Marion D. WHITLEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1956-10-11No. No. 13347

237 F.2d 787

Summary · law.co

Holding. The conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial because the marked money, like the narcotics, should have been suppressed as evidence obtained through an illegal arrest and search lacking probable cause and valid consent.

Appellant was arrested and convicted of narcotics offenses after police entered a rooming house following an informant's purchase of drugs using marked money. Police arrested appellant in a bathroom, then searched a separate bedroom on the same floor where they found narcotics and recovered the marked money from appellant's purse. The trial court suppressed the narcotics but allowed the marked money into evidence based on an alleged consent to the search.

The appellate court found no valid basis for either the arrest or the subsequent search. The informant had provided only vague information about a "particular room" and "particular person," but police had no clear evidence that appellant was the person involved in the drug transaction. Moreover, the search of the bedroom was not a valid incident to arrest because the room was physically separated from where appellant was arrested, and the arrest itself lacked probable cause. Additionally, the police improperly accessed a non-public porch through a window to observe the bedroom occupant, which tainted any observations made from that location.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an arrest was supported by probable cause when police received only general information from an informant
Whether a search of a bedroom separated from the arrest location can be justified as incidental to arrest
Whether consent to search can be valid when given by a person under arrest
Whether police may lawfully access a non-public porch through a window to observe a room

Procedural posture

Appeal from a conviction under narcotic laws challenging the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress marked money recovered during a warrantless search.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

EDGERTON, Chief Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction under the narcotic laws. Appellant was arrested after an informer under police surveillance had entered and left a three-story rooming house in which ap pellant and others lived. In the house the informer had parted with so-called “marked money”, meaning bills whose serial numbers were recorded, and acquired narcotics. At appellant’s trial the police testified that the informer gave them information about a “particular room and the location of the room” and also about “a particular person”.

Appellant and a woman named Meredith both occupied one bedroom on the third floor. The police entered the house by the front door and went to the third floor. Through an open door they saw the appellant in a bathroom. They entered the bathroom and arrested her. The bathroom was not connected with the bedroom.

Some of the officers went through a window from the bathroom to a porch. From the porch, they looked into the bedroom and saw Meredith preparing to give herself a hypodermic injection. They entered the bedroom, searched it, and found narcotics. They also opened the door from the bedroom into the hall, which was locked, and admitted the other officers who had appellant in custody. They asked appellant where her money was and she indicated it was in her purse. They took the marked money from the purse.

The appellant filed a motion to suppress the seized narcotics as evidence, and moved orally to suppress the money. The motion was granted as to the narcotics but denied, on the theory of consent, as to the money. We think the money as wtell as the narcotics should have been suppressed.

We find no evidence of voluntary consent. In Judd v. United States, as in this case, the alleged consent to a search and seizure was given by a person under arrest. In reversing the conviction we said: “a waiver or consent must be proved by clear and positive testimony, and it must be established that there was no duress or coercion * * 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 66, 190 F.2d 649, 651.

Since the room in which the appellant was arrested was separated by a corridor and a locked door from the room that was searched, it is not clear that the search and seizure were incidental to her arrest. Even if they were incidental, the arrest did not justify the search and seizure, for there was no proof that the arrest was legal. There was no proof that the informer had told the police that the appellant was the “particular person” who had sold narcotics. Accordingly it does not appear that the officers had probable cause, when they arrested appellant, to believe she had committed a felony. Cf. Wrightson v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 392, 222 F.2d 556, 558; Wrightson v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 377, 236 F.2d 672.

The arrest of Meredith, also, does not appear to have been legal and therefore does not justify the search and seizure. Since the porch from which the police saw Meredith was not open to the public, and the police reached it through a window, they had no right to be on the porch, whatever may be thought of their previous presence in the relatively public corridors of the rooming house. It follows that what they saw from the porch, even if it gave them probable cause to believe that Meredith had committed a felony, did not justify them in arresting her. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.