CHERRY COTTON MILLS, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Supreme Court of the United States1946-03-25No. No. 187

327 U.S. 53690 L. Ed. 83566 S. Ct. 7291946 U.S. LEXIS 3128SCDB 1945-122

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Court of Claims properly exercised jurisdiction to hear the government's counterclaim against Cherry Cotton Mills because the RFC, despite its corporate designation, constitutes a federal agency whose claims fall within the statutory language allowing the government to plead counterclaims in suits brought by private parties.

Cherry Cotton Mills sought a tax refund of $3,104.87 from the federal government. However, the General Accounting Office directed the Treasury to pay that refund directly to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to offset a debt the company owed to the RFC. Cherry Cotton Mills sued in the Court of Claims for the refund, and the government filed a counterclaim for the full amount owed to the RFC. The company argued the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear the government's counterclaim, raising two objections: first, that the Comptroller General lacked authority to redirect the refund payment, and second, that the RFC should be treated like a private corporation and therefore its claims against the company were not claims "on the part of the Government."

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The Court held that the Court of Claims' authority to entertain counterclaims did not depend on whether preliminary government accounting steps were proper. More fundamentally, the Court found that the RFC, though styled a corporation, was in substance a federal agency—its directors were presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed, its operations served public purposes, its funding came entirely from the government, and it bore no independent financial risk. Under the applicable statute, Congress intended the Court of Claims to resolve all mutual obligations between the government and those suing it in a single proceeding, and this efficiency principle applied equally whether the government's interest was held by the RFC or any other federal agency.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear counterclaims on behalf of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Whether the RFC should be treated as a private corporation or as a federal agency for purposes of statutory counterclaim authority
Whether preliminary actions by the Comptroller General affect the court's jurisdiction to adjudicate counterclaims

Procedural posture

The Court of Claims rendered judgment for the United States on its counterclaim, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the lower court had jurisdiction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1942 the Government owed the petitioner a $3,104.87 refund of processing and floor taxes paid by the petitioner under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The petitioner owed the Reconstruction Finance. Corporation $5,963.51, balance on a note for borrowed money. Tile General Accounting Office directed the Treasury not to pay the tax refund to the petitioner, but to issue a check for the refund payable to the R. F. C. “to partially liquidate” petitioner’s indebtedness to that governmental agency. As authorized by 28 TJ. S. C. 250 (1), the petitioner then brought suit against the Government for the tax refund in the Court of Claims. The Government filed a counterclaim for the $5,963.51, asserting the right to do so under 28 U. S. C. 250 (2), which gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine “All set-offs, counterclaims, ... or other demands whatsoever on the part of the Government of the United States against any claimant against the Government in said court . . .” The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine the counterclaim on these two grounds: (1) the Comptroller exceeded his authority in directing the Treasury to pay the tax refund to the R. F. C. instead of to the petitioner; (2) the R. F. C. should be treated in the same way as a privately owned corporation and when so treated the petitioner’s admittedly valid indebtedness to R. F. C. is not a claim “on the part of the Government” entitling it to set up a counterclaim under 28 U. S. C. 250 (2). The Court of Claims, rejecting both these contentions, rendered judgment for the United States and against the petitioner for the amount it owed the R. F. C. less the amount of the tax refund. We granted certiorari.

Little need be said as to the contention concerning the alleged lack of authority of the General Accounting Office to direct the Treasury not to pay the petitioner, since we agree with the Court of Claims that its jurisdiction to hear and determine counterclaims is in no way dependent upon the preliminary intergovernmental steps which precede court action. For this reason the petitioner’s argument based on our decision in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, where we considered the power of the Comptroller General in relation to wholly different legislation, has no bearing on the power of the Court of Claims under 28 U. S. C. 250 (2).

Nor do we find any justification for giving to 250 (2) the narrow interpretation urged. Its purpose was to permit the Government, when sued in the Court of Claims, to have determined in a single suit all questions which involved mutual obligations between the Government and a claimant against it. Legislation of this kind has long been favored and encouraged because of a belief that it accomplishes among other things such useful purposes as avoidance of “circuity .of action, inconvenience, expense, consumption of the courts’ time, and injustice.” Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Lindell, 281 U. S. 14, 17 and cases cited.

We have no doubt but that the set-off and counterclaim jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was intended to permit the Government to have adjudicated in one suit all controversies between it and those granted permission to sue it, whether the Government’s interest had béen entrusted to its agencies of one kind or another. Every reason that could have prompted Congress to authorize the Government to. plead counterclaims for debts owed to any of its other agencies applies with equal force to debts owed to the R. F. C. Its Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; its activities are all aimed at accomplishing a public purpose; all of its money comes from the Government; its profits, if any, go to the Government; its losses the Government must bear. That the Congress chose to call it a corporation does not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than what it actually is, an agency selected by Government to accomplish purely governmental purposes. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U. S. 517, 524. Nor is this congressionally granted power to plead a counterclaim to be reduced because in other situations, and with relation to other statutes, we have applied the doctrine of governmental immunity or priority rather strictly. The Government here sought neither immunity nor priority. Its right to counterclaim rests on different principles, one of which was graphically expressed by the sponsors of the Act of which § 250 (2) is a part: It is “as much the duty of the citizen to pay the Government as it is the duty of the Government to pay the citizen.” 58 Cong. Globe 1674, April 15, 1862, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549; Keifer. & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81.