Opinion-of the Court by
Justice Lockwood.
Two questions are presented in this case: 1. What is the true construction of the obligation made by the plaintiff in error to the defendant in error? 2. Ought the instructions prayed for to have been given to the jury ? On the first point, the court are of opinion that by the true construction of the contract of the parties, the relation of client and counsel was created, and that it became necessary for Mr. Wash either to have contributed his legal knowledge and assistance in the suit of George against Whiteside and Bradshaw, or have been ready and willing at the trial to have aided and conducted the suit to its final termination. The confidence reposed in counsel is of a personal nature, and can not be delegated without the consent of the client. The evident object of the party in making this contract being to obtain the legal services of Mr. Wash in prosecuting the suit, the court ought to have instructed the jury that, unless they believed Cornelius had dispensed with the personal services of Mr. Wash, they ought to find for Cornelius.
In relation to the second charge given to the jtiry, to wit: “ that although the plaintiff did not in person attend to the suit for George, yet if Peck and Carr did attend to it for him, as well as he, Wash, could have done, Wash would have a right to recover.” If the court is right in their construction of this contract, this instruction was clearly wrong. In the employment of counsel to manage a cause, the client is governed by a variety of considerations which relate to the character, learning and skill of the lawyer, and whether the client exercises a sound judgment in his selection, is a matter in which he alone is interested, but he is entitled to receive the identical legal services he has contracted for. It may, with propriety, be asked, by what rule could a jury decide whether Peck and Carr did render the same services that Wash might have done, had he been present? It is only sufficient to state the question to show the utter impracticability of its being determined by a jury. They can have no data on which to predicate an opinion. The judgment must be reversed with costs, with permission to the defendant in error to have the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Blackwell, for plaintiff.
Starr, for defendant.
Judgment reversed.
If attorneys who are co-partners, accept a retainer, the contract is joint, and continues to the termination of the suit, and neither can be released from the obligations or responsibilities assumed, cither by a dissolution of then- firm, or by any other act or agreement between themselves. Walker v. Goodrich, 16 Ill., 341.
An attorney agreed with a father to institute proceedings for the division and sale of land held by the lather and his daughter in common, and the father agreed to pay for such services five hundred dollars when the land should be sold and the purchase money become due, or the usual fee in case the attorney should fail to procure the division. The father died after an order for the sale had been entered by the court, but before the sale had taken place; and the guardian of the daughter had the suit dismissed. Held, that the attorney was only entitled to the usual fee for his services. Bunn et al. v. Prather et al., 21 Ill., 217.
Contingent fees to attorneys are not against law or public policy. Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill., 449.