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Turpin et al. v. Turpin et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri1885-10
88 Mo. 337

Summary

Holding. The appeal is dismissed as premature. On the merits, the court held that the actual sale price of land sold to effect partition controls the distribution calculation rather than the commissioners' valuation, and that advancements cannot be charged against beneficiaries who are not explicitly charged in the will or codicil.

This case involves a dispute over the partition and distribution of Jeremiah Turpin's estate among his seven children and other beneficiaries. The testator's will directed that his property pass to his wife for life, then to his children equally, with specific provisions for Nancy Robertson (who was to receive certain land in Saline county valued at five thousand dollars) and Frank Turpin (who was charged with a three-thousand-dollar advancement). When the estate could not be divided in kind, the parties sold the non-Saline county lands through private sale at a price that reduced Nancy Robertson's share below five thousand dollars. The court then ordered a sale of part of the Saline county land to complete the distribution.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the commissioners' valuation or the actual sale price should determine each beneficiary's share. The court held that because a sale was necessary to effect partition, the proceeds from the actual private sale—not the commissioners' appraisal—must control the distribution calculation. Additionally, the appellants argued that two other sons should be charged with advancements based on lifetime gifts from the testator, but the court rejected this claim, finding that the doctrine of hotchpot (bringing advancements into account) applies only in intestacy cases, and that here the will itself explicitly designates which child receives an advancement charge.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether an order of sale is a final judgment appealable before approval and distribution
  • Whether commissioners' appraisal or actual sale proceeds determine beneficiary shares in partition
  • Whether advancement doctrine applies to beneficiaries not explicitly charged in the will

Procedural posture

The case was appealed from a trial court order directing sale of estate property to effect partition, before any sale or report thereof occurred.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Black, J.

This a proceeding between the devisees of Jeremiah Turpin for the partition of real estate. The testator gave his property, real and personal, to his wife, who was dead at the institution of this suit, for life, then to his seven children in equal parts, charging his son Frank with an advancement of three thousand dollars, and constituting two of his sons trustees for Nancy Robertson as to her share. By the codicil, Nancy is to have certain lands in Saline county at a valuation of five thousand dollars, if her share equals that amount, and if not, then that part thereof west of the road at two thousand five hundred dollars, and the other portion is to be sold and the proceeds divided. The commissioners appraised the whole estate, putting the Saline county land at five thousand dollars, at an aggregate amount which would give to her the whole of that tract. They also reported that the other lands could not be divided in kind. Thereupon the court ordered a sale of the property, other than that in Saline county. The parties then sold the lands not situated in Saline county at private sale, .all joining in the conveyance, at a price which made the share of Nancy less than five thousand dollars. Thereupon the court ordered a sale of that part of the Saline ■county land not lying west of tbe road. From this order and before any sale or report thereof, this appeal was taken.

1. Following the opinion in Murray v. Yeates, 73 Mo. 14, and authorities there cited, the order of sale is not a final j uclgment within the meaning of section 3391, Re" vised Statutes, from which an appeal will lie. It is the order of approval and distribution which constitutes the final judgment. This appeal was, therefore, premature and must be dismissed.

2. To avoid the delay and expense of another appeal we aré asked to consider certain other questions, which, we proceed to do. For Mrs. Robertson it is contended the valuation fixed by the commissioners must control. While the testator valued the land to go to her, he fixed upon no method of determining the value of the other lands. He must have had in view the law as to that. He evidently contemplated an equal distribution of the property, not valued in the shape in which it became neces: sary to put it to effect a distribution, Had the property been susceptible of division in kind, the report of the commissioners when approved would have ended the matter. A sale being required in order to effect a partition, the proceeds would stand in lieu of the land, and the amount of the sale would determine the amount to go into the computation for a division, and not the value fixed by the commissioners. Instead of a public sale the parties made a private sale, as they had a right to do,, and that is conclusive upon all the parties as to the value of the land so sold and the court properly so ruled.

3. On the part of the plaintiffs it is insisted that; H: JB. and Wm. J. Turpin should each be charged with three thousand dollars by way of advancement, because of land of that value conveyed to them by the father in his lifetime: One of these deeds, as wTe understand the record, was made before the date of the will, the other thereafter, but before the date of the codicil. No charge is made against these devisees by the will or codicil, though the son Frank is thereby charged with three thousand dollars-The doctrine of bringing advancements into hotchpot apl plies only in cases of intestacy. 4 Kent Com. [13 Ed.] p. 41S; 2 Williams Ex. [Am. notes] p. 1608. And this is often said to be the rule where there is a surplus undisposed of by the will. Marshall et al. v. Rench et al., 3 Del. Ch. 254; Needles’ Ex. v. Needles et al., 7 Ohio St. 432. In this state the matter is governed by statute and the statute only applies to children of persons dying intestate. Secs. 2166-7, R. S. Other provisions as to advancements are made as to children not named or provided for in the will. Sec. 3970, R. S. Here the children are all provided for in the will; one is by the will charged with an advancement, the others are not, though two were advanced before the date of the codicil.

The will must control. The appeal is dismissed.

All concur.