Tiget v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1900-01-24

110 Ga. 244

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment was reversed because the trial court erred in admitting the deceased's prior statements about expecting to be killed, improperly interrupted and embarrassed the defendant during his testimony, and gave instructions to the jury that contained an improper intimation of the judge's opinion regarding the evidence.

The defendant was tried for murder, and the trial court admitted testimony from a witness describing statements made by the deceased one or two days before the killing. The deceased allegedly told the witness that he did not know when he could visit, that he might be dead before getting the chance, that he expected to be killed, and that the man he expected to kill him lived very close by. The defendant objected to this evidence, but the trial court allowed it.

During the defendant's testimony, the trial judge interrupted him multiple times while he was explaining facts about cotton-picking and cotton-weighing that he claimed were material to his defense. The judge told him to stop rambling and to focus on relevant matters. The defendant's counsel noted that the defendant was uneducated and asked the judge to be patient. Additionally, the judge's instructions to the jury appeared to contain language suggesting an opinion about what evidence had proven the defendant's guilt, which was improper.

The court found that while judges may prevent defendants from discussing entirely irrelevant matters during their testimony, they may not harass or restrict defendants in ways that embarrass them or suppress their statements. The judge's interruptions and tone went beyond proper judicial control. The instructions also improperly suggested the judge's view of the evidence presented.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of victim's prior statements about expecting death
Trial court's authority to interrupt and restrict a criminal defendant's testimony
Whether judicial interruptions can embarrass or suppress a defendant's statement
Propriety of jury instructions that suggest the judge's opinion on what was proved

Procedural posture

The defendant was convicted of murder at trial in Worth Superior Court; he moved for a new trial on multiple grounds, and the case was appealed to the state supreme court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Little, J.

1. It was error, in the trial of one charged with murder, to admit, over proper objection by defendant, the evidence of a witness-introduced by the State, to the effect that, a day or two previously to the homicide, witness asked the deceased when he was coming to see him; that deceased replied he did not know, that he might be dead. before he got a chance to come, that he expected to be hilled, and-, that the man he expected to do it lived two or three steps from his door. Woolf oik v. State 81 Ga. 552; s. c. 85 Ga. 69.

Argued December 4, 1899.

Decided January 24, 1900.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Spence. Worth superior court. April term, 1899.

The motion for a new trial contained, in addition to the ground dealt with in the first headnote, and other grounds which need not be set forth, the following: Because, as the defendant .started to the stand to make his statement and before he had uttered a word, the court said to him, “Now confine yourself, to the issues in this case.” Later, while he was making his statement and explaining circumstances testified about by the State’s witnesses relative to hiring some cotton-pickers and weighing-some cotton,— which defendant _ insisted was material and relevant, he ivas interrupted by the court, who said to him, ’“Make your statement about this,- — -what you had to do with it. The court hasn’t got time for you to ramble all over the country.” Thereupon the defendant said, “Judge, let me tell about, the cotton-picking ”; and the counsel for the defendant said to the court that the defendant was an ignorant negro, and he would be glad if the court would bear with him as much as possible. The court then said to the defendant, “Well, go on and get through.” It is complained that the interruptions and language used by the court were calculated to and did embarrass the defendant, and suppress and shake his statement, and diminish its effect upon the jury.

The instructions referred to in the third headnote were as follows; “ Take any contradictory statements made by the defendant, if any were made or shown to be made by the testimony ; see what explanation he made of any facts and circumstances which pointed to him as the guilty party, if any; see what explanation he made, if it was possible for him to explain these facts and circumstances, if necessary, so as to determine whether you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” It is complained that this contained an intimation of the court’s opinion of what had been proved.

2. While the presiding judge in the trial of a criminal case may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, require the accused to omit from his statement reference to entirely irrelevant matters, it is not contemplated by the statute that he shall be embarrassed and circumscribed by the rules which control the admissibility of evidence. Hackney v. State, 101 Ga. 512.

"3. The language of the charge as set out in two grounds’ of the amended motion for a new trial may be susceptible of a construction that it contains an intimation of an opinion by the judge as to what had been proved, and should therefore not have been used.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concurring.

Perry & Tipton, for plaintiff in error. J. M. Terrell, attorney-general, and W. E. Wooten, solicitor-general, contra.