OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Saul Vincente Ramirez appeals his conviction by a jury of one count of knowingly and unlawfully making a false statement in an application for asylum in the United States. We affirm.
Ramirez first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Ramirez claims he was prejudiced by the testimony of an INS agent who, in violation of a consent agreement between the parties, testified that Ramirez’s Canadian asylum documents originated with the Ontario War Crimes Unit. We have conducted a review of the record and find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny the motion. United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1486 (4th Cir.1985); Fed.R.Crim.P. 33.
Next, Ramirez argues that the district court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instruction on “materiality” in favor of that of the Government. Again, after reviewing the instructions at issue and the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to utilize the instruction offered by Ramirez. United States v. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d 175, 181 (4th Cir.2000); see Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770-72, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988).
Ramirez also takes issue with the district court’s decision to exclude his expert witness from testifying that Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations required that Government witness Harold Montes be either a licensed attorney or a member of a certified non-profit organization in order to have assisted Ramirez with his asylum application. Upon our review, we conclude that the exclusion of the witness did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 182; see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 265 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir.1986)).
Finally, Ramirez argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion in limine requesting that Government Exhibit 2, Ramirez’s U.S. asylum application, be redacted to remove two responses to questions about Ramirez’s previous address because the responses appear false and thus constitute evidence of unindicted acts that may be crimes. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion in limine. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 349-50 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 886 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 448 (4th Cir.1991).
We accordingly affirm Ramirez’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.