RAY et al. v. BARBER

Supreme Court of Georgia2001-06-04No. S01A0231

273 Ga. 856548 S.E.2d 283

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Board of Pardons and Paroles must follow discretionary application procedures when appealing an action filed by a prisoner, as the plain statutory language requires that appeals of all actions filed by prisoners proceed through the discretionary application process. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

The Board of Pardons and Paroles appealed a trial court decision granting in part a mandamus petition filed by Morris Barber. The central dispute involved whether the Board, as a non-prisoner defendant, must follow discretionary application procedures when appealing actions initiated by prisoners under Georgia law. The court examined the statutory language of OCGA § 42-12-8, which states that appeals of all actions filed by prisoners must follow the discretionary application procedure outlined in Code Section 5-6-35.

The court concluded that the plain language of the statute clearly requires discretionary application procedures for all appeals involving actions filed by prisoners, regardless of whether the appellant is the prisoner or another party. The Board's alternative interpretation—that only appeals filed by prisoners need follow the discretionary process—would render certain statutory language superfluous and thus was rejected. The court noted that the legislature had demonstrated its ability to create different appellate procedures for prisoners and non-prisoners in other contexts, supporting a straightforward reading of the challenged statute. The application requirement serves important policy objectives by enabling expedited case review and reducing appellate court workload.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether non-prisoner defendants must comply with discretionary appeal procedures when appealing actions initiated by prisoners
Interpretation of OCGA § 42-12-8's language regarding which party's appeals require discretionary applications
Application of the rule against rendering statutory language superfluous in construing legislative intent

Procedural posture

The Board of Pardons and Paroles filed a discretionary application and notice of appeal challenging a trial court's decision granting in part Barber's mandamus petition against the Board.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Fletcher, Presiding Justice.

The trial court granted in part Morris Barber’s petition for mandamus against the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Walter Ray, as chairman of the Board, filed a discretionary application and a notice of appeal. We granted the application to consider whether a non-prisoner defendant is required to follow the discretionary application procedures when appealing an action filed by a prisoner. Because the statutory language is clear, we hold that a discretionary application is required.

1. OCGA § 42-12-8 provides that “[a]ppeals of all actions filed by prisoners shall be as provided in Code Section 5-6-35 [the discretionary appeal provision].” The Board contends that the legislative intent of the statute shows that the discretionary application process should only apply to appeals filed by prisoners. Where a statute is “susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it.” As long as the language is clear and does not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, “it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.” Here the language is clear and requires that in all actions filed by prisoners, appeals must come by discretionary application.

The Board’s interpretation would rewrite the statute to say that “all appeals filed by prisoners” must come by application. This interpretation renders the phrase “of all actions” superfluous, and is, therefore, disfavored. Additionally, the legislature has demonstrated its ability to require different appellate procedures for the state and prisoners. OCGA § 9-14-52 (b) and (c) provide that a prisoner who is denied habeas corpus relief “must file a written application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal,” while if the prisoner is granted relief, “no certificate of probable cause need be obtained by the respondent as a condition precedent to appeal.” Furthermore, the legislative requirement of an application to. appeal serves several important policy goals; it permits expeditious consideration of a case and ameliorates the large appellate court caseload.

Decided June 4, 2001.

Thiirbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard A. Brownlow, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Morris Barber, pro se.

2. In his petition for mandamus, Barber alleged that the Board of Pardons and Paroles failed to timely consider him for parole and sought to require the Board to grant him parole or set a tentative parole date. The trial court directed the Board to give Barber consideration for parole and denied all other relief sought. After applying the applicable law and Board rules to the peculiar facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting this relief.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981) (citation omitted).

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 479 (37 SC 192, 61 LE 442) (1917).

Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975) (“it is not presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning”).

See Tri-State Building & Supply, Inc. a Reid, 251 Ga. 38, 39 (302 SE2d 566) (1983).

OCGA § 42-12-2; Scruggs v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 588 (408 SE2d 103) (1991).