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Charles Edward STEGALL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit1958-06-04No. No. 13382
259 F.2d 83

Summary

Holding. The district court's judgment overruling the motion to vacate was affirmed. The defendant's claim of absent presence during certain testimony raised no reversible error where trial counsel was present and the jury received limiting instructions, and attacks on the sufficiency of an indictment or information are not properly brought through Section 2255 collateral motions but must be raised on direct appeal.

A convicted defendant sought to vacate his judgment through a federal motion, raising two primary challenges. First, he contended that testimony regarding a codefendant's confession was presented while he was absent from the courtroom, allegedly violating his right to be present. However, his trial counsel was present throughout, the confession was explicitly limited to the codefendant's case by judicial instruction, and the defendant first raised this absence claim more than eight years after trial without his attorneys having previously objected. Second, he attacked the sufficiency of the information charging him, arguing it failed to adequately describe the alleged offense.

The court rejected both contentions. Regarding the absence claim, even accepting the defendant's version of events, no prejudice resulted given the jury's clear instructions that the confession could not be used against him. On the sufficiency challenge, the court determined that such attacks must be brought on direct appeal, not through collateral proceedings. The information adequately charged a federal offense under the relevant statute, the trial court had proper jurisdiction, and no facial defect appeared on the information itself, making it immune from collateral attack.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether defendant's alleged absence during codefendant's confession testimony violated his rights
  • Whether sufficiency of an indictment may be attacked through Section 2255 collateral motions
  • Whether limiting jury instructions cured any prejudice from alleged absence

Procedural posture

The appellant sought to vacate his conviction through a Section 2255 motion filed in federal court more than eight years after his trial conviction, and the district court denied the motion.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, a convicted defendant in a criminal case, moved to vacate judgment, pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. Section 2255. He alleged that certain testimony was taken during the trial of his case while he was absent from the courtroom. This testimony had to do with a confession of a codefendant, Messamore. The confession was admitted in evidence solely for consideration by the jury of the case against Messa-more; and the trial court explicitly instructed the jury that it could, in no wise, be considered against appellant. By his own choice and employment, appellant was represented by two able lawyers, one of whom had represented him for approximately a month before the trial. The claim that appellant was not present when testimony regarding the confession of Messamore was introduced is made for the first time more than eight years after the trial, and while the allegation of appellant’s petition in this regard is not denied, appellant’s attorneys on the trial of the case did not call the trial court’s attention to any claim that appellant had not been present at all times during the trial, or that he was not present at the time the testimony regarding Messa-more’s confession was introduced. Even if appellant had been absent during the testimony as to Messamore’s confession —which is doubtful — appellant’s attorneys were present at all times; and assuming appellant’s statement to be true, he was not prejudiced in any way, in view of the trial court’s admonition that the confession could be considered only as to Messamore and could not be considered in any way against appellant.

Appellant attacked the sufficiency of the indictment by motion to vacate, pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. Section 2255. The proper method of attacking the sufficiency of an indictment before this court is by direct appeal. “When there is an offense defined by a federal statute, of which the sentencing court has jurisdiction, and the indictment or information apparently attempts to charge an offense under such statute and such court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the sufficiency of the indictment is not subject to attack in a habeas corpus proceeding, nor by motion under § 2255, supra. Here, there was an offense defined by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314. The information attempts to charge an offense under that statute. The sentencing court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It does not affirmatively appear on the face of the information that no Federal offense was committed. Accordingly, we hold that the information was not vulnerable to collateral attack by motion under § 2255, supra.” Kreuter v. United States, 10 Cir., 201 F.2d 33, 35.

This case does not fall within the exceptions to the rule above stated. See Barnes v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 86. Title 28 U.S.C.A. Section 2255, cannot be made a substitute for an appeal. Davilman v. United States, 6 Cir., 180 F.2d 284.

Other contentions advanced by appellant have been considered and are found to be without merit.

The judgment of the district court overruling the motion to vacate is affirmed.