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Holler versus Weiner

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1851-02-24
15 Pa. 242

Summary

Holding. The judgment is affirmed. The defendants breached their contract with Weiner by failing to consign goods directly to him as agreed and instead routing shipments through intermediaries, and the post-suit correspondence was properly admitted into evidence as admissions occasioned by the plaintiff's responsive letters.

Weiner, acting as a sales agent, entered into an agreement with the defendants under which he would obtain orders for their goods in the city and receive the merchandise for direct delivery to local purchasers. Instead of following this arrangement, the defendants bypassed Weiner by routing their shipments through their New York agents, who then forwarded goods directly to customers without notifying him. The court found this practice constituted a clear breach of contract and violation of good faith, entitling Weiner to recover damages. The defendants' suggestion that they intended to pay his commissions regardless did not excuse their conduct, as the arrangement itself was fundamentally altered.

The defendants challenged the admission of certain correspondence into evidence, arguing that letters written after the lawsuit commenced were improper. The court rejected this objection, explaining that when one party receives a letter making factual assertions and responds to it, those statements become admissible as equivalent to conversations or declarations between the parties, regardless of when they were written. The assessment of what weight to assign to such testimony remained within the jury's discretion.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether the defendants breached an agency contract by circumventing the agreed delivery arrangement
  • Whether letters written after commencement of suit are admissible when responded to by the other party
  • Whether damages are recoverable for breach of contract and violation of commercial good faith

Procedural posture

Weiner appealed from a judgment entered after trial in which a jury determined damages for breach of contract and violation of faith in a commercial agency relationship.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Rogers, J.

It is undoubtedly error to submit a fact to the jury of which there is no proof. But the ruling of the charge is not exposed to this exception, as we cannot read the testimony without coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff, Weiner, has great reason to complain of the conduct of the defendants. Weiner accepted the agency under the well-founded belief that the goods, for which he procured orders in this city, would be consigned directly to him, to be delivered by him to the purchasers here. This is the fair import of the contract, and must have been so understood by the parties. Instead of pursuing this ordinary course, suggested alike by the bargain and common courtesy in the transaction of such business, the defendants sent their goods to their general agents in New York, and by them they were forwarded, without any notice, to the purchasers here. This is an obvious wrong, for which the plaintiff is entitled to damages, as well for the breach of contract as for violation of faith. For every breach of contract the law implies damages, of the measure of which the jury are to judge, under the superintendence and control of the court: 1 Salic. 19, Ashley v. White. No satisfactory reason has been given by the defendants ; for it is in vain to say they always intended to pay the plaintiff’s commissions on the shipment, as it is hardly credible they designed to pay double commissions. And, even if they did, yet this is an injury, for which the plaintiff is entitled to redress, the amount of which, as before remarked, must be determined by the jury. That it was too much, after the reduction made by the court, I am not prepared to say; but, if it was, it is a question with which we have nothing to do.

That the evidence was properly admitted, cannot be doubted. The letters, although written after the commencement of the suit, are evidence, because they were responded to by the defendants. The letters were admitted as a connected whole; no objection being made to any particular part of the correspondence. Had the defendants taken no notice of the plaintiff’s letter, which no doubt would have been the case had his present counsel been at his elbow, the exception would avail here. But allegations made in a letter, responded to by the other party, are considered in the light of declarations or conversations between the parties, and as such properly admissible in evidence: Roe v. Day, 7 Car. & Payne 705; 1 Car. Kirw. 626. The weight to be given to the testimony is for the jury to determine; who consider, under all the circumstances, how much of the whole statement they deem wbrthy of belief, including as well- the facts asserted by the party in his own favor as those making against him: 1 Greenleaf Ev. sec. 201. It is a matter of no sort of consequence whether letters or conversations, as to their competency, are before or after suit brought: 10 Ser. & R. 269, Marshall v. Sheridan; 8 Watts 103, Galbraith v. Elder.

Judgment affirmed.