Floyd v. Floyd

Supreme Court of Georgia1895-07-15

97 Ga. 124

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court erred in dismissing Gus Floyd's plea on demurrer because the facts alleged—a gift of land by the owner, exclusive possession, valuable improvements made in reliance on the gift, and extended possession without acknowledgment of adverse claims—state a valid equitable defense to ejectment. Judgment reversed.

Mary Floyd brought an ejectment action against Gus Floyd to remove him from disputed land. Gus filed a plea asserting that the land's original owner, James Floyd (Gus's putative father), had made a gift of the property to him, that Gus took exclusive possession and made valuable improvements in reliance on that gift, and that he maintained possession for more than seven years without paying rent or acknowledging any competing claim. The trial court dismissed this plea as legally insufficient.

The court reversed, finding the plea adequate. Although a statute creating a presumption of gift based on seven years of exclusive possession by a child applied only to legitimate children, the court concluded that Gus stated a valid equitable claim under a different statute. That statute permits equity to enforce a voluntary agreement to give land when the recipient takes possession and makes valuable improvements in good faith reliance on the promise. The court held that Gus had alleged facts sufficient to establish a perfect equity in the property, which he could assert defensively in the ejectment action.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an illegitimate child may claim title under a statutory presumption of gift based on seven years of exclusive possession
Whether a voluntary gift of land followed by possession and valuable improvements creates an enforceable equitable interest defensible in ejectment
Whether equitable principles apply to protect a putative son who relied on a gratuitous promise of land

Procedural posture

The defendant's plea to an ejectment action was dismissed by the trial court on demurrer as legally insufficient, and the defendant appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Simmons, Chief Justice.

Mary A. Eloyd brought ejectment against Gus Eloyd. He filed the following plea, which on motion was dismissed as insufficient in law: Mary A. Eloyd is the wife and sole heir at law of James H. Eloyd, deceased, and claims title to the premises in dispute solely as such heir at law. James IT. Eloyd died intestate, and no administration has ever been granted upon his estate. Defendant is the illegitimate son of J ames IT. Eloyd, who recognized him as his son. James IT. Eloyd, who was the owner of the land in dispute, for the purpose of providing for the defendant as his son, made a gift of said land to defendant, who went into exclusive possession thereof under said gift, paid the taxes and made valuable improvements thereon on the strength of said gift. Defendant held possession of said land under said gift, and without payment of rent, for more than seven years during the life of said James IT. Eloyd. Since said gift James IT. Eloyd has made no claim of dominion over said land; and defendant has always claimed title on the strength of said gift, and has never made any disclaimer or recognized any adverse title. ■

It was contended by the plaintiff in error, that the facts recited constituted a good plea under section 2664 of the code, which declares that “the exclusive possession by a child of lands belonging originally to the father, without payment of rent, for the space of seven years,-shall create conclusive presumption of a gift, and convey title to the child, unless there is evidence of a loan, or of a claim of dominion by a father acknowledged by the child, or of a disclaimer of title on the part of the child.” In our opinion this section of the code does not apply to an illegitimate child. It is well settled that at common lawthe words child and children mean only legitimate child and children. An illegitimate child does not take by inheritance from the putative father; indeed the law does not recognize any relationship between them except in certain cases as to which express provision is made. See on this subject, 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, “Child,” page 230, note, and cases cited.

Counsel for the plaintiff in error contends, however, and correctly we think, that the plea is good under section 3189 of the code, which provides that if possession of lands has been given under a voluntary agreement or gratuitous promise, “upon a meritorious consideration, and valuable improvements made upon the faith thereof, equity will decree a performance of the agreement.” The plea, as we have seen, alleges that the land was given to the- defendant by his putative father for the purpose of providing for the defendant as his son, and that the son went into exclusive possession and made valuable improvements thereon “on the strength of said gift.” Irrespective of other considerations, the defendant, under these circumstances, acquired a perfect equity in the premises, and it is well settled that one in possession of land may by showing a perfect equity successfully defend his possession. And this he may do without praying for specific performance. See Vanduzer v. Christian, 30 Ga. 336. The court erred, therefore, in striking the plea on demurrer.

Judgment reversed.