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SMITH v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1898-11-17
105 Ga. 724

Summary

Holding. The judgment was affirmed. The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on former acquittal as a defense, because retailing liquor without license and keeping open a tippling-house on the Sabbath are separate and distinct offenses, and the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

Smith was convicted of keeping open a tippling-house on Sunday and retailing liquor without a license. He appealed on multiple grounds, including that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the defense of former acquittal. The court rejected this argument, finding that the two offenses are legally distinct crimes. A prior conviction for one does not bar prosecution for the other, even if the same conduct underlies both charges. The court cited precedent establishing that selling liquor to a minor without parental consent does not shield a defendant from a separate charge of selling liquor without a license.

Smith also argued the verdict was unsupported by the evidence. The court disagreed, finding sufficient testimony to support the jury's finding that his house functioned as a tippling-house on the Sunday in question. A witness testified he purchased and consumed whisky there that day, and the defendant's own statement acknowledged selling whisky on that date. The presence of bottles and jugs in the defendant's home, combined with testimony from multiple witnesses about drinking on the premises, provided adequate evidentiary support for the conviction.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether former acquittal on one liquor offense bars prosecution for a related but distinct liquor offense
  • Whether evidence of sales and consumption of liquor on the defendant's premises on Sunday supports conviction for keeping open a tippling-house
  • Whether two offenses arising from the same conduct are sufficiently distinct to allow separate prosecutions

Procedural posture

Smith appealed his conviction for keeping open a tippling-house on Sunday and retailing liquor without license, assigning errors regarding jury instructions on former acquittal and sufficiency of the evidence.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Fish, J.

One of the assignments of error in the motion for a new trial was that the court erred in failing to charge the jury upon the plea of former acquittal. We do not think there is any merit in this exception. The offenses of retailing liquor without license and keeping open a tippling-house on the Sabbath day are separate and distinct. Neither of them is a necessary element in and an essential part of the other. Either of them may be committed without perpetrating the other. A person prosecuted for either is in no jeopardy of being convicted of the other, or of any offense which is an essential part of the other. The case of Blair v. State, 81 Ga. 629, is exactly in point. It was there held that “A fonner conviction of selling liquor to a minor without the written consent of his parent or guardian, even if properly pleaded, would not be good in bar of a prosecution for selling liquor without license, though the act of selling were the same in both cases.” See Bell v. State, 103 Ga. 397. It may be noted that in Minor v. State, 63 Ga. 319, it appears that Minor was tried for keeping open a tippling-house on the Sabbath day, and also for retailing liquor without license, and was convicted in both cases. The point that he could not be convicted of both offenses appears not to have been made.

Complaint was made that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Whether defendant’s house was a tippling-house on Sunday, July 31, 1898, and was kept open on that day, were of course questions to be determined by the jury, from all the facts and circumstances of the case. If it was really a tippling-house at that time, although it may have just begun its existence as such, and if defendant kept it open on that day, he was guilty of a violation of the statute. The evidence was that on that Sunday the house was kept open, and that several persons were tippling therein. Rhodes testified, “I took drinks there that day. Ordered four drinks. I drank rye whisky, others drank corn. Defendant poured it out of a bottle.” This testimony was uncontradicted. ■ The defendant, in his statement, simply said: “I sold that whisky to Jessie Isaac on Sunday, July 31, 1898. She said she was sick and needed it. Those men witnesses were never there before Sunday, July 31, 1898. I did not run any tippling-house.” There were a number of jugs and bottles of whisky found in defendant’s cupboard. Jessie Isaac bought some whisky there on Saturday night, a week- before July 31, 1898,. and a half-pint on the last-named day. Rhodes swore that he had been there once or twice on Sunday,-and went there on Sunday only. It is true he did not state the purpose of his visits, but he was tippling there on July 31. ■ Peek testified: “I had got no whisky from defendant on July 31, 1898. We had not been there long enough. I got one drink there before on a Sunday.” We think the jury could infer from the testimony of these witnesses and the -surrounding circumstances that the house was a tippling-house. The verdict therefore was not contrary to the evidence.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concurring, except Simmons j (7- J., and Lumphin, P. J,, absent.