WINGFIELD v. THE STATE

Court of Appeals of Georgia1997-05-13No. A97A1225

226 Ga. App. 448486 S.E.2d 676

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed Wingfield's convictions, finding the evidence sufficient, the videotape evidence properly admitted, the jury trial waiver knowing and voluntary, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ernest Wingfield was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of selling crack cocaine and received a life sentence as a recidivist. He appealed on several grounds: that the evidence was insufficient, that videotape evidence should have been excluded, that he did not knowingly waive his jury trial right, and that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellate court examined each claim and found none had merit. The evidence—including testimony from an undercover agent who purchased cocaine from Wingfield on two occasions and chemical confirmation of the substance—was sufficient for conviction. The videotape of one transaction was properly admitted because the agent who recorded it testified it was accurate and unaltered. The court found that Wingfield knowingly and voluntarily elected a bench trial after being informed of his jury trial right and discussing it with counsel, rejecting his later complaint that counsel had misled him about sentencing. The claim of ineffective assistance was rejected because the trial court's factual finding that counsel had not made sentencing misrepresentations was not clearly erroneous.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Sufficiency of evidence for cocaine sales convictions
Admissibility of videotape evidence
Validity of waiver of jury trial right
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim

Procedural posture

Ernest Wingfield appealed his conviction on two counts of selling cocaine after a bench trial, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, admission of videotape, his jury trial waiver, and his trial attorney's effectiveness.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Following a bench trial, Ernest Wingfield was convicted on two counts of selling cocaine. As a recidivist, he received a life sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the court’s admission of videotapes showing the cocaine sales. He also contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial, and he charges his trial attorney with ineffective assistance of counsel. Held:

1. In reviewing Wingfield’s three enumerations challenging the sufficiency of evidence, we construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found Wingfield guilty of these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 161 (1), 162 (469 SE2d 300) (1996).

The State’s chief witness was an independent undercover agent who worked at the direction of Jeff Youngblood, a Crisp County dep uty sheriff. The agent testified that just before 6:00 p.m. on January 17, 1996, he met Wingfield in the parking lot of a nightclub in Crisp County. Wingfield gave him crack cocaine in exchange for $20. Later that evening, the agent again met Wingfield in the same parking lot and purchased from him another $20 piece of crack cocaine. The transaction was secretly captured on videotape, and a Georgia Bureau of Investigation chemist identified the material purchased as cocaine. This testimony, which the trial court sitting as factfinder found credible, is sufficient to support the convictions. See Jones, supra at 162; King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 406 (3), 407 (447 SE2d 712) (1994).

2. Wingfield claims the trial court erred by admitting the videotape of the cocaine sales. Here, the undercover agent testified that he knew how to operate the recording device; that his review of the videotape showed it had not been altered; and that the videotape fairly and accurately depicted the transactions at issue. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. Dunn v. State, 218 Ga. App. 329, 330 (461 SE2d 294) (1995). Contrary to Wingfield’s argument, the foundational requirements stated in State v. Berky, 214 Ga. App. 174, 176 (447 SE2d 147) (1994), vacated, 266 Ga. 28 (463 SE2d 891) (1995), are not applicable. Those additional requirements were applied to a situation in which no witness was available to testify to the accuracy of the videotape.

3. We find no error in the court’s determination that Wingfield knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Before trial, Wingfield told the court he wished to have a bench trial. The court reminded Wingfield of his absolute right to trial by jury, and Wingfield’s trial counsel told the court he had advised his client of his right to jury trial and had discussed with his client the “positive and negative sides of waiving a jury trial.” Wingfield told the court that no one had forced him to make the decision.

After the court delivered its verdict, however, Wingfield complained to the court that his attorney had “misled him” into believing he would receive a lighter sentence if he opted for a bench trial. The court appointed Wingfield new counsel. At the hearing on Wingfield’s motion for new trial, Wingfield’s original attorney denied the allegations and testified he told Wingfield that if he were convicted, he would receive a life sentence.

Although the burden is on the State to prove Wingfield personally, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial by jury, “the record supports the trial court’s finding that [Wingfield] consulted with his attorney and made an intelligent and knowing decision to waive this right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hansen v. State, 222 Ga. App. 537, 539 (3) (474 SE2d 735) (1996). See also Evans v. State, 216 Ga. App. 21, 24 (3), 25 (453 SE2d 100) (1995).

Decided May 13, 1997.

Before Judge Faircloth.

David E. Morgan III, for appellant.

John C. Pridgen, District Attorney, Patrick J. McDonough, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

4. In his final enumeration, Wingfield claims his trial attorney rendered him ineffective assistance by leading him to believe he would receive a lighter sentence if he agreed to a bench trial. As discussed in Division 3, supra, the trial court rejected this factual assertion. As the trial court’s finding on this issue was not clearly erroneous, we cannot say the attorney rendered ineffective assistance. See Taylor v. State, 266 Ga. 129 (464 SE2d 385) (1995); Smith v. State, 207 Ga. App. 290, 291 (2) (428 SE2d 95) (1993).

Judgment affirmed.

Smith, J., and Senior Appellate Judge Harold R. Banke concur.