MEMORANDUM
David Raymond Andrews, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants placed him in restraints because of his race and conspired to deny him access to the courts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary judgment, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Andrews’s access-to-courts claim based on the alleged withholding of his certifícate of funds because Andrews failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an actual injury as a result of the policy prohibiting personal possession of certified documents. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (actual injury for access-to-courts claim requires showing that defendants hindered a non-frivolous legal claim).
The district court properly dismissed Andrews’s equal protection claim because Andrews failed to exhaust administrative remedies in a proper manner. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir.2010) (“[A]n inmate must first present a complaint at the first level of the administrative process.”); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (an inmate’s grievance must ‘“provide enough information ... to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures’ ” (citation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.