Opinion of the Court by
Chief Justice Thomas Reynolds.
This was a suit in chancery, commenced by Primm, for the purpose of setting aside a contract made with James W. Davidson and wife, and to erjoin a judgment obtained against himself by Bryan and Morrison upon a note executed under said contract. The bill alleges that sometime in July, 1808, Primm purchased of said Davidson and wife a certain tract of land lying in St. Clair County, which land descended to the wife of said Davidson as heir at law of one Peter Zip, deceased ; that said Davidson and wife were to execute to him such deeds as would completely vest in him the same title which the said Zip, deceased, had in the premises. That, accordingly, said Davidson and wife, together with one Jane Everett, who claimed an interest in the premises, did execute to him a deed for said land—that in consideration of such purchase, he agreed to pay the said Davidson the sum of eight hundred dollars, for the payment of which, he executed his note to the said Jane Everett for the sum of two hundred and sixty-six dollars ; and for the balance of said purchase money, beside a small part paid, he executed his notes to the said Davidson. The bill further shows that at the time of making said contract, and of the execution of the deed aforesaid, the said wife of Davidson, who was the sole heir to the said Zip, was under the age of twenty-one years, and that since she has arrived at full age, has refused to execute a deed for said land, without the payment of an additional sum.
It is further shown, that after the note executed to the said Jane Everett became due, it was assigned to Bryan and Morrison, who purchased the same through their agent, William Atchison,—that said Atchison had a full knowledge of all the circumstances under which said note was executed. The said Bryan and Morrison commenced suit upon said note and recovered judgment.
The prayer of the bill is to perpetually enjoin said judgment and cancel the notes given pursuant to said purchase. An injunction to stay the collection of said judgment was granted by the judge in vacation. The bill as to Davidson and wife was taken pro confesso. Bryan and Morrison answered, setting forth their ignorance of all the circumstances under which said note was executed—that they are the innocent purchasers of said note—deny knowing that their agent had any knowledge of said circumstances, but do not deny that their agent possessed such information. During the progress of the suit in the court below, the injunction was dissolved and the said Bryan and Morrison proceeded and collected their judgment. Upon the final hearing of the cause, the court below decreed that the notes should be can-celled, and that Bryan and Morrison refund to the said Primm the money so collected. To reverse this decree this appeal is prosecuted. We will first consider whether the bill contains equity, if so, whether that equity attaches upon the note in the hands of Bryan and Morrison.
The knowledge by Davidson of his wife’s being under age at the time of executing the conveyance, and not disclosing that fact to Primm, is surely a suppression of the truth; add to this the fact of his wife’s disagreement to the contract after she arrived at full age, and I think it will not be contended that the bill contains no equity. Between Primm, then, and Davidson and wife, the decree ought to be affirmed.
The next inquiry is, does this equity extend to Bryan and Morrison. They do not deny that Atchison, their agent, had knowledge of Primm’s equity. This of itself would be notice to them.
But regardless of this fact, the note was assigned to Bryan and Morrison after it became due. Under this circumstance, they took it subject to all the equity which attached in the hands of the original payee. * It was contended in the argument by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the court erred in decreeing the money to be refunded by Bryan and Morrison, when the bill did not pray for such relief.
It will be remembered, that the prayer, as to them, is for a perpetual injunction, that after the injunction was dissolved, they proceeded and collected their judgment. Could not the court then decree the money to be refunded? We have no hesitation in saying they could. Otherwise, the complainant would be turned round and compelled to seek his redress by an action at law. If the injunction had been made perpetual, without this additional relief, the same absurdity would have followed. Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed and the defendant recover his costs,
Judgment affirmed.
The same defense may be set up against the assignee of a note, which was transferred after its maturity, as could be made against the original payee. Tyler v. Young et al. 2 Scam., 444; Sargeant v. Kellogg et al. 5 Gilm., 273 ; Walter v. Kirk et al. 14 Ill., 55. And so is the statute. Purples statutes, p. 772, Sec. 8. Scates’ Comp., p. 292.
An assignee of a note takes it subject to any defense existing between the maker and the payee which appears on the face of the note, or of which he had notice at the time of the assignment; and in such case it is immaterial whether the note was assigned before or after it became due. Frink et al. v. Ryan, 3 Scam., 324.
The same is held in Rector v. Rector et al. 3 Gilm., 119, and Doyle et al. v. Teas et al. 4 Scam., 250.
Laws of 1819, page 1.
In Isaacs v. Steele, 3 Scam., 103, the court said they had no doubt that under the prayer for general relief, a court of chancery may decree that which is not specifically prayed for, and grant more than is asked. And again in Manchester et al. v. McKee, 4 Gilm., 519. “The general prayer is sufficient to authorize the granting of any relief which the statement of the bill would warrant.” See also Alexander et al. v. Tams et al., 13 Ill., 225. Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill., 30.
The complainant is not confined to the particular relief prayed for in the bill, but, under the general prayer, is entitled to such a decree as the nature of the case may require. Beebe and others v. Bank of New York, 1 Johns. Rep., 529.