought before a board of special inquiry for examination as to his qualifications for admission to the United States, and if not admitted said alien seaman shall be deported . . .”

See. 20 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1924, c. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 165: “ Section 32 of the Immigration Act of 1917 is repealed, but shall remain in force as to . . . all seamen, arriving in the United States prior to the enactment of this Act.”

United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 54 F. (2d) 1086.

Kirk v. Lawrenson, 24 F. (2d) 64 (C. C. A. 5); Weedin v. Okada, 2 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 9); Matsutaka v. Carr, 47 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 9).

U. S. G, Tit. 8, §§ 132, 167 (a), 202, 203, 204, 205, 208.

U. S. G, Tit. 8, § 204.