Tenbrooke versus Jahke

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1875-02-23No. No. 227

77 Pa. 392

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed and a new trial is awarded because the trial court erred in assuming the existence of fraudulent suppression and withdrawing factual questions from the jury, and erred in instructing the jury that damages for the street opening could be set off against the purchase price.

The plaintiff purchased a lot at a master's sale where public notice indicated that Baring Street had been laid out across the property, with damages to be paid to the purchaser. The defendant, who was present at the sale and lived nearby, later sued the plaintiff, claiming the plaintiff had suppressed material facts about the street opening. The trial judge instructed the jury that such suppression entitled the defendant to set off the damages against the purchase price, effectively removing the factual question from jury consideration.

The court found this instruction erroneous. The facts were susceptible to different interpretations—the defendant may well have known about the street opening given his presence at the sale where it was publicly announced, and the purchase price may have been set with this encumbrance in mind. Rather than a case of fraudulent suppression, the situation resembled mutual mistake, which equity typically addresses through contract rescission and restitution, not set-off. The court also rejected the judge's rulings on whether damages for the street opening could be claimed or offset in this suit, finding that such damages constitute a personal claim to the owner at the time of injury and do not transfer with the land.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether suppression of material facts regarding a street opening constitutes fraud or mutual mistake
Whether factual disputes regarding alleged suppression should be submitted to the jury or decided by the court
Whether damages for a street opening can be claimed or set off by a subsequent purchaser

Procedural posture

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, and the trial court issued instructions to the jury that were challenged on multiple assignments of error.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Passoít

delivered the opinion of the court,

We do not find any serious error in either of the first six specifications. The seventh refers to the refusal of the learned judge to answer the points submitted to him by the counsel of the plaintiff. We think such refusal was error. The sixth and seventh points were not answered in the general charge, and should have been affirmed. A party who applies for it is entitled to a clear and distinct instruction on the rule of law applicable to his case, and it is error to withhold it: Slaymaker v. St. John, 5 Watts 27.

The remaining assignments allege error in the charge of the court. In the portion of the charge contained in the eighth specification the learned judge assumed, that there was the suppression of a material fact, and instructed the jury that said suj^pression entitled the defendant to a set-off in dollars and cents the injury caused to his lot by the opening of-Baring street. This virtually withdrew the question of fact from the jury. It may be that the court was right in its view of the facts; but they are not incapable of another and very different interpretation. The plaintiff had purchased the lot in question at a master’s sale. Public notice was given at said sale that Baring street had been laid out over this lot, and that the purchaser would be entitled to the damages. The defendant was at the master’s sale and bid against the plaintiff for said lot. In addition, the defendant lived within two hundred and fifty feet of Baring street. The only knowledge the plaintiff appears to have had upon this subject, was what occurred at the master’s sale, at which, as before stated, the defendant -was also present. He may very well have assumed .that the defendant knew Baring street had been laid out over the lot, and the price may have been fixed at what the plaintiff regarded as its value, subject to such an encumbrance. In such case there is no conclusive presumption that there was either the suppressio veri, or the suggestio falsi. It more nearly resembles the case of a mutual mistake, where equity relieves, not by allowing the party to keep both the property and the price, but by rescinding the contract and by restoring the parties to their former position. In this case the plaintiff offered to take the property back and restore the money paid with interest. The defendant declined this offer He may or may not have a defence to this suit, as the jury may find the facts in regard to the alleged suppression by the plaintiff of the fact that Baring street had been opened over the lot. This fact should have been submitted to the jury, instead of being assumed by the court.

The portions of the charge referred to in the ninth and tenth assignments of error were clearly erroneous. It has been repeatedly held that damages for the opening of roads and streets are a personal claim; they are assessed in favor of the owner at the time of the injury, and do not run with the land : McFadden v. Johnson, 22 P. F. Smith 335. The defendant has not, in any aspect of the case, a claim to the damages qua damages, and could not sot them off in this suit. If evidence for any purpose, it could only have been as to the measure of damages sustained by defendant by reason of the opening of Baring street. Even upon this question they were not conclusive.

Judgment reversed, and a venire faeias de novo awarded.