MORGAN et al. v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1904-06-08

120 Ga. 294

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed as to Gaddy and affirmed as to Morgan. The court held that in a murder indictment charging multiple defendants as principals in different degrees, the specific designation of which defendant is the first-degree principal is immaterial, and the culpable act of any defendant is imputed to all; however, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove Gaddy's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Andy Morgan and Henry Gaddy were tried together for the murder of Ben Stroup under an indictment containing two counts. The first count charged Morgan with murder; the second charged Morgan as the direct perpetrator and Gaddy as present and aiding and abetting. Both were convicted by jury, and they moved for a new trial, which was denied.

The defendants challenged the trial court's jury instruction regarding the burden of proof and the alternative theories of liability presented in the indictment. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that when multiple defendants are charged as principals in different degrees in a murder indictment, the specific designation of who is the first-degree principal versus second-degree principal is immaterial. The unlawful act of any one person among those charged is legally attributed to all of them.

The appellate court found the evidence against Gaddy to be entirely circumstantial and insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a majority of the court concluded the evidence against Morgan was sufficient to support the verdict, though the court was divided on this point. The court affirmed Morgan's conviction while reversing Gaddy's.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether jury instruction on alternative theories of principal liability in murder indictment was proper
Whether designation of first-degree versus second-degree principal in indictment affects guilt or punishment
Whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Procedural posture

Defendants were convicted after jury trial, moved for a new trial which was denied, and appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Cobb, J.

Andy Morgan and Henry Gaddy were placed upon trial under an indictment charging them with the offense of murder. The indictment contained two counts. The first count charged Andy Morgan with the offense of murder in killing Ben Stroup. The second count charged Andy Morgan with being the actor or-absolute perpetrator of the crime, and Henry Gaddy with being present, aiding and abetting Andy Morgan in its commission. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty against both of the accused. Their motion for a new trial was overruled, and they excepted.

Complaint is made that the court erred in charging as follows : “As before stated, gentlemen, the burden is upon the State to prove each and every material allegation in the bill of indictment, every necessary fact. The necessary facts to be proved are these: that Andy Morgan, either by himself or in concert with Henry Gaddy, or that Henry Gaddy, either by himself or in concert with Andy Morgan, did in the county of Fulton, at or about the time charged in this bill of indictment, shoot and murder Ben Stroup, as charged in the bill of indictment.” There was no error in this charge. “When principals in the first and second degrees are punished alike, no distinction between them need be made in the indictment. The act of one is the act of all.” Leonard v. State, 77 Ga. 764. See also Collins v. State, 88 Ga. 347; Nobles v. State, 98 Ga. 77. All these cases relate to the conviction of one charged as a principal in the first degree on evidence showing him guilty as a principal in the second degree. But the converse of this proposition is likewise true. “ An indictment that A gave the mortal blow, and B, C, and D were present and abetting, is sustained by evidence that B gave the blow, and A, C, and D were present and abetting.” East, P. C. 350, §121. “In an indictment for murder, where several are charged as principals, one as principal perpetrator, and the others as present aiding and abetting, it is not material which of them is charged as principal in the first degree, for the mortal injury done by any one of those persons is, in legal contemplation, the act of each and every one of them.” State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. Dec. 583. See also Whart. Cr. Ev. § 102, p. 95, and cit. in n. 2; Benge v. Com., 92 Ky. 1; State v. Putman, 18 S. C. 175; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 (2). The question under discussion was not involved in love-joy. v. State, 82 Ga. 87.

The evidence was entirely circumstantial, and we are all of the opinion that it was not of such a character as to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gaddy was guilty, and therefore the judgment will he reversed as to him. The case against Morgan is somewhat stronger, and Justices Candler and Evans and the writer are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to authorize the verdict as to him. The Chief Justice and Justices Fish and Lamar do not think that the evidence as to Morgan was sufficient to relieve the case from all reasonable doubt. The Justices who are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient are also agreed that none of the special assignments of error are of such a character as to require a reversal of the judgment, or even to require any elaborate discussion; and all of the Justices concur in the proposition stated in the first headnote.

Judgment reversed as to Gaddy, and affirmed as to Morgan by operation of law.