HOPKINS et al. v. HAMBY CORPORATION et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia2000-10-23No. S00A0994

273 Ga. 19538 S.E.2d 37

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the settlement of the underlying dispute eliminated the justiciability of the partition question and that neither the established narrow exception to the mootness doctrine nor the alternative criteria for addressing moot cases of significant public concern had been satisfied.

The appellants sought review of a question concerning whether multiple parcels of land could be partitioned in a single proceeding when one party held an interest in only one tract, with all parties' rights stemming from a common cotenancy source. After the parties reached a settlement during the appeal, the court examined whether to proceed despite the mootness of the underlying dispute.

The court declined to hear the case because it had become moot—the settlement eliminated the actual controversy between the parties. Although the court acknowledged a narrow exception to the mootness doctrine for issues capable of repetition that would evade review, the partition question did not qualify. The partition issue, while capable of recurrence, would not necessarily escape review in future cases. Additionally, the court considered whether the appeal involved a matter of significant public concern or special circumstances justifying decision despite mootness. Since the dispute involved only private property owners, lacked frequency of occurrence, and allowed adequate time for resolution when the procedural issue arose anew, none of the factors supporting retained jurisdiction were present.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether partition of multiple tracts in one proceeding is proper when a party holds interest in only one parcel
Application of the mootness doctrine in appellate review
Whether issues of significant public concern justify deciding moot cases

Procedural posture

The appellants appealed a partition matter, but the parties settled the underlying dispute during appellate proceedings, rendering the case moot.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Fletcher, Presiding Justice.

This appeal raises a question, of law concerning whether this state should adopt a rule allowing the partition of separate tracts of land in one proceeding, even though one party may have an interest in only one parcel, when the rights of the parties derive or descend from a cotenancy as a common source of title. While this case was pending in this Court, the parties settled the case but did not withdraw their appeal. Since this case does not meet any exception to the mootness doctrine, we dismiss it as moot.

The general rule is that appellate courts do not consider moot questions. Mootness is a question of court policy based on the theory that courts do not give opinions on abstract propositions of law that do not involve an actual controversy between parties. We have adopted a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness when the issue is capable of repetition and yet evades review. Although the issue of severance in partition cases is capable of repetition, it would not necessarily evade review. Therefore, this case does not meet our narrow exception to the mootness doctrine.

Other states have adopted a rule that permits them to decide an appeal in a moot case where the case contains an issue of significant public concern or an issue that might avert future litigation. The courts find justification for deciding issues raised in moot cases when (1) the public interest will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided; (2) the matter involved is likely to recur frequently; (3) it involves a duty of government or government’s relationship with its citizens; and (4) the same difficulty that prevented the appeal from being heard in time is likely to again prevent a decision. This appeal fails to meet any of these criteria. The dispute is a matter between private property owners, it is unlikely to occur on a frequent basis, and there should be sufficient time to resolve the procedural issue when it arises again. Therefore, the case does not present an issue of significant public concern that justifies our retaining jurisdiction and deciding the appeal despite the settlement of the underlying dispute.

Decided October 23, 2000.

King & Croft, F. Carlton King, Jr., Thomas A. Croft, W. Rhett Tanner, for appellants.

Austin E. Catts, Lee & MacMillan, Thomas J. Lee, for appellee.

Appeal dismissed.

All the Justices concur.

See O’Neal v. Cooper, 67 So. 689 (Ala. 1914); Shoup v. Cummins, 166 N.E. 118 (Ill. 1929); Harlan v. Langham, 69 Pa. 235 (1872); Sproles v. Gray, 296 SW2d 839 (Tenn. 1956); see generally Annotation, Right to Partition of Different Tracts of Land in Same Proceeding, 65 A.L.R. 887, 897 (1930) (discussing rule as an exception to general rule governing partitions and listing cases).

See Chastain v. Baker, 255 Ga. 432 (339 SE2d 241) (1986).

See Allenbrand v. Zubin Darius Contractor, 855 P2d 926 (Kan. 1993).

See Collins v. Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120 (508 SE2d 653) (1998).

See, e.g., Westark Christian Action Council v. Stodola, 848 SW2d 935 (Ark. 1993).

See Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors, 111 A2d 379 (Md. 1954) (citing authorities).