Opinion of the Court by
Chief Justice Reynolds.
This was an action of assumpsit, for the non-performance of a contract. To the declaration, the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. To this plea there was a demurrer, and the demurrer overruled by the court below.
To reverse that decision, this writ of error is prosecuted.
The statute, limiting actions in cases like the present, was approved March 22d, 1819, [Laws of 1819, page 141,] and limits the time in which actions on the case upon promises shall "be commenced, to five years. As that statute has not run five years, it can not operate as a bar to this action.
It is not necessary now to decide, whether, if the five years had run under the territorial government, it would not have been a bar, and might have been pleaded. It will be time enough to settle that question, when brought before us ; we can only say at present, that we incline to the affirmative of that question.
Let the judgment be reversed, the plaintiff recover his costs, and the cause remanded for new proceedings to be had, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
As a general rule, a statute is to operate in futuro only, and is not to be so construed as to affect past transactions. A retrospective effect will not be given it unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the legislature. If it is left doubtful what was the real design, the statute must be so construed as to have a prospective effect only. Jones, adm. v. Bond, post. Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm., 221. Thompson v. Alexander, 11 Ill., 55. Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill., 227.