Groover, Stubbs & Co. vs. Brown

Supreme Court of Georgia1882-12-19

69 Ga. 60

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment in favor of Mrs. Brown's homestead claim was affirmed. The trial court did not err in admitting the homestead documentation, in instructing the jury on Mrs. Brown's status as both beneficiary and head of family, in permitting oral evidence of payment to the administrator, or in denying the motion based on newly discovered evidence.

Mrs. Brown claimed a house and lot in Sandersville as her homestead after her husband's death, at which time she had two minor children. A creditor of the deceased husband obtained a judgment on a debt created after 1868 and levied on the property. By the time of the levy, the children had reached adulthood. The jury found in favor of Mrs. Brown's homestead claim, and the trial court denied the creditor's motion for a new trial.

The creditor raised four objections to the homestead determination. The court rejected each one. The homestead papers were admissible despite minor defects, as the surveyor's order appearing in county records satisfied legal requirements. Mrs. Brown qualified as both a beneficiary of the homestead estate and its head-of-family trustee—a dual status that continued as long as she remained a widow and the children remained minors. Once the children reached adulthood, the homestead estate terminated as to them, but Mrs. Brown retained her interest as a widow. The trial court properly admitted oral evidence showing that Mrs. Brown had paid the excess value over $2,000 to the estate administrator, rather than requiring documentary proof from the administrator's returns. Finally, the creditor's claim of newly discovered evidence failed because the administrator's returns were accessible before trial and the creditor's failure to examine them constituted negligence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether homestead papers with minor defects are admissible as evidence
Whether a widow qualifies as a beneficiary of the homestead estate or only as a trustee for minor children
When homestead estate rights terminate upon children reaching majority
Whether oral evidence may prove payment of homestead excess value to an administrator
Whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial when the evidence was accessible before trial

Procedural posture

The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. Brown's homestead claim, denied the creditor's motion for a new trial, and the creditor appealed on four assigned errors.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Jackson, Chief Justice.

This was a claim to a house and lot in Sandersville, as her homestead, by Mrs Brown. The property was levied upon by the plaintiff in error on a judgment rendered on a debt created since 1868. Mrs. Brown applied for and obtained the homestead after the death of her husband, he leaving two minor children and herself as his widow. The children were of age at the date of the levy! On the charge of the court the jury found for the claim! ant, and the plaintiff having been denied a new trial, excepted.

Four errors are assigned : First, that the court erred in admitting the homestead as evidence.before the jury because of defects therein; secondly, because the widow was not a beneficiary of the homestead trust, but merely, as head of the family, the trustee for her two minor children, and with their majority in age the homestead estate terminated; thirdly, because the court admitted parol proof that the excess over $2000.00 had been paid the administrator; and fourthly, on account of newly discovered evidence.

The homestead papers were properly admitted in evidence. The order to the county surveyor need not have appeared on the face of the homestead papers. It was enough that it appeared on the minutes. It is presumed that this officer did all required by law before he granted the homestead. 47 Ga., 195. This applied as well (to notice in the absence of proof that there was none.

The homestead papers show that the widow as “ the head of a family consisting of herself and two minor chib dren,” applied for and had the homestead set apart. So she was a beneficiary for whom the estate was set apart, as well as the quasi trustee or head of the family in whom the legal title was vested as long as the beneficiaries existed as such. The children so existed until they arrived of age; the widow as long as she remained a widow. Therefore there is no error in the charges and refusals to charge on matters concerning this point.

Nor was there error in admitting parol evidence to prove- that the excess of value over $2,000.00 for homestead was paid by the wido.w to the administrator. His returns were not better evidence than would be a receipt from him or any other admission by him. He was the person to whom the money was properly payable, where the widow applied for homestead. Virtute officii, he was the receiver in such a case to distribute that excess to the creditors and heirs. This application was made in 1872, prior to the act of 1876, which repealed sections 2014 and 2015 of the Code of 1873. This application was made under the act of 1870, p. 71, codified in Code of 1873, section 2014.

There is nothing in the motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence- If the plaintiff wished to put in the returns, he should have examined them before trial. Naturally he would look to the returns to see if the excess in value over $2,000 had been paid to the administrator and returned by him, and it is in these returns that plaintiff has found newly discovered evidence. It is laches not to have examined them and discovered what was in them before trial. Besides, the object was to impeach the parol evidence of the administrator, and to do that a new trial is not granted on account of newly discovered evidence.

Judgment affirmed.