MEMORANDUM
A majority of the panel agrees that the grant of summary judgment was improper, but the judges disagree as to why. One judge believes that Davis has created a triable issue of fact as to whether the school district’s policy of allowing out-of-district seniors to finish their studies created a protected property interest, particularly because the school knowingly acquiesced in Davis’s continued enrollment without an out-of-district permit. See Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont., 687 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.2011); Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 377 (9th Cir.1983).
The other judge in the majority would hold that Davis has created a triable issue of fact as to whether Davis’s disenrollment implicated a liberty interest. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Although the school district argues that “disenrollment” differs from expulsion, the form the school gave Davis (1) was titled “Expulsion Procedures: Due Process Rights;” (2) listed Davis’s “offense” as “Possessed, sold, or otherwise furnished any firearm, knife, explosive, or other dangerous object;” and (3) stated that Davis was entitled to several “Due Process Rights,” including a hearing. The second judge therefore believes that Davis has sufficiently shown that the disenrollment affected his liberty interest in his reputation to survive summary judgment.
REVERSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.