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RANDOLPH v. BRUNSWICK AND BIRMINGHAM RAILROAD COMPANY et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1904-08-12
120 Ga. 969

Summary

Holding. The judgment granting nonsuit was affirmed. The court held that the filing of a second action for the same cause does not abate an appeal of the first action, and that the plaintiff's assignment of error was sufficient to challenge the nonsuit judgment.

A railroad company moved to dismiss an appeal after the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit for the same injury while the first case was still pending on appeal. The court rejected this argument, holding that the existence of a second action cannot be used to dismiss an appeal of the first action. The court also rejected a challenge to the assignment of error in the bill of exceptions, finding it sufficiently specific to raise the question of whether the evidence supported the plaintiff's claims.

On the merits, the court examined the facts surrounding a pedestrian struck by a train. The evidence showed the train was traveling at approximately twenty-five miles per hour on a straight, unobstructed track, and the engineer could have seen the deceased from more than half a mile away. The deceased appeared to have been walking safely near the track before suddenly turning and walking about twelve feet across the tracks, where he was struck. Given the train's speed, it would have been impossible to stop in time once the engineer spotted him in danger. The court found these circumstances supported the trial court's grant of nonsuit.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether filing a second action abates an appeal of a prior action for the same cause
  • Whether a general exception to a nonsuit provides a sufficient assignment of error
  • Whether evidence that a pedestrian suddenly entered a train's path supported a nonsuit

Procedural posture

The trial court granted a nonsuit, the plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions and appealed by writ of error, and the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on multiple grounds.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lamar, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The court granted a nonsuit. The plaintiff sued out a writ of error. On the call of the case here, the defendant presented a certificate from the clerk of the superior court, showing that after the bill of exceptions had been transmitted to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff filed another suit for identically the same cause of action; and thereupon the defendant moved to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that the institution of the second suit was an acceptance and ratification of the judgment granting a nonsuit. Courts do not settle moot questions or deal with fictitious litigation; neither will they proceed to judgment-where it is shown that the parties have settled their controversy, or that the judgment has been satisfied. In such case the writ of error will be dismissed in the appellate court. If on an application for injunction it appears that the act sought to be enjoined has been fully completed, a like dismissal will result. Tuells v. Torras, 113 Ga. 691; Gallaher v. Schneider, 110 Ga. 322; Owens v. Read Phosphate Co., 115 Ga. 768. Compare Sutcliffe v. McSweeney, 102 Ga. 807; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S 547. But all these decisions relate to the conduct of the parties, or the condition of the subject-matter, in the suit then pending in the Supreme Court. None of them rule that an action rightly brought and then undisposed of shall be dismissed because of the conduct of one of the parties in another and • independent action. If the plaintiff had consented to the nonsuit (Zorn v. Lamar, 71 Ga. 81), or, after a judgment of involuntary nonsuit, had brought a new action and •thereby yielded to the judgment before presenting a bill of exceptions, a different question might have been presented. But. here she continued and preserved the original action by filing a bill of exceptions. The pendency of this former suit may have been good ground for abating the second, but the pendency of the second can not beused to abate the first. Civil Code, § 3737. This ground to dismiss the writ of error must be overruled.

The bill of exceptions recites that the court ordered a non-suit ; that plaintiff “ excepted to the action of the court in granting said motion for nonsuit, and now excepts and assigns said action as error.” The defendant moved to dismiss the bill of exceptions on the further ground that this was no proper assignment of error. The judgment is equivalent to a yuling that the plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient to prove the case as laid. The ruling was general, and so was the exception. The assignment was as specific as the judgment, and is sufficient to raise the question as to whether the evidence sustained the allegations of the petition. Holst v. Burrus, 79 Ga. 114; Howell v. Pennington, 118 Ga. 497.

The deceased was killed in the morning by a train running on schedule time at the rate of about twenty-five miles an hour. The place was not a public crossing, though it was used as a- path by pedestrians. The track was straight and unobstructed. Had the deceased been upon the track be could have been seen by the engineer for more than half a mile. In like manner he could have seen and heard the engine for a long distance before it reached him. There was nothing to indicate that his sight or hearing was defective. All of the circumstances indicated that he was walking near the track in a place of safety, that he turned obliquely, walked, say twelve feet, across the track; and just failed to cross, before he was hit by the rapidly moving engine. Considering the speed at which the locomotive was running, it is evident that it would have been impossible to stop the train between the time the engineer could have seen him in a place of danger and the time that he was struck. On this ground the court might properly have granted the nonsuit, without considering any variance between the allegata and probata, or the further question as to whether the deceased himself could not have avoided the danger by the exercise of ordinary care. Ivy v. East Tenn. R Co., 88 Ga. 71.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.