MORRISON v. DICKEY

Supreme Court of Georgia1904-03-04

119 Ga. 698

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed. The trial court erred in giving contradictory jury instructions without clearly resolving their inconsistency, in making prejudicial comments suggesting fraud by Morrison while excluding relevant testimony, and in refusing to permit parol evidence to explain the ambiguous payment terms in the settlement agreement.

Morrison sued Dickey regarding a settlement agreement for a pending lawsuit. The central dispute involved whether Dickey's obligation to provide a $750 note constituted consideration for the settlement. Morrison testified that the note was the agreed-upon consideration, while Dickey disputed this claim. The trial court gave conflicting instructions to the jury—first stating that the settlement was complete, then suggesting jurors should determine whether consideration existed apart from the note. The trial court also made prejudicial comments suggesting Morrison had committed fraud when excluding testimony from Morrison's wife about what Morrison had told her regarding Dickey's promise to provide the note.

The court identified several errors in the trial proceedings. The jury instructions contained an internal contradiction that was not resolved through clear judicial guidance, leaving jurors to determine on their own whether one instruction cured the other. Additionally, the trial court's exclusion of the wife's testimony came with language implying fraud by Morrison, which prejudiced the plaintiffs' case. Furthermore, the settlement language regarding payment "as hereafter agreed" was facially incomplete, and parol evidence should have been admitted to clarify whether the $750 was conditioned on profits or subject to other limitations.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether conflicting jury instructions on consideration and settlement validity require reversal
Whether exclusion of wife's testimony with accompanying fraud insinuations prejudiced plaintiffs
Whether parol evidence is admissible to clarify incomplete payment terms in a settlement agreement

Procedural posture

Morrison appealed a jury verdict in favor of Dickey on Dickey's plea of settlement.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Lamar, J.

(after stating the foregoing facts.) The jury having found for Dickey on the plea of settlement, it is not necessary to consider assignments relating to other -branches of the case. From an inspection of the general charge; which was included in the record, it does appear that the trial judge in one portion thereof did submit to the jury the question as to whether there was any consideration other than the $750 note; and also instructed them that if there was no consideration for the settlement, it was nudum pactum. But these general observations were inconsistent with the pointed and explicit statement that “ I charge you that that settlement was a complete settlement of the case.” This excluded the theory of the plaintiff that the settlement had been signed after the execution and completion of the contract of sale of March 10, 1903, and was therefore made, not as a part of the second sale, but without consideration. The defendant insists, however, that this error was cured by other portions of the charge. As to this answer see S., F. & W. Ry. v. Hatcher, 118 Ga. 273, where it was said : “The attention of the jury was not specially called to the fact that it was intended to correct what had been previously said. The jury must take the whole charge as the law, and it is not for them to select one part to the exclusion of another, nor to decide whether one part cures or qualifies another, without being instructed so to do by the judge.”

Morrison testified that the consideration for the settlement of the pending suit was that Dickey was to give a note for $750 and interest. This Dickey denied. In excluding the testimony of Mrs. Morrison that when she signed the settlement her husband told her that Dickey was to give the note for $750, the court said, “ It looks to me as if he was general agent; and he has committed .a fraud on her, she has to bear it.” There may be a clerical error, but as this statement appears in the record it was the expression of an opinion that Morrison had committed a fraud. If, as seems probable, the court stated, “ If he was general agent and if he has committed a fraud on her, she has to bear it,” it was an intimation of the same opinion. The conversation between the husband and wife, or principal and agent, may not have been admissible against Dickey ; but it was prejudicial to the plaintiffs case to suggest that the agent in that conversation was stating to the wife something different from what he had agreed with the defendant.

It is unnecessary to consider any other assignment except that based on the refusal to strike the plea to the effect that the $750 was only to be paid out of profits. The undertaking to pay “$750 as hereafter agreed” was on its face incomplete, and parol evidence was admissible to explain the ambiguity (Civil Code, § 5202) and show not only the date when such payment was to be made, but also the source from which and the condition on which it was to be paid. The time of payment might be fixed by a date, or it might also be referred to the period when profits had been earned.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Simmons, G. J., absent.