Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Naro, J.), rendered June 28, 1999, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Santiago, 62 AD2d 572, affd 48 NY2d 1023; People v Huggins, 228 AD2d 241; cf., People v Middleton, 212 AD2d 809; People v Lumpkin, 173 AD2d 738).
Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15 [5]). Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Goldstein and S. Miller, JJ., concur.