Chipman against Martin

New York Supreme Court of Judicature1816-05

13 Johns. 240

Summary · law.co

Holding. An unsatisfied judgment obtained against an original tenant does not extinguish or impair a landlord's remedy of distress for unpaid rent. A new trial was granted because the trial judge's instruction that the judgment constituted absolute payment and satisfaction of the rent was incorrect.

This case concerns whether a landlord's right to distrain goods for unpaid rent is eliminated by an unsatisfied judgment obtained against the original tenant. The lease in question had been assigned, and the landlord obtained a judgment against the original lessee for the same rent at issue, but the original tenant became insolvent and the judgment remained unpaid. The court held that an unsatisfied judgment does not extinguish or impair a landlord's right to distress for rent, since the doctrine of merger only eliminates the specific cause of action upon which the judgment was based—not collateral remedies. The court drew an analogy to the principle that a judgment on a bond does not prevent a mortgagee from pursuing other remedies tied to the original obligation.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that the judgment against the original tenant constituted absolute payment and satisfaction of the rent, which the appellate court found to be error. Because only actual payment or satisfaction can eliminate the landlord's right to distrain, and because the judgment remained unsatisfied against an insolvent defendant, the distress was lawful and the statutory penalty for wrongful distress did not apply.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an unsatisfied judgment on a covenant in a lease eliminates the remedy of distress for rent
The meaning of 'rent due and in arrear' under the distress statute for purposes of determining wrongful distress
Whether the doctrine of merger of causes of action applies to extinguish collateral or concurrent remedies

Procedural posture

An action was brought to recover double damages under the distress statute for rent allegedly distrained when no rent was actually due, with the defendant claiming an unsatisfied judgment against the original tenant defeated the landlord's right to distrain.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Thompson, Cb. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court. This action is founded upon the 9th section of the act concerning distresses for rent, (1 R. L. 436.,) which declares, that if any distress and sale shall be made, for rent pretended to be in arpear and due, when no. pent, is in arrear or due, the party so distraining, or for whom such distress shall be made, shall be liable to an action on the case, by the owner of the goods dis-trained, who shall recover double the valué of such goods.

The lease by which the rent in question is reserved, was giyen by the defendant to Chauncey Stewart, and by him assign- ed to the defendant. A judgment has been obtained, upon the covenant in the lease, against the original lessee, for the same pent for which the distress was made. But no- execution has been issued upon this judgment, or satisfaction in any way ob» .tained, and Stewart is insolvent. The principal question in the case is, whether this judgment does, in any manner, take away or impair the remedy by distress ; and I am satisfied it does not. We must bear in mind, that the present action is to recover a penalty^ and, Of course, all the rules applicable to the construction of penal statutes ape to be adopted. Under such íulés of construction,it cannotbe said, that the rent was no ft due and in arrear; nothing ghoit of actual .payment, or satis,faction, will meet the good sense and sound interpretation-of this statute. The doctrine of extinguishment does not apply to this . case. The. particular cause of . action, for which a judgment is pbtaiped, is extinguished:.or .merged in .such.judgment, No action of. covenant could be-brbught against Síéw^rrfPr ,the samp rentier which.the former judgment was obtained^ If Stew? art had still remained in possession, and the .distress be,en made on his goods, the-unsatisfied judgment Would, in;niy: ¿pinion, have formed no obstacle to the legality of such distress; ..much. less cólPpr is there for setting up a judgment against an irísol-. vent, to discharge , the present plaintiff from the rent. ■ The principle which governed the decision of Drake v. Mitchell), (3 East, 258.,) is very much in .point. It-is there held, that a judgment is but a security for the original cause of action, until it be made productive in satisfaction, and until then it cannot operate to change, any. other collateral ..concurrent remedy •which the party . may have. The judgment; ,if Stewart .was solvent, could only be considered as additional, security for* and,not as satisfaction of the rent; that still.exists, and-is due and. in arrear. Like the case of a bond and mortgage, a j.udg-: Ment upon, the bond will not preclude the mortgagee from ing his actiPu of ejectment, and recovering possession of the; land. .All fhe principles applicable to the case before Us are noticed, and involved, in, the decision of Bantleon v. Smith, (2 Binney, 152.,) which go fully fo establish, that the defend*, ant, in this case, had a double remedy .for his rent ; one upon the covenant: in the. lease.. and one against the land;; and that nothing short of actual satisfaction will discharge either. The direction of the judge to. the jury, that the judgment against ^Stewart ;.wa,si.>an absolute payment and extinguishmentof thp rent,, was incorrect, ánd a new trial must be granted, with costs to abide the event of the suit, , ... . . -

New trial;granted.