Battle vs. The State of Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia1885-01-06

74 Ga. 101

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of the trial court was reversed because the court erred in rejecting testimony regarding the deceased's prior statements that contradicted his dying declarations, and such contradictory statements should have been admitted to impeach the dying declarations against the defendant.

Bob Battle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury trial in Crawford Superior Court. He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial court improperly admitted the dying declarations of the victim, Nelson Jackson; and second, that the court wrongly excluded testimony from witnesses regarding different statements the victim made after being wounded—statements in which the victim allegedly indicated he intended to kill Battle and would have done so had others not intervened.

The court acknowledged that dying declarations constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, though this exception departs from the traditional common law approach of excluding such evidence. However, the court expressed concern that prosecutors now routinely introduce dying declarations as a matter of course rather than only when necessity genuinely requires it. The court found merit in Battle's second argument, reasoning that if dying declarations are admissible against a defendant based on necessity and public policy, fairness dictates that conflicting statements made by the deceased at other times should equally be admissible to impeach those dying declarations. The court noted that the inability to cross-examine the deceased or call his attention to the circumstances of his earlier statements poses the same necessity problem that justifies admitting dying declarations in the first place.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of dying declarations in criminal trials
Whether conflicting prior statements of a deceased person may impeach his dying declarations
Hearsay exception and the right to cross-examine
Prosecutorial use of dying declarations beyond necessity

Procedural posture

Battle appealed his murder conviction and life sentence from Crawford Superior Court, challenging the trial court's evidentiary rulings on the admission of dying declarations and rejection of prior contradictory statements.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Blandeord, Justice.

Bob Battle was indicted for murder, in Crawford superior court, for killing Nelson Jackson; he was found guilty, and, under the recommendation of the jury, sentenced to serve in the penitentiary for life. . Defendant moved for a new trial, on several grounds, which was overruled by the court, and he excepted, and the case is brought here on those exceptions.

There are but two exceptions insisted upon in this court:

(1.) That the court erred in admitting the dying declarations of the deceased in evidence.

These declarations were properly admitted under our law and the various rulings of this court It is doubtful if they were admissible, originally, at common law. The English judges admitted such evidence, originally, with great caution, and then only from necessity, and when declarant was in extremis, with a full knowledge of his condition, such condition being equivalent in its solemnities to the sanction of an oath; but it has always been considered that this rule was a departure from the general rule excluding hearsay evidence ; and while the circumstances under which the declaration was made were considered equivalent to an oath, yet these circumstances furnish no equivalent to the defendant for his right of cross-examination; Originally this testimony was resorted to from necessity, but now it may be had, notwithstanding there may be abundant evidence as to the homicide and the circumstances attending it. Whereas the judges at one time admitted this evidence with great caution and hesitation, now it seems to be resorted to by the prosecuting officers and admitted as a matter of course, provided the statute be complied with.

(2.) The next ground of the motion for new trial insisted on here is, that the court erred in rejecting the testimony of several witnesses to prove the sayings of the deceased after he was cut; that “ if they had not caught the ax which he had, as he drew it back to strike Bob, they would have had to carry him off in a wagon, as he intended to kill him, and would have done so.”

It has been held at the common law that the accused could prove the general bad character of the deceased, that he was unworthy of belief, and any other matter which might legitimately affect the credit of his statement. Why can it not be shown that he made a statement or statements at different times different, from his (lying declaration ? If a witness is sought to be impeached as to a statement made under oath by showing he has made statements previously not under oath different from the statement deposed to, this has always been allowed, if the witness’s attention is called to the time, place and circumstances under which the former statements were made. It cannot be easily seen, if the dying declarations of the deceased, made exparte in the presence of his own friends and relatives, and notin the presence of the accused or his friends, without a cross-examination, and testified to by his friends and relatives, are to be admitted against the accused from the necessity of the case, why the declarations of the deceased, after the mortal blow is given, to other persons and at other times, different from the dying declarations, should not be admitted in evidence to impeach the dying statement. If the one is admitted contrary to the general rule, why should not the other be likewise admitted ? The former is admitted in favor of public justice, why not the latter in favor of life and liberty ? The main objection urged to its admissibility is that the attention of the deceased was not called to the time, place and circumstances under which the statements were made, but a sufficient reply to this is that the necessity of the case, the declarant being dead, makes this impossible ; it stands on a like necesssity as the admission of dying declarations. If public policy requires the admission of dying declarations in advancement of public j ustice, the like policy requires the admission of different statements of the accused at different times in favor of life and liberty. See 10 Cal., 36; 21 Cal, 368; Roscoe’s Crim. Ev., 36; Wharton Crim. Ev., 298; 9 Yerger, 278, 280; 25 Mich., 405; Arch. Crim. Pl. and Pr., 434; 43 Ga., 238.

It is to be admitted that none of these authorities are fully up to this point, except the 10 and 21 Cal. R., above cited, and it is to bo conceded that there are decisions the other way. But when it is considered that the prosecuting officers of the state, on all occasions when they can, put in the dying declarations of deceased persons, whether there be a necessity for it or not, it is but right that the accused should have whatever benefit he may derive from contrary statements of the deceased.

The judgment of the court below should be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

- Hall, Justice, concurred, but furnished no written opinion.

Jackson, Chief Justice, dissented, but furnished no written opinion.