Appeal of Bentleys Executors

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1882-02-27

99 Pa. 500

Summary · law.co

Holding. The presumption of payment arose before the legatee presented her petition based on the debt's twenty-year lapse without claim or acknowledgment, and the executor's casual refusal to a third party was insufficient to rebut this presumption. The decree is reversed.

A debt that remains unpaid, unacknowledged, and unclaimed for twenty years is presumed to have been paid absent evidence explaining the delay. Under this presumption, the creditor bears the burden of proving that payment did not occur—a different standard than applies when a debt is barred by statute of limitations, where a new contract must be shown. The executor in this case stated to a third party that he would not pay the legacy because the legatee was wealthy enough, but this casual remark fell far short of the clear admission required to overcome the presumption arising from the passage of time.

The court reasoned that when someone refuses payment in conversation with a stranger about another's claim, this does not carry the same weight as a direct refusal when the creditor actually requests payment from the debtor. The executor lived nearly twenty years after the legacy became due, and the legatee did not press her claim for over twenty-one years. The combination of the executor's death and the extended delay strengthened the presumption of payment rather than weakening it, since representatives of a deceased debtor are less likely to possess evidence of actual payment than the debtor himself would have. The legatee's failure to claim promptly after the executor's death also weighed against her, as she could have immediately asserted her claim against the estate.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a debt unclaimed for twenty years is presumed paid absent explanation
What constitutes sufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of payment by lapse of time
Whether an executor's informal statement to a third party constitutes recognition of a debt

Procedural posture

The legatee appealed from a decree in her favor regarding a legacy claim against the executor's estate; the lower court had rejected the accountants' exceptions based on the presumption of payment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mr. Justice Trunket

delivered the opinion of the court, February 27th 1882.

A debt which has been due and unclaimed, and without recognition, for twenty years, in the absence ¡ of explanatory evidence, is presumed to have been paid. This presumption, prima facie, obliterates the debt, and the onus of proof is upon the creditor, not to establish a new contract as is the case when a debt is barred by the statute of limitations, but to show that payment of the debt has not been made: Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. St. 239. In that case, within twenty years, the debtor admitted to the creditor and to strangers that he had not paid the debt, and said he would not, and it was held that the presumption of payment was rebutted. .Here the sum of the testimony is that the executor said to a third person that he would not pay the legacy, because the legatee was rich enough without it. This is far short of the direct admission in Reed v. Reed, and the court below rightly held that it was insufficient to overeóme a presumption of payment aiising from lapse of time. When a person in conversation with a stranger respecting the claim of another, says he will not pay it, there is not the same reason for inferring recognition that exists when the creditor requests and the debtor refuses payment. In the latter case, not to deny is to admit. Besides, the debt is claimed. But it does not concern the stranger whether the claim is existing or has been paid ; he has no right to ask payment.

The executor lived almost twenty years after the legacy became due and payable. It was not claimed by the legatee, for more than twenty one years after it was due. The debt was unrecognized and unclaimed, for over twenty years, and the time of payment is deemed to have been before the beginning of the period, else payment would not be presumed. Were the debtor living, the reason for invoking the presumption would not be so strong as now, for his representatives are not so likely to know of the actual evidence of payment as he would be. The difficulty in proving a fact, which occurred many years before its existence is questioned, lies at the foundation for its presumption from lapse of time. Then, the mere fact of the debtor’s death ought not to be a sufficient explanation of the creditor’s delay. Immediately, he may make claim against his debtor’s estate. The case differs from one where the debtor was in extreme poverty, or beyond sea. And if the debtor be a trustee ho may avail the rule respecting stale demands, though he could not the statute of limitations: Power v. Hollman, 2 Watts 218. In that case the court, conceding that claims against an insolvent who had assigned his property, in trust for creditors, would not be barred by the statute, ruled that lapse of time would raise a presumption of their payment.

We are of opinion that the presumption of payment of the appellee’s claim had arisen, before the presenting of her petition.

Decree reversed, and the exceptions to the adjudication by the accountants sustained, costs to be paid by the appellee, Ann E. Daly.